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Developing counties have established a number of social safety-net programmes to deal with various 
concerns. These programmes cover issues ranging from health, nutrition, education and job creation 
using public works and other approaches. Typically, such programmes focus on specific areas. For 
example, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes focus on providing cash transfers to reduce 
child labour and enhance human capital investments or for instance, the recognition that catastrophic 
healthcare expenditure is one of the most common factors in precipitating poverty has led to the 
implementation of a variety of health insurance schemes throughout the developing world (Acharya et 
al., 2013; Devadasan et al., 2006; Lu et al., 2012). Indeed, the push towards universal healthcare coverage 
(UHC) is providing further impetus to the development of health insurance schemes.
Table 1.1: Overview of standard of living indicators of 
two countries studies in this thesis
Year Bangladesh India
Income per capita  
(Current USD$)
1995 
2014
320.4 
1092.7
381.5 
1595.7
Life expectancy at birth 
(years)
1995 
2013
63.0 
71.0
60.0 
66.0
Mortality rate, under-5  
(per 1,000 live births)
1995 
2014
114.0 
40.0
109.0 
50.0
Maternal mortality ratio 
(modeled estimate, per 
100,000 live births)
1990 
2013
440.0 
170.0
460.0 
190.0
Female literacy rate  
(% of females ages 15-24)
1990 
2013
38.0 
83.0
49.0 
82.0
Underweight children  
(% of total)
1995 
2013
58.0 
31.9
41.4 
43.5
Health expenditure, 
public (% of total health 
expenditure)
1995 
2013
36.2 
35.3
27.0 
32.3
Out-of-pocket health 
expenditure (% of private 
expenditure on health)
1995 
2013
96.1 
93.0
91.4 
85.9
Improved sanitation 
facilities (% of population 
with access)
1995 
2014
40.0 
60.0
21.0 
40.0
Source: World Bank Open Data
While not challenging the usefulness of 
programs that focus on a specific area, the 
last two decades have also seen the advent of 
integrated approaches to poverty alleviation 
in countries in South Asia and Africa (Misha 
et al., 2014; Paul, 2007; United Nations, 2008)
providing multifaceted support in the form 
of asset-transfer, food-stipends, education, 
healthcare and social support for two years. 
Utilizing a four-round panel data spanning 
9 years and combining regression and 
propensity score weighting, we evaluate 
CFPR\u2019s short and long term impact 
on income, employment, social status, 
food security and asset ownership. While 
remarkable effects of CFPR are evident in 
short and medium-term (up to 6 years since 
baseline. This is perhaps a useful approach, 
most notably for the ultra-poor who are 
typically precluded from traditional market 
based poverty alleviation approaches. 
In addition to income generation, these 
programmes integrate a number of 
additional components such as training and 
transfers related to health, education, nutrition and social mobilization. The fact that generally separates 
these approaches from traditional interventions is that as opposed to a one-off push, these programmes 
require participation over a certain duration over which the additional services are delivered. Though 
the scope, the targeted population and the components vary considerably, programmes such as these 
are gaining popularity and are being implemented across a number of developing countries (Banerjee 
et al., 2015).
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This thesis evaluates two social safety-net programs implemented in South Asia. One of these focuses 
on a single area, health insurance, while the other is an integrated program. The first half of the thesis 
(Chapter 2 to 4) focuses on the evaluation of two health insurance schemes that have been implemented 
in India. The first is a Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI) scheme that provides coverage for both 
in and outpatient care. The second scheme is a high-profile national insurance scheme called Rashtriya 
Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY), implemented by the Government of India. The latter half of the thesis 
(Chapters 5 to 7) focuses on an ultra-poverty alleviation programme undertaken in Bangladesh called 
Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction: Targeting the Ultra-poor (CFPR:TUP). The programme uses 
an integrated approach to ultra-poverty alleviation through the provision of income generating assets 
and multifaceted training over a duration of two years. 
1.1  Health insurance in India
Notwithstanding notable improvements in health indicators over the past decades, the provision of 
quality healthcare and access to financial protection remains a major concern. Although India boasts the 
4th largest economy in the world, a third of the population still lives below the poverty line (World Bank, 
2014). Private healthcare expenditures constitute 68% of total healthcare expenditure, of which more 
than 86% is paid out-of-pocket (OOP). Since only 15% of the population has access to financial protection 
(such as health insurance) from such expenditures, this exposes many households to hardship or causes 
them to forego care altogether (Bhandari et al., 2010; World Health Organization, 2012). 
 To fill this vacuum, Community Based Health Insurance schemes have been suggested as alternatives 
since the early 1990s. There are currently a number of such schemes operating across the country, 
each of which offers different benefit packages. Examples include the Yeshasvini CBHI programme in 
Karnataka which provides coverage for outpatient diagnosis, laboratory tests and inpatient surgical 
procedures, a scheme in Gudalur, Andhra Pradesh provides hospitalization coverage (Aggarwal, 2010; 
Devadasan et al., 2010), and a scheme in Maharashtra is restricted to providing consultation services 
through community health workers (Mahal et al., 2013)preventive products, and insurance. These factors 
motivated this intervention wherein a composite health-care package was delivered by a telemedicine-
enabled community health worker (CHW. Each of these schemes targets different groups in rural India –
Yeshasvini targets farmers belonging to a co-operative and informal sector workers; the CBHI in Gudalur 
targets indigenous (Adivasi) households while the scheme in Maharashtra targets low-skilled workers. 
The impact of such schemes on access to healthcare and financial protection is mixed. Furthermore, 
most of these studies rely on non-experimental approaches to evaluate the effects of the scheme and 
bias arising from self-selection into insurance remains a concern. 
 In contrast to the existing literature, the CBHI schemes investigated in this thesis have been rolled 
out and implemented so as to support an experimental evaluation of the effects of access to insurance 
on health care and financial protection. Three schemes were rolled out in locations in Uttar Pradesh 
and Bihar states of India and provide both inpatient and outpatient coverage to the participants. These 
locations were deliberately chosen as they are considered among the poorest in the country with the 
least education and large gender disparities (Planning Commission, 2011). The schemes differ from a 
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number of existing schemes operating in India in the sense that they are both managed and financed 
by the communities in which they operate. The schemes were rolled out among Self-Help Group (SHG) 
households. SHGs are groups of 10-20 women living in the same village who come together and agree 
to save a specific amount each period and are generally trained and supported by NGOs (Fouillet and 
Augsburg, 2008).
 Prior to identifying the impact of the CBHI schemes, Chapter 2 of the thesis examines health seeking 
behaviour among the SHG households. Understanding local healthcare practices is crucial in designing 
benefit packages that effectively address the needs of the insured. The chapter estimates the probability 
of seeking out or inpatient care followed by modelling the likelihood of seeking care from specific 
providers, while distinguishing between demand and supply side related determinants. 
 Core objectives of an insurance scheme include facilitating access to care and alleviating the burden 
of healthcare expenses. Chapter 3 evaluates the impact of CBHI participation on access to care followed 
by measuring the magnitude of financial protection afforded to the insured for both out and inpatient 
care. The essay distinguishes itself from other literature in the field in two distinct ways. First, this is 
one of the first studies that utilizes a step-wise cluster randomized control trial (CRCT) to facilitate the 
evaluation. Second, the scheme evaluated is “stand alone” in the sense that it operates in the absence of 
financial or administrative support from the government. 
 Alongside private health insurance schemes such as the CBHI, several state-level publicly funded 
insurance schemes have also been in effect since the late 1990s. A number of issues however, led to 
the dissolution of most of these programmes (Prinja, Kaur, & Kumar, 2012; Balooni, Gangopadhyay, 
Turakhia, & Karthik, 2012; Sood et al., 2014; Results for Development Institute, 2010). Taking into account 
the shortfalls of previous endeavours, in 2008, the Government of India launched the RSBY, one of the 
largest social protection programmes in the country’s history. The programme targets below-poverty-
line (BPL) households and provides inpatient insurance coverage at a heavily subsidized rate. To date, the 
voluntary programme has been rolled out in 436 (of 479) targeted districts in all 29 states of the country, 
providing coverage to more than 37 million BPL households. 
 Chapter 4 provides a comprehensive assessment of the RSBY. Although a number of papers exist 
on the enrolment and impact aspect of the programme, they are primarily based on secondary district-
level data. Additionally, there are no papers on factors that determine scheme retention. In this chapter, 
we first analyse household level determinants of enrolment using the same household level data as 
used in Chapter 2 and 3. Second, given membership renewals are an important benchmark of how 
RSBY’s performance is deemed by participants, we analyse the determinants of dropping out of the 
scheme. Finally, we use a difference-in-differences approach to identify the impact of participating in the 
RSBY on healthcare use and financial protection. 
1.2  Integrated approach to ultra-poverty alleviation in Bangladesh
Despite the impressive strides made in poverty reduction and the achievement of becoming a low-
middle income country (from being a Least Developed Country), a third of the population still lives 
below $1.25/day. Similarly, although the number of people living in ultra-poverty ($0.60 to $0.70/day) 
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has decreased considerably between 2000 and 2010, it is still about 21 percent (Gimenez et al., 2013; 
National Institute of Population Research and Training (NIPORT) et al., 2013). The country reached a 
number of the Millennium Development Goals, including those related to reducing maternal and child 
mortality. However, despite these notable achievements, malnutrition remains a major contributor 
to child morbidity and mortality in Bangladesh (Rahman et al., 2009). Nearly 39% of children younger 
than 5 in rural Bangladesh are underweight while 28% of women report thinness (National Institute of 
Population Research and Training (NIPORT) et al., 2013).
 In the absence of effective government-driven efforts to tackle poverty a vibrant NGO community 
has developed in the country. Bangladesh currently has nearly 2500 registered organization across the 
country focusing on improving the lives of the poor (Hamilton, 2015). One of the most popular tools 
so far has been microfinance. Despite its permeation, a number of prominent studies show that while 
the programme, is indeed useful in that it promotes entrepreneurship and brings many out of poverty, 
inclusion barriers preclude the participation of the ultra-poor (Hashemi and Rosenberg, 2006; Navajas et 
al., 2000). 
 BRAC, an international NGO launched the first phase of the CFPR programme in 2002 with the 
explicit intention of reaching the ultra-poor and pushing them out of ultra-poverty. Using a three-step 
targeting procedure to ensure the inclusion of the poorest and to prevent leakage, the CFPR requires 
participants to enrol for a period of two years during which time they are provided a productive asset 
base (typically in the form of livestock and poultry), continuous and intensive training sessions, both in-
class and hands-on, on maintaining assets, a food subsidy, education, health, nutrition, and social and 
legal support. 
 A number of studies have confirmed the positive short-term effects of CFPR on participants’ 
socioeconomic status measured through income and the type of employment (Rabbani et al., 2006), 
health and health related expenditures (Ahmed et al., 2007; Ahmed, 2006; Prakash and Rana, 2006) 
and food security (Ahmed and Rana, 2005; Haseen and Sulaiman, 2007; Prakash and Rana, 2006). Given 
the relative size of the push provided by the programme to the participants, in comparison to the 
participants’ baseline status, the magnitude of the short-term gains are not unexpected. Given the broad 
scope of the CFPR and the particular importance attached to the health component, Chapter 5 first 
measures the short-term impact of the programme on the nutritional status of participant household 
members taking advantage of the randomized rollout. We subsequently investigate the spill-over effects 
on non-participants (both poor and non-poor). Similarly, we investigate the heterogeneity of impact 
across the sex of the household head followed by the sex of the individual. Lastly, we identify potential 
pathways of both the main effects and spill-over effects.
 Chapter 6 evaluates the impact of the programme on explicitly targeted outcomes such as 
agricultural asset holdings (typically livestock and poultry) and financial market participation 
(microfinance participation, savings rates) in the medium-term (six years post-graduation). This is 
followed by the evaluation of implicitly targeted outcomes such as income, the likelihood of owning 
other income generating assets (e.g. rickshaws and cycle-vans) and landholdings.
 One of the long-term goals of CFPR is to precipitate lasting changes in the employment trajectories 
of the participants, away from activities such as begging, working as maids and day-labouring to 
entrepreneurial activities. In Chapter 7, in addition to the outcomes investigated in Chapter 6, we 
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evaluate the long-term employment trajectories of the participants. As gender inequality is high on the 
policy agenda in Bangladesh and the impact of anti-poverty programmes has been linked to the gender 
of the main recipients (Berger, 1989), we investigate the heterogeneity of these trajectories across the 
gender of the household head and the baseline employment status. 
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Healthcare Seeking Behaviour among  
Self-help Group Households in Rural Bihar 
and Uttar Pradesh, India
In Collaboration with: Ellen van de Poel, Pradeep Panda, David Dror and Arjun Bedi
502047-L-sub01-bw-Raza
Chapter 2
16
2.1  Introduction
Healthcare financing in India is still largely reliant on out of pocket spending (OOPS),1 exposing many 
households to financial hardship or causing them to forego care altogether (Binnendijk et al., 2012; 
Bonu et al., 2009; Murray et al., 2012). Since 2008, the government has been offering inpatient coverage 
through a scheme called Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) for those below the poverty line, but 
outpatient care, representing some 80 percent of total health expenditure, is generally still not included 
(Bhandari et al., 2010; Dror and Vellakkal, 2012). In the absence of other solutions to ease OOPS, a number 
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have introduced community-based health insurance (CBHI) 
schemes in rural India (Devadasan et al., 2006; Dror et al., 2007). These schemes have different benefit-
packages, reflecting both different priorities within a demand-driven model, and unequal availability 
of services across rural locations.2 Clearly, a good understanding of household healthcare seeking 
behaviour can inform how well such schemes respond to perceived priorities.
 There is some evidence on determinants of health-seeking behaviour in urban settings in India 
(Das and Hammer, 2007; Das and Sanchez-Paramo, 2003; Das et al., 2012; Ergler et al., 2011; Gupta and 
Dasgupta, 1999; Levesque et al., 2006; Sudha et al., 2003). However, studies based on rural India are 
comparatively sparse. Ager and Pepper (2005)concern remains regarding the rates of utilization of 
state-provided services within Orissa. The reported study examined patterns of service utilization across 
the rural population of four districts of Orissa, with special reference to perceptions of the availability 
and quality of state services at the primary care level. Within the selected districts, 219 interviews were 
conducted across 66 villages. Households reported utilizing a wide range of health care providers, 
although hospitals constituted the most frequently--and primary health care centres (PHCs reported 
that in 1996 primary healthcare centres were relatively underused in rural Odisha and that households 
preferred (qualified and unqualified) private providers.3 They reported that reputation of provider, cost 
and ease of access were important in influencing provider choice. Using data from India’s National 
Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO), Borah (2006)a better understanding of the individual provider 
choice decision is required. This paper is an attempt in this direction as it investigates the determinants 
of outpatient health care provider choice in rural India in the mixed multinomial logit (MMNL and 
Sarma (2003) found that the demand for healthcare in rural areas is negatively affected by the price 
of healthcare and distance to a healthcare facility. They concluded that poorer households were more 
price-sensitive, with higher elasticity of demand in seeking care for children than for adults. Gautham, 
et al. (2011)the present study sought to collect descriptive evidence on 1 st contact curative health care 
1 Private expenditure constitutes 81 percent of total health expenditure in India of which 94 percent is out-of-pocket expenditure 
(Bhandari et al., 2010). Less than 15 percent of the population is covered by health insurance (Bhandari et al., 2010; World Health 
Organization, 2012). 
2 There are a number of schemes operating across the country, each of which offers different benefit packages. Examples include 
the Yeshasvini CBHI programme in Karnataka which provides coverage for outpatient diagnosis, laboratory tests and inpatient 
surgical procedures, a scheme in Gudalur, Andhra Pradesh provides only hospitalization coverage (Aggarwal, 2010; Devadasan et 
al., 2010), and a scheme in Maharashtra is restricted to providing consultation services through community health workers (Mahal 
et al., 2013). Each of these schemes targets different groups in rural India – Yeshasvini targets farmers belonging to a co-operative 
and informal sector workers; the CBHI in Gudalur targets indigenous (Adivasi) households while the scheme in Maharashtra 
targets low-skilled workers.
3 Unqualified or less than fully qualified practitioners are referred to by a variety of designations: rural medical practitioners (RMPs), 
local medical providers, non-degree allopathic providers or somewhat informally as “quacks” (De Costa and Diwan, 2007). 
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seeking choices among rural communities in two States of India - Andhra Pradesh (AP, using data from 
household surveys, key informant interviews and focus group discussions, found that the majority (92%) 
of respondents in Andhra Pradesh visited private providers, of which 75 percent visited non-degree 
allopathic providers (NDAP); and in Odisha, 53 percent of respondents sought allopathic care, of which 
about 76 percent were NDAP. The main reasons for such choices were providers’ proximity, and their 
readiness to make home visits when needed. 
 The main objective of this paper is to examine and understand healthcare seeking behaviour with a 
view to drawing lessons on the design of benefit packages offered through CBHI schemes. In particular, 
this paper provides evidence on the healthcare seeking behaviour of a specific but important group in 
rural India, namely households affiliated to self-help groups (SHG). The study was carried out against the 
backdrop of the introduction of CBHI schemes, implemented by local NGOs, which were going to offer 
insurance to households where at least one member was affiliated to a self-help group in March 2010 
(see Doyle et al., (2011) for further details). The study draws on baseline surveys which were conducted a 
year prior to scheme launch and focuses on rural Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, two of India’s most populated, 
poorest and least urbanized states, with large gender differences.4 As SHG households are typically 
poorer and less educated than the general population our analysis sheds light on the healthcare seeking 
behaviour of a relatively marginalized population in rural India (Panda et al., 2014).5 
 We begin the analysis by estimating the probability of seeking any out or inpatient care. Second, 
we model the probability of seeking care from a specific provider, while distinguishing between patient 
and provider characteristics. Third, our analysis distinguishes between care sought for acute and chronic 
conditions, between outpatient and inpatient care, and we examine the probability of seeking care from 
a wider range of providers. 
 The paper is organized as follows: the methods (data and analytical techniques) are described in 
section 2, followed by results in section 3. Section 4 contains a discussion and concluding remarks. 
2.1  Methods
2.2.1  Data and Specification
The data used in this paper is drawn from household surveys conducted between March and May 
2010 in Kanpur Dehat and Pratapgarh districts in Uttar Pradesh and in Vaishali district in Bihar.6 As 
mentioned above, these baseline surveys preceded the implementation of three CBHI schemes which 
offered insurance to targeted households.7 The target group consisted of 3,686 SHG households (1284 
4 The surveys were designed to provide a better understanding of the healthcare needs among the targeted group such that the 
benefit package could be tailored to meet local needs.
5 A self-help group (SHG) usually consists of between 10-20 poor women living in the same village who come together and agree 
to save a specific amount each period. The savings of all SHG members are combined and deposited in a bank or a co-operative 
organization. Members may borrow from the pooled savings when the SHG agrees to give the loans. SHGs are usually supported 
and trained by NGOs. According to Fouillet, Augsburg [40] there are about 40 million SHG members in India. 
6 These districts were purposively selected as the NGOs offering the CBHI insurance scheme had an established network of self-
help groups in these three districts.
7 Project details can be found at http://www.microinsuranceacademy.org/content/developing-efficient-responsive-community-
based-health-insurance-cbhi-india and in Doyle, Panda et al. (2011).
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in Pratapgarh, 1039 in Kanpur Dehat and 1363 in Vaishali) representing 21,366 individuals. All targeted 
households were surveyed. The primary respondents were the SHG members themselves or the head of 
the household, if the member was unavailable. Information on other household members was collected 
from the primary respondents.8
 While the survey gathered information on a wide range of socio-demographic and economic 
characteristics, of particular interest is the detailed information collected on health status, self-reported 
symptoms experienced during the four weeks preceding the survey for outpatient care and one year 
for inpatient care, and choice of provider. Respondents who reported an illness were asked whether 
they sought care, and if so, from which type of provider. Data pertaining to the following pre-selected 
providers were collected: traditional healers, priests, pharmacists, NDAPs, nurses, qualified private 
doctors, qualified public doctors, specialist public doctors, specialist private doctors and ‘others’.9 
Outpatient episodes were separated into acute or chronic.10 For chronic illnesses, information was 
gathered on the most recent visit; for acute illnesses, information was gathered for up to three illnesses 
and three visits per illness in the four weeks preceding the survey. While we have data on multiple 
illnesses and multiple visits, the analysis deals mainly with choice of healthcare provider for the first 
illness and the first visit, as most individuals (98%) experienced only a single illness during the four-
week period. While there are repeat-visits for the same illness, the number of cases is not as large as 
the first visit and perhaps more importantly, as will be discussed later, the choice of provider does not 
vary substantially in subsequent visits. In the case of inpatient care the survey enquired whether any 
household member had been hospitalized in the 12 months preceding the survey.
 Consistent with the existing literature, the probability of healthcare use and the choice of provider 
are modelled as functions of individual and household level covariates (Borah, 2006; Sahn et al., 2003; 
Sarma, 2003). The individual characteristics include the respondent’s demographics, educational 
attainment, occupational status and self-reported health status. For models related to acute illnesses, 
we use the socioeconomic characteristics of the household head, since a substantial proportion of the 
sample consists of children (41%). We control for the nature of the respondent’s illness by including 
a set of self-reported symptom variables and health status is measured by the generic quality of life 
variable (EQ5D) which contains information on five dimensions of health: mobility, self-care, pain, ability 
to perform usual activities and mental health status. The scores from each question are converted into 
an index that is increasing in health and ranges between -1 to +1 using the procedure suggested by 
Dolan (1997). As these questions were administered only to individuals older than 12 years, the EQ5D 
measure is only used while modelling the probability of obtaining care for chronic conditions which 
is estimated only for respondents older than 12. Household level covariates include household size 
8 For all survey instruments, ethical approval was acquired from the independent ethics committee of the University of Cologne. 
Informed consent was taken prior to each interview, and respondents were free to halt the interview at any time, or to refuse to 
answer questions.
9 Qualified private doctors and specialists have been grouped together and are henceforth referred to as private doctors. Similarly, 
qualified public doctors and specialists have been grouped together and are referred to as public doctors. Due to the small 
number of observations, traditional healers, priests and nurses have been grouped together and form part of the ‘other’ category. 
We have also clubbed trained AYUSH (Ayurveda, Yoga and Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and Homoeopathy) doctors in category 
“other” as only 2 of 4184 respondents who reported an illness sought care from an AYUSH doctor.
10 Chronic illnesses are defined as conditions that are reported to have been ongoing for 30 days or more.
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and gender of the household head, whether a household belongs to a scheduled tribe or caste and 
household socioeconomic status as captured by (the log of ) per capita consumption.11
2.2.2  Analytical technique
The probabilities of using acute and chronic outpatient care, and inpatient care, are modelled using 
probit specifications. We consider the probability of using outpatient care conditional on reporting an 
illness while for the probability of inpatient care we use the full sample. 
 To model the choice of healthcare provider for outpatient care, we use an alternative-specific 
conditional logit model (McFadden, 1974). This has the advantage of allowing both individual and 
provider level characteristics to influence the choice of healthcare provider (Borah, 2006; Erlyana et al., 
2011; Qian et al., 2009) and does not require arbitrary choices as in the case of a nested logit model 
(Brown and Theoharides, 2009; Chawla and Ellis, 2000; Dor et al., 1987). The probability that individual i 
chooses healthcare provider j (out of a set of m providers) can then be written as:
P
ij
 =                               , j = 1, ..., m 
exp(x
ij
β+z
i
γ
j
)‘
exp(x
il
β+z
i
γl)‘ ‘∑ml=1
‘
 (1)
where x
ij
 are healthcare provider specific regressors and z
i
 are individual specific regressors. 
 Since respondents only report information such as cost and travel time for the providers they 
actually visit, following established practice (Borah, 2006; McFadden and Train, 2000; Qian et al., 2009), 
we impute costs and time faced by each individual and for each provider.12 We estimate a log linear 
model on the sample of users (using individual, household covariates and village indicator variables) and 
subsequently predict costs and travel time for the entire sample.13 To ease interpretation of coefficients, 
we calculate marginal effects for the alternative specific variables as:
= p
ij
 (1  p
ij 
)β       
δp
ij
δx
ik
 (2)
Since we use the logarithm of costs and travel time in our models, the marginal effects for these two 
variables is interpreted as the change in the probability of choosing healthcare provider j due to a 1 
percent increase in costs or travel time. All analysis was done using STATA version 12.0. 
11 Information on household consumption is self-reported and based on a 30-day recall period for store bought and home grown 
food items and a 12 month recall period for household durables and investments in agricultural equipment. This is then divided 
by the household size to arrive at the figure.
12 This study considers direct costs of care that relate to consultation fees, medicines, lab and imaging tests.
13 While we follow accepted practice, it is likely that this approach underestimates variation in costs and travel time that may be 
experienced by those who did not use care.
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2.3  Results 
2. 3.1 Summary statistics
Table 2.1 shows summary statistics for the full sample, and separately for the three different sites. Half of 
the adult respondents are women while children younger than 13 years account for 37 percent of the 
sample. The average household size is 6.8. About 37 percent of household heads have no education 
while 11 percent have higher secondary education. As for employment, 34 percent of the household 
heads are self-employed in agriculture followed by 26 percent who work as casual wage labourers. Thirty 
percent of the sample may be classified as scheduled caste or tribe (SC/ST).14 The average annual per 
capita consumption is INR 13,588.15 While there are differences across the three sites in aspects such as 
the percentage of female headed households and occupational status of household head, differences 
are minimal for household size, self-assessed health status, educational attainment, share of SC/ST, and 
annual per capita expenditures. 
Table 2.1: Description and means of covariates 
Variable Means
Pooled Kanpur 
Dehat
Pratapgarh Vaishali
Demographics
Female headed household (1/0) 0.19 0.09 0.19 0.21
Female children 0-13 (1/0) 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.20
Female aged 14-55 years (1/0) 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.27
Female older than 55 years (1/0) 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05
Male aged 0-13 years (1/0) 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.21
Male aged 14-55 years (1/0) 0.26 0.31 0.26 0.23
Male older than 55 years (1/0) 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04
Household size 6.77
(2.75)
6.94
(2.64)
7.28
(3.22)
6.10
(2.07)
Self-assessed health measure (EQ5D) increasing in 
health (-1 to +1)
0.76 0.77 0.79 0.72
Education (respondent)
No education (1/0) 0.38 0.33 0.35 0.44
Primary education (1/0) 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.28
Secondary education (1/0) 0.28 0.33 0.30 0.23
Higher secondary education (1/0) 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.05
14 This is a higher proportion than the state rural SC/ST averages (nearly 17 per cent in Bihar and 23 per cent in Uttar Pradesh). 
15 PPP$1 = INR 18.073 for 2010. A comparison between SHG affiliated households and randomly selected non-SHG affiliated 
households in the same location shows that the monthly per capita expenditure and educational attainment of SHG members 
was about 6% and 7% lower than the comparison group.
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Table 2.1: (Continued)
Variable Means
Pooled Kanpur 
Dehat
Pratapgarh Vaishali
Education of household head
No education (1/0) 0.37 0.31 0.33 0.46
Primary education (1/0) 0.17 0.14 0.19 0.17
Secondary education (1/0) 0.35 0.40 0.37 0.28
Higher secondary education (1/0) 0.11 0.15 0.11 0.09
Socioeconomic Status
Annual per capita expenditure  
(Indian Rupees [INR])(17329)
13588 
(25338)
15922 
(10095)
11368 
(14688)
13961
Household belongs to a scheduled tribe/caste (1/0) 0.30 0.28 0.33 0.29
Occupation (respondent)
Self-employed in agriculture (1/0) 0.11 0.19 0.07 0.07
Self-employed in non-agriculture (1/0) 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.06
Other employment (1/0) 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02
Casual wage labourer (1/0) 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.11
Not working (1/0) 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.04
Doing housework (1/0) 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.19
Student (1/0) 0.48 0.45 0.48 0.51
Occupation of household head
Self-employed in agriculture (1/0) 0.34 0.63 0.22 0.21
Self-employed in non-agriculture (1/0) 0.14 0.07 0.17 0.18
Other employment (1/0) 0.07 0.03 0.12 0.05
Casual wage laborer (1/0) 0.26 0.13 0.29 0.35
Not working (1/0) 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.04
Doing housework (1/0) 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.17
Student (1/0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Location
Household located in Kanpur Dehat (1/0) 0.29
Household located in Pratapgarh (1/0) 0.37
Household located in Vaishali (1/0) 0.34    
Notes: Underlined categories are used as reference categories in the regression models. The health status indicator 
EQ5D only pertains to those above the age of 12. Standard deviation provided in parentheses for continuous 
variables. [Observations: 21,366]
2.3.2  Disease Burden and Healthcare Seeking Behaviour
Table 2.2 shows the distribution of self-reported symptoms for both acute and chronic conditions. 
Approximately 20% and 15% of individuals report acute and chronic symptoms, respectively (see 
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Figure 2.1).16 Over half (52%) of the acute conditions relate to gastrointestinal symptoms (diarrhoea and 
cholera), followed by respiratory symptoms (20%). While symptoms related to chronic conditions were 
more difficult to classify, 27 percent were grouped into the ‘other’ category, followed by musculoskeletal 
symptoms (23%), lung/respiratory symptoms (15%) and gastrointestinal symptoms (15%). Ten percent 
of the sample reports having persistent allergies or infections. 
Table 2.2: Distribution of self-reported symptoms for acute and chronic conditions
 Category Means
   Pooled Kanpur 
Dehat
Pratapgarh Vaishali
Acute (N=4171) Gastrointestinal symptoms (1/0) 0.52 0.57 0.56 0.46
Febrile symptoms (1/0) 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.14
Lungs/respiratory symptoms (1/0) 0.20 0.15 0.21 0.22
Musculoskeletal symptoms (1/0) 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03
Other symptoms (1/0) 0.16 0.19 0.13 0.15
Chronic (N=3277) Lungs/respiratory symptoms (1/0) 0.15 0.17 0.09 0.21
Gastrointestinal symptoms (1/0) 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.19
Musculoskeletal symptoms (1/0) 0.24 0.20 0.35 0.09
Chronic allergies/infections (1/0) 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.14
Other symptoms (1/0) 0.27 0.33 0.24 0.28
Internal symptoms (1/0) 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09
Notes: Underlined categories are used as reference categories in the regression models. Chronic conditions exclude 
children younger than 13 years of age.
Figure 2.1 displays the pattern of healthcare seeking behaviour in the sample (see Annex ‘ for site level 
details). There are several notable points emerging from the figure. The majority of individuals do seek 
care for both acute (86%) and chronic illnesses (70%). Of those who seek care for acute illnesses, only 8 
percent visit qualified doctors/specialists at public health facilities while the rest seek care from private 
practitioners. NDAPs account for 56 percent of visits while qualified doctors/specialists in private practice 
account for 23 percent of the visits, followed by pharmacists (11%). For chronic illnesses the private 
sector dominates (83 percent of healthcare visits). Qualified private doctors/specialists and NDAPs are 
responsible for a substantial proportion of care (39% and 30% respectively) followed by pharmacists 
(14%). With regard to inpatient care, once again private care (nursing homes and private hospitals) 
dominates and accounts for 78 percent of visits followed by public hospitals (15%) and other public 
providers (7%). Figure 2.2 displays healthcare seeking behaviour for second visits in the case of acute 
illnesses. The main point emerging from the figure is that individuals tend to use the same provider a 
16 The surveys were implemented during the low morbidity season and it is possible that the incidence of reported illnesses is 
understated. In this part of rural India, the maximum burden of disease occurs during the monsoon season – May to July (see 
Kumari et al., (2012)). 
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second time. For instance of the 1,991 individuals who visited NDAPs, 629 (29 percent) report a second 
visit of which 91 percent visit an NDAP. In the case of those who visited private providers, 35 percent 
report a second visit of which 72 percent visit a private provider the second time around.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reporting an 
Illness 
(Sample:
21366)
Acute Illness
(4171obs/20%)
No care sought
(593obs/14%)
Care sought
(3579obs/86%)
Other
(84obs/2%)
NDAP
(1991obs/56%)
Pharmacist
(381obs/11%)
Public
(275obs/8%)
Private
(848obs/23%)
Chronic Illness
(3295obs/15%)
No care sought
(1000obs/30%)
Care sought
(2295obs/70%)
Other
(83obs/3%)
NDAP
(674obs/30%)
Pharmacist 
(328obs, 14%)
Public
(318obs/14%)
Private
(892obs/39%)
Inpatient Care
(440obs/3%)
PHC/CHC 
(30obs/7%)
District hospital 
(66obs/15%)
Nursing Home 
(196obs/45%)
Private Hospital 
(148obs/33%)
Figure 2.1: Health seeking behaviour in the sample
Note: The sample for chronic illnesses and inpatient care exclude children younger than 13 years of age.
2.3.3  Determinants of seeking care conditional upon reporting illness 
Table 2.3 contains estimates of the probability of seeking outpatient care for acute (column 1), chronic 
illnesses (column 2), and inpatient care (column 3). Several points emerge from these probit estimates. 
Across all three specifications, for the most part, employment status and whether an individual belongs 
to the SC/ST groups do not have much of a bearing on the probability of seeking care. However, 
socioeconomic status as reflected by annual per capita household expenditure is positively correlated 
with the probability of seeking care. A one percent increase in expenditure is associated with a four 
percentage point (pp) increase in the probability of seeking care in case of an acute illness. The effect for 
chronic illnesses is stronger (seven percentage point effect) while for inpatient care the effect is much 
smaller, perhaps reflecting the necessity of such care. Reflecting ease of access to at least some form 
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of medical care, educational attainment is not correlated with the probability of seeking care for acute 
illnesses. However, those with higher educational levels (higher secondary education) are substantially 
(13 pp) more likely to seek care for chronic illnesses. In the case of acute illnesses there are clear gender 
differences. Male children (0-13 years) and working age men (14-55 years) are more likely to be treated for 
acute conditions compared to adult females (5 and 6 percentage points respectively). Female children 
are also more likely to receive care compared to adult females in the age group 14 to 55. Respondents 
in Pratapgarh and Kanpur Dehat are substantially less likely to seek outpatient care compared to those 
in Vaishali. This may be due to the greater proximity of healthcare providers in Vaishali versus the other 
two sites. The health status of an individual has an expected sign, namely those in better health are less 
likely to seek care. 
Acute Illness 
(4172/20%)  
No care sought 
(593/14%)  
Care sought 
(3579/86%) 
NDAP  
(1991/56%) 
Pharm (6/0.3%)
 
NDAP 
(570/29%) 
Other (6/0.3%)  
Public (22/1%)  
Private (25/1%)  
Other (84/2%) 
Pharm (1/1%) 
NDAP (5/6%)  
Other (7/8%)  
Public (1/1%) 
Private (1/1%)  
Public (275/8%) 
Pharm (2/1%)  
NDAP (18/7%) 
Other (3/1%)  
Public 
(84/31%)  
Private (9/3%)  
Pharmacist 
(381/11%) 
Pharm (76/20%)  
NDAP (14/4%)  
Other (0/0%)  
Public (3/1%)  
Private (3/1%)  
Private  
(848/23%) 
Pharm 
(4/0.4%)  
NDAP (9/1%)  
Other (60/7%)  
Public 
(12/1.4%)  
Private 
(217/25%)  
Figure 2.2: Health seeking behaviour for those suffering from an acute illness (first and second visit)
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2.3.4  Determinants of choice of provider
Figure 2.3 shows the main reasons provided by respondents for choosing a specific healthcare provider 
(Figure 2.3A for acute, 2.3B for chronic conditions and 2.3C for inpatient care respectively). In the case 
of acute illnesses, NDAPs dominate and the main reason for visiting them is their proximity (60 per 
cent), followed by the view that they are the best providers (23 per cent) while cost considerations 
are not as important (10 per cent). Those who visit private hospitals point out that the main reason for 
visiting them is that they are considered the best providers of care (50 per cent) followed by proximity. 
With regard to chronic conditions, qualified doctors/specialists in private practice dominate as they are 
considered as best by the care-seekers (58 percent). The reason for visiting NDAPs is their proximity. 
Disaggregated results by site reveal similar patterns (see Annex Table 2.2).
 Before modelling health provider choice, we estimated travel time and average costs for providers 
across sites, both for acute and chronic conditions (Annex Table 2.3). Across all three sites the closest 
providers are NDAPs followed by pharmacists (17 and 19 minutes travel time, respectively). On average, 
qualified public and private providers are about 40 minutes away. Across the three locations Vaishali 
seems to have the greatest concentration of access to healthcare facilities. On average, NDAPs are 
only 9 minutes away in Vaishali as compared to 18 and 24 minutes in Pratapgarh and Kanpur Dehat 
respectively. Similarly, it takes about 32 minutes to access qualified doctors in Vaishali as compared to 
54-56 minutes in Kanpur Dehat. 
 With regard to the costs of treatment, there are marked differences across acute and chronic 
conditions. Regardless of the provider, the cost of care is higher for treating chronic conditions compared 
to acute illnesses. We find that pharmacists are the cheapest amongst the various providers for both 
acute and chronic illnesses (INR 69 and INR 154 respectively), followed by NDAPs (INR 128 and INR 246 
respectively), public doctors (INR 155 and INR 570 respectively) and private doctors (INR 380 and INR 929 
respectively). 
 Table 2.4 shows odds ratios (OR) based on a conditional logit model for choice of outpatient care for 
acute conditions (reference category: public healthcare providers). Children, either male or female, are 
more likely to receive care from private doctors or NDAPs. There is some evidence that higher education 
is associated with the use of greater care from private providers. For instance, households headed by 
heads that have secondary education are more likely to use private care (OR – 1.7) and individuals living 
in households where heads have higher secondary education are less likely to visit NDAPs (OR – 0.65). 
Patients living in households with higher per capita annual expenditure are less likely to forego care and 
also less likely to visit other providers. Belonging to a SC/ST group has no bearing on provider choice. 
Consistent with the differences in availability of care, respondents living in Kanpur Dehat are more likely 
to forego care while households in Pratapgarh are far more likely to use public care as compared to other 
providers. 
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Figure  A: Reasons for choosing provider for Acute Illnesses  
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Figure B: Reasons for choosing provider for Chronic Illnesses  
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Figure C: Reasons for choosing provider for inpatient care  
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Figure 2.3: Self-reported reasons for choosing a healthcare provider for acute, chronic and inpatient 
conditions
Notes: Each figure for acute, chronic and inpatient care represents the number of cases (3573, 2280 and 437 
respectively) reported. The sample for chronic illnesses and inpatient care exclude children younger than 13 years of 
age. Responses are not mutually exclusive.
502047-L-sub01-bw-Raza
Healthcare seeking behaviour in rural India
29
2
Ta
bl
e 
2.
4:
 D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
 o
f p
ro
vi
de
r c
ho
ic
e 
fo
r o
ut
pa
tie
nt
 c
ar
e 
fo
r a
cu
te
 c
on
di
tio
ns
Va
ri
ab
le
N
on
e
O
th
er
Ph
ar
m
ac
is
t
Pr
iv
at
e
N
D
A
P
O
dd
s 
 
ra
tio
St
an
da
rd
 
er
ro
r
O
dd
s 
 
ra
tio
St
an
da
rd
 
er
ro
r
O
dd
s 
 
ra
tio
St
an
da
rd
 
er
ro
r
O
dd
s 
 
ra
tio
St
an
da
rd
 
er
ro
r
O
dd
s 
 
ra
tio
St
an
da
rd
 
er
ro
r
Fe
m
al
e 
he
ad
ed
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 (1
/0
)
1.
33
6
0.
34
8
3.
05
4*
**
1.
23
3
1.
21
5
0.
33
9
1.
41
4
0.
35
6
1.
43
5
0.
33
5
Fe
m
al
e 
ch
ild
re
n 
0-
13
 (1
/0
)
1.
38
2
0.
41
3
2.
01
6
1.
12
3
1.
32
0.
41
7
2.
30
8*
**
0.
67
2
1.
86
1*
*
0.
48
7
Fe
m
al
e 
ol
de
r t
ha
n 
55
 y
ea
rs
 (1
/0
)
1.
10
4
0.
43
7
1.
42
7
0.
87
7
1.
31
1
0.
56
5
1.
34
6
0.
52
2
1.
21
5
0.
43
9
M
al
e 
ag
ed
 0
-1
3 
ye
ar
s 
(1
/0
)
1.
08
7
0.
31
2.
87
5*
*
1.
53
5
0.
86
5
0.
26
4
2.
20
0*
**
0.
60
5
1.
67
3*
*
0.
41
2
M
al
e 
ag
ed
 1
4-
55
 y
ea
rs
 (1
/0
)
0.
74
2
0.
15
8
1.
19
1
0.
47
2
1.
32
1
0.
29
5
1.
41
1*
0.
28
3
1.
17
5
0.
21
8
M
al
e 
ol
de
r t
ha
n 
55
 y
ea
rs
 (1
/0
)
0.
78
0.
35
8
2.
79
4*
1.
69
7
1.
00
9
0.
50
9
1.
06
4
0.
46
7
1.
15
2
0.
46
5
Lo
g 
of
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 s
iz
e
0.
54
0*
**
0.
12
4
0.
55
5
0.
23
2
0.
61
4*
0.
15
3
0.
93
8
0.
20
1
0.
95
4
0.
19
Pr
im
ar
y 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
(1
/0
)
0.
85
9
0.
19
5
0.
29
2*
*
0.
14
2
0.
84
1
0.
20
4
1.
06
4
0.
22
8
1.
11
0.
21
6
Se
co
nd
ar
y 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
(1
/0
)
1.
51
7*
*
0.
29
5
1.
00
5
0.
35
1
1.
14
9
0.
24
2
1.
69
4*
**
0.
31
7
1.
26
4
0.
21
9
H
ig
he
r s
ec
on
da
ry
 e
du
ca
tio
n 
(1
/0
)
0.
70
7
0.
18
7
0.
91
2
0.
50
2
0.
93
7
0.
25
9
1.
37
1
0.
33
2
0.
65
4*
0.
14
9
Lo
g 
of
 a
nn
ua
l p
er
 c
ap
ita
 e
xp
. (
IN
R)
 
0.
65
0*
*
0.
11
7
0.
46
2*
*
0.
16
4
0.
78
0.
15
5
0.
96
3
0.
15
6
0.
90
9
0.
14
Sc
he
du
le
d 
ca
st
e/
tr
ib
e 
(1
/0
)
1.
12
9
0.
18
8
0.
65
9
0.
2
1.
04
2
0.
18
8
0.
91
0.
14
7
1.
20
9
0.
17
8
Se
lf-
em
pl
oy
ed
 in
 n
on
-a
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 (1
/0
)
1.
19
0.
30
3
1.
13
9
0.
47
9
1.
86
7*
*
0.
48
3
1.
54
0*
0.
36
3
0.
96
7
0.
21
2
O
th
er
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t (
1/
0)
1.
66
2*
0.
46
7
0.
81
9
0.
44
3
1.
47
3
0.
44
1
1.
11
5
0.
30
8
0.
73
8
0.
18
6
Ca
su
al
 w
ag
e 
la
bo
ur
er
 (1
/0
)
1.
36
9
0.
29
6
1.
23
1
0.
48
3
1.
15
5
0.
27
1
1.
48
6*
0.
30
5
1.
12
8
0.
21
3
N
ot
 w
or
ki
ng
 (1
/0
)
1.
95
3*
*
0.
63
5
0.
82
5
0.
64
6
1.
07
1
0.
40
4
2.
11
5*
*
0.
66
6
1.
37
5
0.
39
8
D
oi
ng
 h
ou
se
w
or
k 
(1
/0
)
0.
94
5
0.
30
5
0.
60
5
0.
31
8
0.
84
1
0.
29
7
1.
15
7
0.
35
8
0.
78
4
0.
22
5
St
ud
en
t (
1/
0)
0.
75
2
0.
18
3
0.
47
6
0.
22
6
1.
00
7
0.
25
7
0.
60
6*
*
0.
14
3
0.
81
8
0.
17
2
Ka
np
ur
 D
eh
at
1.
99
2*
**
0.
45
8
1.
18
1
0.
41
3
0.
42
0*
**
0.
11
0.
65
3*
0.
14
3
1.
26
1
0.
26
3
Pr
at
ap
ga
rh
0.
43
5*
**
0.
08
7
0.
20
3*
**
0.
07
2
0.
40
8*
**
0.
08
2
0.
19
3*
**
0.
03
6
0.
38
9*
**
0.
06
8
A
cu
te
 g
as
tr
oi
nt
es
tin
al
 s
ym
pt
om
s 
(1
/0
)
1.
44
6*
0.
29
6
1.
62
1
0.
60
2
1.
26
5
0.
26
7
0.
83
4
0.
15
6
1.
20
1
0.
20
9
502047-L-sub01-bw-Raza
Chapter 2
30
Ta
bl
e 
2.
4:
 (C
on
tin
ue
d)
Va
ri
ab
le
N
on
e
O
th
er
Ph
ar
m
ac
is
t
Pr
iv
at
e
N
D
A
P
O
dd
s 
 
Ra
tio
St
an
da
rd
 
Er
ro
r
O
dd
s 
 
Ra
tio
St
an
da
rd
 
Er
ro
r
O
dd
s 
 
Ra
tio
St
an
da
rd
 
Er
ro
r
O
dd
s 
 
Ra
tio
St
an
da
rd
 
Er
ro
r
O
dd
s 
 
Ra
tio
St
an
da
rd
 
Er
ro
r
A
cu
te
 fe
br
ile
 s
ym
pt
om
s 
(1
/0
)
1.
71
8*
0.
53
3
1.
21
6
0.
75
1
0.
70
1
0.
24
6
0.
73
6
0.
22
1
0.
78
0.
21
9
A
cu
te
 m
us
cu
lo
sk
el
et
al
 s
ym
pt
om
s 
(1
/0
)
4.
71
1*
**
2.
11
2
4.
89
4*
*
3.
19
9
2.
12
1
1.
02
6
1.
80
1
0.
81
4
1.
34
3
0.
58
O
th
er
 a
cu
te
 s
ym
pt
om
s 
(1
/0
)
0.
90
1
0.
22
3
1.
21
2
0.
51
5
0.
64
5
0.
17
3
0.
97
0.
21
6
0.
64
3*
*
0.
13
5
Lo
g 
of
 c
os
t
0.
99
6
0.
00
5
0.
99
6
0.
00
5
0.
99
6
0.
00
5
0.
99
6
0.
00
5
0.
99
6
0.
00
5
Lo
g 
of
 ti
m
e
0.
85
8*
**
0.
02
9
0.
85
8*
**
0.
02
9
0.
85
8*
**
0.
02
9
0.
85
8*
**
0.
02
9
0.
85
8*
**
0.
02
9
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
: 4
,1
71
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
ot
es
: T
he
 ta
bl
e 
pr
ov
id
es
 o
dd
s 
ra
tio
s 
ba
se
d 
on
 a
 c
on
di
tio
na
l l
og
it 
m
od
el
. T
he
 re
fe
re
nc
e 
ca
te
go
ry
 is
 v
is
iti
ng
 a
 p
ub
lic
 p
ro
vi
de
r. 
M
od
el
s 
ar
e 
es
tim
at
ed
 o
ve
r t
he
 s
am
pl
e 
th
at
 re
po
rt
ed
 
an
 a
cu
te
 il
ln
es
s. 
Th
e 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t a
nd
 o
cc
up
at
io
n 
va
ria
bl
es
 re
fe
r t
o 
th
e 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t a
nd
 o
cc
up
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
he
ad
. *
, *
*, 
**
* 
in
di
ca
te
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
 a
t t
he
 1
0%
, 5
%
 a
nd
 1
%
 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
502047-L-sub01-bw-Raza
Healthcare seeking behaviour in rural India
31
2
The last two rows of Table 2.4 illustrate that respondents are sensitive to the time it takes to reach a 
provider, and are far less likely to visit providers located further away. Table 2.5 shows the marginal effects 
of travel time required to reach various types of providers. A 1 percent increase in travel time reduces 
the probability of visiting a NDAP by 4 percentage points and the probability of visiting a private doctor 
by 2 percentage points. Respondents are not as responsive in the case of travel time to pharmacists and 
public doctors. Consistent with Figure 2.3, these estimates show that the main advantage of NDAP is 
their proximity. The substantially larger negative effect of distance to NDAPs compared to more qualified 
providers suggests that if NDAPs were not located close by, their advantage would be whittled away as 
households would then be less likely to trade proximity for quality. Surprisingly, and an issue that we 
return to later, the cost of care does not seem to have a bearing on provider choice.
Table 2.5: Predicted probabilities of the effect of travel time to the provider
 Travel Time Cost
 Acute Illness Chronic Illness Acute Illness Chronic Illness
No care -0.018*** -0.020 0.000 -0.021***
Other -0.003*** -0.002 -0.001 -0.003***
Pharmacy -0.012*** -0.008 0.000 -0.009***
Private -0.024*** -0.018 -0.001 -0.019***
Public -0.009*** -0.008 -0.001 -0.009***
NDAP -0.036*** -0.015 0.000 -0.017***
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Estimates pertaining to chronic illnesses are provided in Table 2.6. There is no strong statistical evidence 
of gender related differences. If anything, it seems that older males are more likely to forego care 
(OR – 2.16). Households headed by individuals with higher secondary education are far more likely to 
visit private providers (OR – 3.4). Caste and household per capita expenditure do not seem to exert a 
strong influence on provider choice. In contrast to the findings for acute illnesses, we find that travel 
time does not influence provider-choices. However, provider choice is sensitive to cost (last two rows of 
Table 2.6). A one percent increase in cost reduces the probability of visiting an NDAP or a private doctor 
by 2 percentage points (Table 2.5).
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2.4  Discussion and conclusion
This paper examined healthcare seeking behaviour among households where at least one female 
member is affiliated to a woman’s self-help group in rural parts of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, India. 
Consistent with recent evidence from rural Odisha, a state in Eastern India (Gautham et al., 2011), we 
found that the majority of rural households do access some form of care. In the case of acute illnesses 
only 14 percent of respondents forego care and in the case of chronic illnesses about 30 percent do not 
seek care. 
 Analysis of provider usage patterns shows overwhelming use of private care for both outpatient and 
inpatient services. In the case of acute illnesses, private care is sought by 90 percent of those who seek 
care while the corresponding figures are 83 percent in the case of chronic illnesses and 78 percent in 
the case of hospitalization. This study confirms the findings of Ager and Pepper (2005) and Gautham et 
al. (2011) that non-degree allopathic providers account for a substantial proportion of health care. In this 
study such providers accounted for 56 percent of all visits in acute cases and 30 percent in the case of 
chronic illnesses (see Figure 2.1). With regard to acute illnesses, the econometric estimates highlight the 
importance of proximity in determining provider choice while the self-reported information (Figure 2.3) 
confirms that the main reason for relying so heavily on NDAP is their proximity. Somewhat different from 
findings reported in Borah (2006) and Sarma (2003), we found that direct costs did not have a bearing 
on choice of provider at least in the case of acute illnesses but does influence provider choice when 
households are faced with chronic illnesses. For chronic illnesses the econometric estimates show that 
cost plays a role in determining provider choice while proximity is not as important. This is consistent 
with the patterns in Figure 2.1 which show that qualified private practitioners are the most sought after 
providers in case of chronic illnesses and that households rely on such providers as they are considered 
the best source of care (see Figure 2.3). Overall, in the case of acute conditions, which are less likely to 
be serious, proximity appears to be important in driving provider choice while in the case of chronic 
conditions households feel the need for higher quality and costs are more likely to inhibit access to care. 
Notwithstanding these remarks, it is possible that identification of the cost effect is inhibited by the use 
of predicted cost variables, rather than actual information on costs of care across providers for different 
ailments. 
 Given the paper’s focus on households where women are affiliated to self-help groups, the 
generalizability of the findings may be limited. Furthermore, the lack of information on cost of care 
and other provider-specific factors such as quality of care are also limitations. Notwithstanding, these 
limitations our findings confirm that in the locations studied there is a tendency to seek care from 
allopathic providers, mostly unqualified, and that publicly provided services are less likely to be chosen, 
even by a relatively poor population in two of India’s poorest states. 
 This study has been conducted within the framework of a larger research program which deals 
with the implementation of CBHIs in rural India. A key implication from this study is that since proximity 
is an important factor influencing healthcare-seeking behaviour, CBHI schemes should also consider 
reimbursement for transportation costs and/or reimbursement of foregone earnings as part of the 
insurance package. Some experiments with CBHI in India and Nepal have already reported doing just 
that (Acharya et al., 2013; Devadasan et al., 2006). Finally, one cannot ignore the preponderant role of 
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NDAPs in provision of primary care. The debate over their role in the Indian rural medical provision 
system is well known (De Costa and Diwan, 2007; Kanjilal et al., 2007).
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3.1  Introduction
Less than 15% of the Indian population is covered by health insurance with the result that 94% of 
healthcare expenditure is paid for out-of-pocket (Bhandari et al., 2010; World Health Organization, 2012). 
The absence of pre-financing arrangements exposes many households to financial hardship when 
confronted with ill-health, or causes them to forego care altogether (Binnendijk et al., 2012; Bonu et al., 
2009; Murray et al., 2012). 
 Since the 1990s, Community Based Health Insurance Schemes (CBHI) which involve beneficiaries in 
scheme design and management have been proposed to enhance access to care and provide financial 
protection (Aggarwal, 2010; Devadasan et al., 2010; Dror et al., 2007). Studies of CBHI operating in four 
Indian states report that scheme access is associated with increased utilization of health care (Aggarwal, 
2010; Devadasan et al., 2010; Dror et al., 2007). However, none of these studies control for unobserved 
factors that may influence insurance uptake, although Aggarwal (2010) uses matching and Devadasan 
et al. (2010) use regression to control for selection on observables. A more convincing methodological 
approach is followed by Mahal et al. (2013)preventive products, and insurance. These factors motivated 
this intervention wherein a composite health-care package was delivered by a telemedicine-enabled 
community health worker (CHW who use a randomised design to establish that a pre-paid health 
card raised visits to community health workers and led to more referrals to doctors and hospitals and 
reduced length of hospitalisation and reduced out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditure in rural Maharashtra. 
While these papers purport to analyse the effect of community based insurance schemes, involvement 
of the community in determining scheme benefits and premiums, and thereafter managing the 
schemes is often limited. Government, private insurance companies and donors are usually heavily 
involved in the financing and operations of the schemes.17 Studies outside of India frequently report that 
CBHI is positively associated with increased health care utilization and improved financial protection 
(Ekman, 2004; Mebratie et al., 2013). But only a handful of studies control for observed and unobserved 
characteristics that may have a bearing on insurance uptake and may also influence the outcomes of 
interest.18 
 This paper makes two main contributions. First, it adds to the literature by evaluating the effects 
of three CBHI schemes in northern rural India set up as step-wise clustered randomised control trials 
(CRCT). We offer one of the few studies which uses an experimental approach to evaluate the impact 
of CBHI schemes. We use the randomised rollout of the schemes to identify their impact on health care 
utilization and financial protection, while distinguishing between outpatient care and hospitalizations. 
In addition to the methodological novelty, the paper assesses the impact of CBHI schemes which have 
been designed, and which are administered and managed by the communities themselves and which 
do not receive any financial or technical support from a government or a private provider. 
17 Mebratie et al. (2013) classify CBHI schemes into three categories: government-run community-involved schemes, provider-
based health insurance schemes and community-driven and community-managed schemes. The schemes under scrutiny in this 
paper lie in the last category. Typically, such schemes charge lower premiums, offer less generous packages but have a higher 
degree of community involvement. 
18 Eight of the 46 studies reviewed in Mebratie et al. (2013) use baseline and follow-up data and control for self-selection effects. 
Only one of these studies is based on a randomised control design (Levine et al., 2012). 
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The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the CBHI schemes. Section 3 discusses the data 
while section 4 outlines the empirical approach. Section 5 presents the results and the final section 
contains a discussion and concluding remarks. 
3.2  CBHI Schemes
The CBHI schemes were introduced in 2010 by the Delhi-based Micro Insurance Academy in partnership 
with three local NGOs in Kanpur Dehat and Pratapgarh districts in Uttar Pradesh and in Vaishali district in 
Bihar. The two states are amongst India’s most populated and least educated with large gender disparities 
(Planning Commission, 2011). Enrolment in the schemes was offered to households connected to Self 
Help Groups (SHG). SHGs consist of 10-20 women living in the same village who come together and 
agree to save a specific amount each period and are generally trained and supported by NGOs (Fouillet 
and Augsburg, 2008). 
 At each of the three sites, the target group was defined as all members of households with at 
least one woman registered by March 2010 as a member of a SHG. The 91 villages in the three districts 
were grouped into 48 clusters (15 in Pratapgarh, 17 in Kanpur Dehat and 16 in Vaishali). Clusters were 
formed by combining contiguous villages such that they contained roughly an equal number of SHG 
households (60 to 80). Subsequently, at each site, the clusters were randomly assigned to one of the three 
implementation waves (2011-2012-2013). In each of the implementation waves, all SHG households 
within the selected clusters were offered an opportunity to enrol in the CBHI schemes. By the end of the 
project the entire target population had been offered a chance to join the schemes. Additional details 
on the design of the experiment are available in Doyle et al. (2011). 
 Preparations for the scheme started in the second half of 2010 with a campaign to raise insurance 
awareness including the screening of a movie in the intended treatment areas and numerous meetings 
held at the SHG level. From June to December 2010, based on a set of four to six initial benefit packages 
designed by the Micro Insurance Academy, the intended subscribers of the first wave were offered a 
chance to choose benefit packages.19 This took place in three steps. In the first stage, individual SHG 
members determined the benefit package they preferred. In the second stage, the individual members 
debated their choices and the SHG group was asked to provide a first and a second choice package. In 
the third stage, all the SHG groups met and debated their choices and the package that was chosen by 
most groups was retained in each district (for details, see Dror et al., 2014). Scheme rollout took place in 
February 2011 in Vaishali and Pratapgarh and in March 2011 in Kanpur Dehat. Prior to scheme rollout, 
SHG members were chosen to form parts of the claims committees and governing bodies that steer the 
day-to-day operation of the insurance scheme. The claims committees meet about every three weeks 
to decide on claims and pay-outs, which are settled on a cash basis. 
 Table 3.1 shows the benefit packages chosen across the three sites in the first year of the project 
(2010). Although site specific annual premiums are not considerably different, the packages chosen 
do vary. Members in Vaishali chose cover exclusively for outpatient care while those in Pratapgarh 
19 The benefit packages offered to the SHG members were designed on the basis of information available in the baseline data 
and take into account local health care costs, availability of facilities and the probability of experiencing different health problems. 
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initially opted only for inpatient care, but opted to extend coverage to outpatient care after one year. 
Members in Kanpur Dehat opted for a shallower coverage of both outpatient and inpatient expenses. 
A potential reason for the preference for only outpatient coverage in Vaishali could be the penetration 
of the government run Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana programme that provides insurance coverage 
for inpatient care (Bhandari et al., 2010).20 Changes to the benefit packages could be made annually 
(prior to the next enrolment wave) (see Annex 3.1 for coverage in 2012). Given that inpatient expenses 
were never included in the benefit package in Vaishali, we exclude observations from this site when 
estimating effects on inpatient utilization and expenses.
Table 3.1: CBHI package details in 2011 (wave 1)
Sites Pratapgarh Kanpur Dehat Vaishali
Annual CBHI premium per person/per year (INR ) 176 192 197
Coverage for hospitalization    
Fees (maximum coverage per episode, INR ) 6000 3000 -
Wage loss (per day, INR )1 100 75 100
Transport (maximum coverage per episode, INR )2 100 100 -
Coverage for outpatient care      
Fees (INR ) - Unlimited Unlimited
Lab tests (per year, INR )3 - - 200
Imaging tests (per year, INR )4 - - 300
Coverage for maternity care      
Caesarean (per episode, INR ) 5000 - -
Notes: “-” indicates “Not Included in package”. 1 In Pratapgarh wage losses covered from the 3rd to the 6th day, in 
Kanpur Dehat from the 4th to the 13th day and in Vaishali from the 4th to the 9th day. 2 For hospitalization of more than 
24 hours. 3,4 Maximum amount, per person per year.
It is important to note that throughout all sites and years, coverage for outpatient care is restricted to 
designated practitioners, mainly Rural Medical Providers.21 While not necessarily licensed, these providers 
are responsible for a majority of health care visits for outpatient care (Gautham et al., 2011; Raza et al., 
2013). They are contracted on a yearly capitation basis, with monthly instalments, and are expected 
to provide care and medicines free of charge to the insured. For other covered expenses, receipts are 
provided by the beneficiaries and reimbursements are decided upon by the claims committees.
20 Below-poverty-line households living in the three districts where the CBHI schemes are offered are eligible to enrol in the RSBY. 
In these districts the RSBY scheme covers only inpatient care while the CBHI offers communities an option to cover both types 
of care. Our data suggest that the two schemes complement each other as at the time that the package choices were offered 
to wave 1 households, Vaishali district had an RSBY uptake rate of 48 while RSBY uptake was 18 percent in Pratapgarh and 15 
percent in Kanpur Dehat.
21 By 2013, the Kanpur CBHI scheme had begun offering the services of a qualified doctor who visited the office of the local 
partner NGO and other designated places on a weekly basis. 
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Initially, the intention was that enrolment would be at the household level. However, this was not 
followed as households claimed that paying premiums for all household members was a heavy financial 
burden. Hence, scheme administrators decided that provided women linked to the SHG enrolled, they 
could join the scheme alone or with selected members of their household. 
 During the first wave of implementation, at least one individual from 39% of the households that 
had been offered insurance joined the scheme while during the second wave the corresponding figure 
was 45%. In terms of individuals, these figures translate into an individual insurance uptake rate of 23% in 
wave 1 and 24% in wave 2. Dropout rates are quite high with 54% of the households (42% of individuals) 
who enrolled in the first wave renewing in the second, followed by a renewal of 25% of those originally 
enrolled households (17% of individuals) during the third wave. Analysis of enrolment decisions from 
the first wave reveals that except for hospitalization, which increases the probability of enrolling by 
10 percentage points in Kanpur Dehat, there is no evidence that enrolment is motivated by previous 
illnesses (Panda et al., 2014). While direct evidence of adverse selection may seem modest, households 
with children seem to be more risk averse or expect a higher need for health care and are substantially 
more likely to enrol. 
3.3  Data 
3.3.1  Data collection 
We use three rounds of household panel data collected from SHG-linked households living in each of 
the three sites. The surveys covered all eligible households. In all the surveys the primary respondents 
were the SHG members themselves or the head of the household if the member was unavailable. The 
baseline survey was canvassed before any household was offered enrolment (March-May 2010) and 
covered 21,372 individuals (3,685 housheholds).22 In April-May 2011, SHG-linked households residing in 
a third of the clusters were offered a chance to enrol in the scheme. The second survey was conducted 
between March and May 2012 during which 18,405 individuals (3,318 households) were re-interviewed, 
of whom 1,596 individuals were new to the households by means of marriage, birth and split households. 
Subsequently, enrolment was offered to a second cohort, that is, an additional one third of the target 
group. The third survey was conducted between March and May 2013 and comprised 18,322 individuals 
(3,307 households) of whom 4,285 individuals were new additions over the two previous years. By May 
2012, about two-thirds of the sample (14,209 of the 21,372 individuals surveyed in 2010 or 2,517 of the 
3685 households) had been offered a chance to enrol in the schemes. Those who had been offered a 
chance to enrol in the schemes by May 2012 are considered the treatment group, while those who had 
not been offered a chance to enrol by May 2012 are referred to as controls (see Annex 3.2 for details on 
sample size and distribution between treatment and control in each wave). 
22 All targeted households (SHG members) in the three districts were included in the survey. The study was designed to detect 
a “small” to “medium” effect. At each site the minimum detectable effect size is 0.4 standard deviations while it is 0.2 standard 
deviations for the full sample. The calculations were based on a 5% probability of committing a Type I error, power of 80% and 
an intra-cluster correlation of 5%. Accordingly, for the pooled sample, for outpatient care (mean – 0.8, standard deviation 0.4) an 
effect of size 0.08 (a 10% increase in utilization) is detectable while for inpatient care (mean 0.03, standard deviation 0.16) an effect 
of size 0.03 (a 100% increase in utilization) is detectable. As these figures suggest, the available sample sizes make it harder to 
detect an effect on inpatient care. 
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3.3.2  Variables
The main outcome variables of interest relate to health care utilization and health care expenditures. 
Outpatient care in the 30 days preceding the survey is recorded for all individuals in the household for 
whom sickness is reported during that period. Inpatient care in the 12 months preceding the survey 
is recorded for all individuals. Information on health care costs (consultation fees, costs of medicine 
and lab/imaging tests) and the manner in which a household finances costs was gathered for both 
outpatient and inpatient care and is reported for each individual. This information was used to define 
the probability that a household resorted to hardship financing to cover the cost of care reported for 
each individual. That is, meeting health care costs by borrowing from high interest rate lenders, cutting 
back on essential expenditures23 or selling assets (Binnendijk et al., 2011). All analyses are conducted on 
outcomes defined at the individual level.
 In addition to these outcome variables the surveys gathered information on a range of demographic 
(age/gender indicators, household size, gender of household head), socioeconomic (educational 
attainment, occupational status, scheduled caste/tribe status and per capita household expenditures) 
and health related characteristics. Information on per capita consumption (net of healthcare spending) 
is based on a 30-day recall period for store bought and home grown food items and a 12 month recall 
period for household durables and investments in agricultural equipment.24 
3.3.3  Summary Statistics
Table 3.2 presents baseline means of outcome variables for individuals residing in clusters that were 
offered a chance to enrol in the scheme by 2012 (treatment group) and individuals living in clusters that 
were not offered a chance to enrol by 2012 (control group). Three of the nine outcome variables are 
statistically different across the treatment and control groups but the gaps are not substantial.25 The site 
specific means presented in Annex 3.3 show that there are no statistically significant differences in the 
baseline means of the outcome variables in Kanpur Dehat and that in the other sites the differences are 
limited to one or two outcomes. The differences observed in the probability of using outpatient care in 
the pooled sample emanate from both Pratapgarh and Vaishali. In Pratapgarh the treatment group is 
more likely to seek outpatient care (79.3 versus 72.9 percent) and in Vaishali the treatment group is less 
likely to seek outpatient care (83.7 versus 86.8 percent). 
23 This includes, delays in paying bills for rent, fuel, agricultural/business inputs, pulling children out of school or reducing food 
consumption.
24 Expenditure data, that is, healthcare costs and per capita expenditure are in 2010 prices.
25 The reported illness rates may seem on the higher side but they are not particularly different from morbidity rates obtained 
from surveys conducted in similar parts of the country by other researchers. For instance, based on a survey conducted in 2010 
in Gaya district of Bihar, India, Binnendijk et al. (2012) report an illness rate of 31.4 percent in the month preceding the survey; in 
a survey conducted in 2013-2014 in the neighbouring state of West Bengal, Kanungo et al. (2015) report a morbidity rate of 56 
percent in the two months preceding the survey. 
502047-L-sub01-bw-Raza
Randomized evaluation of CBHI schemes
43
3
Table 3.2: Means of outcome variables at baseline – Treated (offered CBHI by 2012) and control (not 
offered CBHI by 2012) groups
 Individuals 
offered 
enrolment by 
2012
Individuals 
not offered 
enrolment by 
2012
Test: 
Treated=Control
 Treated Mean Control Mean p-value
 1 2 3
Reporting an illness (1/0) 0.34 0.33 0.23
Observations 14894 6478
Health care utilization (1/0)
Outpatient care conditional upon reporting 
illness
0.81 0.79 0.04
Outpatient care from a Rural Medical Practitioner 
conditional upon reporting illness
0.37 0.37 0.67
Observations 5061 2146
Inpatient care 0.03 0.03 0.06
Observations 14894 6478
Individual health care expenditures (conditional upon use)
Outpatient care expenses (INR) 666 611 0.27
(standard deviation) (2052) (1500)
Hardship financing for outpatient care (1/0) 0.18 0.18 0.57
Observations 4082 1685
Inpatient care expenses (INR) 12079 13361 0.40
(standard deviation) (14723) (19142)
Hardship financing for inpatient care (1/0) 0.55 0.50 0.25
Observations 400 204
Health care expenditures (full sample)
Outpatient care expenses (INR) 226 203 0.17
(standard deviation) (1237) (910)
Inpatient care expenses (INR) 325 418 0.07
(standard deviation) (3102) (4115)  
Observations 14894 6478
Notes: The number of observations varies depending on the outcome. The full sample size is 21,372 observations with 
N = 6,265 in Kanpur, 7,814 in Pratapgarh and 7,293 in Vaishali. Hardship financing is defined as having to meet health 
care costs by borrowing from high interest rate lenders, cutting back on essential expenditures or selling assets.
Baseline means for a set of demographic and socio-economic characteristics are provided in Annex 
3.4. For the pooled sample, a number of the covariates are statistically different across treatment and 
control groups but again the differences are not substantial. The treatment group has slightly smaller 
households (6.75 versus 6.85 members) and a slightly higher proportion of household members with 
secondary education (29 percent versus 26 percent). However, they are more likely to belong to the 
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lowest consumption tertile (39.5 versus 37.2 percent) and are more likely to belong to scheduled castes 
(34 versus 29 percent). Although there are differences in magnitude, the site specific means display 
similar patterns, except for one trait. The proportion of scheduled caste households in the treatment 
group is much lower in Kanpur while it is higher in the case of the other two sites. 
 The overall impression emerging from an assessment of the baseline characteristics across the two 
groups is that, while not perfect, the clustered-randomization approach has delivered comparable 
groups. There is no clear link between treatment status and socio-economic traits. While some of the 
pre-treatment outcomes and demographic and socio-economic traits are statistically different, except 
for caste affiliation, the differences are not substantial. As discussed in the next section our empirical 
approach controls for time- invariant attributes such as caste. 
3.4.  Empirical strategy
3.4.1  Intention to treat effect
We first investigate whether being offered CBHI membership has an effect on healthcare utilization 
and financial protection; that is, the intention-to-treat effect (ITT). For the binary health care utilization 
outcomes (y
ivt
 for individual i in village v at time t) we use a model specified as:
y
ivt 
= γOFFER
vt
+x
ivt
 β + δ
t 
+ α
v
 +ε
ivt
. (1)
The model includes year indicators (δ
t 
) to capture time trends in healthcare use common to both treated 
and control groups, village fixed effects (α
v 
) to capture time-invariant village level characteristics26, a set 
of time varying individual and household variables (x
ivt 
) as shown in Annex 3.4 and the key indicator 
variable of interest (OFFER
vt 
) which is switched on if households in village v had been offered the 
possibility of enrolling in the CBHI program at time t. For half the treatment group the post-treatment 
period is two years while for the other half it is one year. 
 We use a (village) fixed effects Poisson model to estimate the effect of being offered CBHI on 
healthcare spending. The Poisson model is well suited to dealing with skewed outcomes with a mass at 
zero (Buntin and Zaslavsky, 2004; Manning and Mullahy, 2001; Mihaylova et al., 2011; Santos and Tenreyro, 
2006; Wooldridge, 2001).27 For the expenditure outcome variables, m
ivt
, we specify the conditional mean 
as:
E(m
ivt 
|OFFER
vt
, x
ivt
, δ
t
, α
v 
)= exp(γOFFER
vt 
+ x
ivt
 β + δ
t 
+ λ
v
), (2) 
where we economize by using the same notation for parameters as (1). The estimated coefficients may 
be interpreted as percentage changes in m due to a unit change in the explanatory variables. 
26 We use village level rather than individual level fixed effects as the IV versions of the non-linear models cannot accommodate 
individual fixed effects. The results were robust to the inclusion of individual fixed effects rather than village fixed effects. Results 
from the ITT models were also robust to using a logit model for the binary outcomes rather than a linear probability model. 
27 The Poisson is optimal when the conditional variance is proportional (not equal) to the conditional mean, but also consistent 
when this is not the case. 
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3.4.2  Average treatment effect on the treated
The ITT effect is a lower bound of the effect of actually enrolling in the CBHI schemes – the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATET). Since households in the control group were not able to access 
CBHI, the ATET is simply the ITT scaled by the proportion of those offered CBHI that actually enrolled. 
While the offer of insurance was randomized, uptake is not exogenous. To estimate the ATET of 
insurance enrolment while accounting for self-selection into CBHI we use the randomized offer of CBHI 
as an instrument for actual uptake (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).28 Models for the binary healthcare 
utilization outcomes are estimated using two-stage least squares and for healthcare expenditures, IV-
Poisson models are estimated using a two-stage GMM estimator (Windmeijer and Santos Silva, 1997).29 
The first stage of these IV models is specified as: 
uptake
ivt 
= θOFFER
vt
 + x
ivt
 ρ + δ
t
 + α
v
 + u
ivt
, (3)
where the dependent variable is 1 if the household accepts the offer of CBHI, and is 0 if the offer is 
declined or not made. 30 
 In all models, standard errors are adjusted to allow for serially and/or spatially correlated shocks at 
the cluster level (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Bertrand et al., 2004). We first estimate models using the 
data pooled across the states (3 for outpatient utilization/expenses and 2 for inpatient), followed by site 
specific estimates. All statistical analysis is done in Stata 13.
3.4.3  Attrition
The rate of attrition between 2010 and 2012 was 21.36% and between 2012 and 2013 it was 17.91%, or 
a total attrition rate of 39.21% at the individual level. At the household level, the rate of attrition by 2012 
was 17.67% and 8.56% in the following year, leading to a total of 26.23%. We examined the probability of 
attrition between the baseline and the endline surveys as a function of demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics and also examined whether attrition rates vary across survey enumerators. The estimates 
suggest that attrition may be attributed to migration for work as unemployed males in the age group 
14 to 55 and who have completed middle to high school are most likely to exit the sample.31 To check 
for attrition bias, we constructed inverse probability weights by running wave-specific probit models of 
remaining in the sample by the next wave on baseline covariates (Jones et al., 2013). Including these 
weights in our regression models led to negligible changes in the estimates (the results are available on 
request). 
28 Since no one in the control group can access CBHI and there is imperfect compliance in the treatment group, the local average 
treatment effect (LATE) is equal to the ATET.
29 In the case of the IV-Poisson model, equation (3) is estimated using ordinary least squares. To control for endogeneity, the 
residual from this first-stage regression is included as an additional regressor in equation (2). The augmented model is then 
estimated using GMM.
30 See Annex 3.5 for first stage regression results. The probability of enrolment is higher for older males and those with primary 
education versus no education. 
31 An examination of the link between the probability of attrition and enumerator codes suggests that variation over enumerators 
accounts for a negligible proportion of variation in attrition. 
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3.5  Results
3.5.1  Effects on health care use
The top panel of Table 3.3 displays the impact of the randomized offer of insurance (ITT) and the uptake 
of insurance (ATET) on the probability that individuals reporting sickness use outpatient and inpatient 
care based on the data pooled across the three sites. The ITT estimates show no significant effect of the 
offer of insurance on any utilization outcome, including care from Rural Medical Practitioners (RMPs) 
who are intended to be the main source of outpatient care covered by CBHI in all three sites. Scheme 
uptake is about 23% and so the ATET estimates are about four times larger than the ITT estimates but 
insignificant. 
Table 3.3: Effects of the randomized offer (ITT) and uptake of insurance (ATET) on healthcare utiliza-
tion and financial protection - data pooled across three intervention sites
  ITT ATET
  Marginal 
effect
Standard  
error 
Marginal 
effect
Standard  
error 
Health care utilization 
Outpatient care conditional upon reporting illness -0.016 (0.021) -0.065 (0.082)
Outpatient care from a Rural Medical Practitioner 
conditional upon reporting illness 
0.001 (0.017) 0.005 (0.069)
Observations 22,569
Inpatient care -0.001 (0.004) -0.005 (0.017)
Observations 38,045
Health care expenditures (conditional upon use) 
Outpatient care expenses -0.044 (0.063) -0.203 (0.173)
Hardship financing for outpatient care 0.001 (0.020) 0.002 (0.081)
Observations 16,665
Inpatient care expenses 0.102 (0.252) 0.047 (0.135)
Hardship financing for inpatient care 0.016 (0.33) 0.047 (0.135)
Observations 914
Health care expenditures (full sample)
Outpatient care expenses -0.059 (0.060) -0.225 (0.206)
Observations 58,099
Inpatient care expenses 0.121 (0.256) 0.882 (1.013)
Observations 38,045
Notes: For binary outcomes (health care utilization and hardship financing), ITT effects are estimated by OLS and 
ATET effects are estimated by 2SLS with CBHI enrolment instrumented by the randomized offer of insurance. For 
expenditure outcomes, ITT effects are estimated by Poisson regression and ATET effects are estimated by GMM of 
a Poisson model with CBHI enrolment instrumented. All models include village level fixed effects, time effects and 
control for the covariates listed in Annex IV. See notes to Table II for the definition of hardship financing. Effects on 
outpatient utilization/expenses are estimated using observations from all three sites. Effects on inpatient utilization/
expenses are estimated using observations from Kanpur Dehat and Pratapgarh.
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Site specific results are reported in Table 3.4 (top panel). In Kanpur Dehat, the offer of insurance is 
associated with a 4 percentage point increase in the probability of seeking outpatient care from any 
provider with the entire increase coming from an increase in the probability of using RMPs but the 
estimated effects are not statistically significant at conventional levels. In Vaishali, the CBHI has no 
effect on utilization. In Pratapgarh, an offer of insurance, which did not initially include coverage of 
outpatient care in this site, is estimated to lead to a statistically significant 7 percentage point decline 
in the probability of seeking outpatient care. Actual uptake of CBHI is estimated as being associated 
with a large decline (51 percentage points) in the probability of using outpatient care.32 The decline 
in use of outpatient care is partly, although not significantly, due to a reduction in the use of RMPs but 
the main change is that households in Pratapgarh are less likely to use general practitioners/specialists 
once insurance, which does not cover care from these providers, is offered (results not shown in table). 
Substitution away from practitioners outside the scheme coverage is not unexpected. However, this 
does not explain the negative coefficient on the use of RMPs. 
3.5.2  Effects on financial protection
ITT and ATET estimates of the effect of insurance on out-of-pocket health care expenditure for 
outpatient and inpatient care and on the probability of hardship financing are provided in the lower 
panel of Table 3.3. Estimates are provided conditional upon the use of care and also for the full sample. 
The point estimates for outpatient expenses are negative. But those for inpatient expenses are positive 
and there is no significant evidence that access to the CBHI scheme works towards reducing out-of-
pocket expenditures. This is counter to what one might expect given that there is no significant impact 
on utilization.
 Site specific results (Table 3.4) show that the CBHI has no effect on health expenditure or on the 
probability of hardship financing in Kanpur Dehat and in Vaishali. In the case of Pratapgarh, the ITT 
estimates indicate that, conditional on use, access to CBHI leads to a 16.4 percent decline in outpatient 
care expenditure while the ATET effects indicate an 80 percent decline for those with CBHI cover. But 
this follows from the estimated reduction in the use of outpatient care and should not be interpreted 
as indicative of a protective influence of the scheme. 33 There is no evidence of any impact on inpatient 
expenses or hardship financing in Pratapgarh. 
32 Outpatient care was only included in the CBHI schemes offered in Pratapgarh in wave 2 but not in wave 1. Restricting the 
sample to the baseline and endline surveys also yields negative, albeit statistically insignificant estimates of the CBHI scheme on 
the probability of using outpatient care in Pratapgarh. 
33 Not only is there a decline in the incidence of outpatient health care use (reported in Table 3.4) but also a statistically significant 
decline in the number of outpatient visits {ITT: -0.164 (Std. Err: 0.077);ATET: -1.251 (Std.Err: 0.657)}.
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3.6  Conclusion
This paper utilizes data from three randomised control trials to evaluate the impact of community based 
health insurance (CBHI) schemes offered to families of women belonging to self-help groups in rural 
India on healthcare utilization and expenditures. Our analysis reveals that the schemes had no impact on 
access to outpatient or inpatient care. Nor do we find any impact on healthcare expenditure. Perversely, 
at one of the sites (Pratapgarh) studied we find that access to insurance led to a decline in utilization 
of outpatient care. This may be partly due to the lack of initial coverage of outpatient care in this site 
but it also appears indicative of the failure of the schemes examined to improve access and financial 
protection. The lack of success is also underlined by the high scheme drop-out rate. Two years after its 
introduction, only about 17% of those who had enrolled in CBHI renewed their membership (Panda et 
al., 2015). Although not directly comparable due to differences in scheme design, our findings differ 
from those reported in the case of other CBHI schemes implemented in India. For instance, in the case of 
the Yeshasvini scheme in Karnatatka, Aggarwal (2010) finds a 6-7% increase in the use of outpatient care 
and a 30% reduction in hardship financing. Mahal et al. (2012) report a 20 to 25% increase in the use of 
outpatient care from community health workers. 
 Qualitative field work based on interviews with 33 households who had enrolled in the scheme 
for at least one year, as well as discussions with the organization implementing the scheme provides 
clues to the underlying reasons for the disappointing results. Sixteen of the households reported that 
they had to pay for outpatient services and medicine for conditions that should have been covered 
by the insurance scheme. Ten of the 33 households dropped out after a year and the most common 
reasons for dropping out included poor quality of services and expenditure on premiums and the need 
to pay for care from non-designated providers. The insurance scheme offers access to outpatient care 
at designated providers who are paid on a capitation basis. Since the designated providers are chosen 
in consultation with the community, it is unlikely that the perception of poor quality services is due to 
those providers falling short of the standards offered by the alternatives. The most likely explanation is 
that the payment system, which pays a fixed fee per patient per year, provides an incentive to lower the 
quality of care offered to insured patients compared to that offered to those paying fee-for-service. A 
Rural Medical Practitioner was paid INR 40 per insured patient per year while the estimated cost per visit 
was INR 125 (see, Raza et al., 2013). Problems related to the capitation system have also been mentioned 
as the main reason for the absence of positive effects of CBHI in Burkina Faso (Fink et al., 2013), and may 
be compounded by a lack of competition between providers. 34
 With regard to inpatient care, the lack of an effect may be related to the small sample size given 
the infrequency of hospitalizations in the target population. Furthermore, coverage for inpatient care is 
relatively shallow, which is a more general problem in the context of community based schemes which 
operate without subsidies.35 
34 On average, there was only 0.28 RMPs per village in Pratapgarh while it was 0.5 in the other two sites.
35 For instance, in Pratapgarh in 2012 the maximum coverage per inpatient care event was INR 4000, while at baseline, conditional 
upon use, inpatient care expenses incurred by individuals who were offered insurance in the preceding year was INR 12,000. 
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There are some limitations to this study. The focus only on households belonging to Self-Help Groups 
hinders generalizability, the number of clusters per site limits power and the explanations provided for 
the unexpected effects may be considered speculative. Notwithstanding these limitations, the results of 
this study display that CBHI schemes, at least of the type examined here, which do not receive external 
financial or technical support, are unlikely to have a large effect on access to care and financial protection. 
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4.1  Introduction
Improving access to adequate healthcare services and financial protection features high on policy 
agendas of low and middle income countries. In India, a developing country with a third of the 
population living below the poverty line and nearly 94% of the workforce in the informal sector, 
there has been little or no access to effective social protection schemes against catastrophic medical 
expenditures until recently (Birdsall, 2015).36 Healthcare costs are typically financed out of pocket (OOP) 
and patients have strong preferences for private care providers, despite the country boasting a free public 
healthcare system (Raza et al., 2013; World Health Organization, 2012)supported by non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs.37 Hospitalizations alone, account for more than a quarter of the population falling 
into poverty every year (Flores et al., 2008; Shahrawat and Rao, 2012). 
 Since the 1990s, a number of interventions have been launched to fill this vacuum, with community 
based health insurance (CBHI) schemes being amongst the most popular (Aggarwal, 2010; Raza et al., 
2014). Implemented predominantly by non-government organizations, these schemes are generally 
characterized by limited voluntary participation and shallow benefit packages (Acharya et al., 2012). Their 
effectiveness in promoting healthcare utilization and providing financial protection are consequently 
mixed (Ekman, 2004; Mebratie et al., 2013). The Government of India (GoI) has also been active in this 
domain through a number of national and local schemes (Devadasan and Jain, 2008; Prinja et al., 2012).38 
High administrative costs, lack of accountability and sustained efforts in implementation, monitoring 
and evaluation have however, led to the dissolution of many such programmes (Balooni et al., 2012; 
Prinja et al., 2012; Results for Development Institute, 2010; Sood et al., 2014). Taking into account the 
shortcomings of previous endeavours, in 2008, the GoI launched the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana 
(RSBY) insurance programme (Karan et al., 2014). A national level programme, the RSBY is expected to 
eventually provide universal healthcare coverage (UHC) (Devadasan et al., 2013; Karan et al., 2014). 
 Administered by state governments in partnership with private insurance companies, the heavily 
subsidized RSBY targets households below the poverty line (BPL) and provides cashless protection 
against hospitalization costs.39 Families of up to five persons pay an annual premium of INR 30 per year 
for protection against hospitalization costs of up to INR 30,000 in any of the empanelled hospitals. The 
programme has been rolled out in 436 (of 479 targeted) districts in all 29 states of the country and 
enrolled 37 million households (approximately 55% of total BPL households) since 2008 (Government of 
India, 2015). From 2011, the RSBY has also been piloting outpatient coverage across eight districts (Nandi 
et al., 2013; Shoree et al., 2014b).
 Seven years after the start of the program, the evidence base on various aspects of the RSBY remains 
sparse. Sun (2010) presents one of the first studies to investigate the determinants of enrolment using 
36 Less than 15% of the population was covered by health insurance in 2009 (Berman et al. 2010).
37 Private expenditure constitutes 81% of total health expenditure in India of which 94% is out-of-pocket expenditure (Bhandari 
et al., 2010; World Health Organization, 2012). 
38 Schemes from state governments include Sanjeevani implemented in Punjab, the Chief Minister’s Health Insurance scheme in 
Assam and the Aarogyasri in Andhra Pradesh. At the national level, the ministry of finance had implemented the Universal Health 
Insurance Scheme along with Employees State Insurance Scheme and the Central Government Health Scheme (Chawla and Ellis, 
2000; Devadasan and Jain, 2008; Prinja et al., 2012).
39 Recently the programme has been expanded to include additional categories of poor households such as construction workers, 
rural employment guarantee scheme workers, street vendors and so forth (Shoree et al., 2014a). 
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village level census data from seven states. The study reveals some evidence of cream-skimming by 
insurance companies in that they prioritize enrolling healthier villages first. Similarly, there is greater 
enrolment in villages with a larger number of BPL households, increased distance from the nearest town 
and greater availability of education and medical facilities. The second part of the study uses household 
level data to conclude that there is gender preference towards men when enrolling households with 
more than 5 members. Using a combination of district level data from 2007-2008 from 590 districts 
and matching it with the District Level Household Data survey, Nandi et al. (2013) examine how 
socioeconomics, political and institutional factors correlate with RSBY participation at the district level. 
The paper first estimates the probability of a district participating in RSBY, followed by a model of the 
determinants of household enrolment in participating RSBY districts. They conclude that districts with 
a higher scheduled caste or tribe (SCST) population, weaker administrative capacity and pre-existing 
insurance schemes experience lower participation and enrolment rates. To understand the importance 
of insurance literacy in engaging potential clients, Das and Leino (2011) collect household data to assess 
the impact of the Information and Education Campaign (IEC) on enrolment into the RSBY in Delhi. They 
find that IEC is not associated with higher enrolment and suggest the timing of the campaign (two 
months prior to the enrolment) as a potential explanation. 
 Evidence on the impact of the scheme on health care use and financial protection thus far has 
been mixed. Nandi et al. (2013) find greater benefits of the programme being captured by higher 
socioeconomic groups. Hou and Palacios (2010) observe higher rates of healthcare utilization among 
RSBY households. Neither of the studies however control for either observable or unobservable 
characteristics that may influence insurance uptake and health care use. Devadasan et al. (2013) find 
continuing OOP despite RSBY membership, but the use of cross-sectional data also limits their ability to 
control for self-selection and hence claims of causality. Selvaraj and Karan (2012) do control for district-
level heterogeneity in observable and (time invariant) unobserved characteristics by using difference-in-
differences on data from 321 RSBY districts and 291 non-RSBY districts in the Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka 
and Tamil Nadu states. The authors find that hospitals in RSBY districts inflate their costs over time 
due to weak scheme administration and operational oversight, leading to increases in expenses for 
inpatient care. This culminates in a greater likelihood of RSBY households facing catastrophic levels of 
expenditures. 
 This paper adds to the literature on RSBY in several ways. First, we analyse household level 
determinants of RSBY enrolment using household level panel data collected in 2012 and 2013. 
Earlier studies are primarily derived from administrative data collected during the initial stages of the 
programme (2008-2010). Second, this is the first study to investigate the determinants of dropping out 
of the scheme. Retaining membership is an important indicator of the sustainability/usefulness of the 
scheme. Third, we investigate whether RSBY membership is associated with increased use of hospital 
care and financial protection. Finally, this is the first paper to focus on the scheme in Uttar Pradesh (UP) 
and Bihar which are among the poorest and least educated states in the country. 
 The paper is organised as follows: The following section describes the details of the RSBY programme. 
Section 2 discusses the data while section 3 outlines the empirical approach. Section 4 presents the 
results and the final section contains a discussion and concluding remarks. 
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4.1.1  Background
The RSBY caters to the largely illiterate BPL households with little financial liquidity, by introducing smart 
cards that provide cashless care in any of the empanelled hospitals (Basu, 2010). In collaboration with the 
central government, the state governments recruit insurance companies through a competitive bidding 
process to launch the schemes. Insurance companies are paid a premium per beneficiary household 
such that they have an incentive to enrol more households (up to INR 750/beneficiary household). These 
companies are also tasked to empanel both public and private hospitals which are compensated directly 
for treating RSBY registered patients. The insurance companies are responsible for the monitoring of 
the hospital activities to ensure quality and prevent misuse (Birdsall, 2015). In order to monitor RSBY, a 
quality control mechanism is in place at the national level, but actual implementation lies with states. 
The state government is expected to monitor the selected insurance agencies and the hospitals that 
are attached. To what extent state government is ensuring the monitoring and quality control is unclear. 
There is a grievance redressal mechanism as well, but there is scant information on who is covering this 
and processes thereof. 
 The scheme is heavily subsidized and the benefit package may be considered very generous in 
comparison to the small premium paid by clients. The package includes more than 700 pre-defined 
surgical packages for maternal and neonatal care, coverage for same-day surgeries and transport costs 
to and from the hospital. Providers are paid on a fee-for-service basic with packages defined for each 
of the covered procedures (Joint Learning Network, 2015). All pre-existing diseases are covered under 
the scheme (Government of India, 2015). While three quarters of the total costs are paid by the central 
government, the rest, including the cost of smart cards are paid by state governments. Depending on the 
state where the programme is being implemented, the government pays up to INR 750 per household 
to bridge the costs (Basu, 2010). The average subsidy per household paid by the state governments are 
INR 262 and INR 490 in UP and Bihar respectively (Government of India, 2015).
 Insurance companies begin the enrolment process by first implementing awareness campaigns 
at the village level, prioritizing those with greater proportions of BPL households (based on a BPL list 
created in 2001). Members are provided an opportunity to renew coverage towards the end of each 
calendar year (Das, 2012). Since 2008 nearly 37 million BPL households have enrolled in the programme 
(Government of India 2014). With the enrolment process nearly complete (the scheme has been offered 
in 436 of 479 targeted districts), the proportions of the target group enrolled stand at 55% (Government 
of India, 2015). It is important to note that the enrolment proportions are likely to be overestimated 
as they reflect cumulative enrolment which does not take into account dropouts. The RSBY began 
operating in UP in December 2008, while enrolment in Bihar started nearly a year later. 
 The RSBY is not without criticisms. First, the list of BPL households used in enrolment procedures 
was created between 2001 and 2002 and is therefore likely to be outdated leading to accusations of 
fraud and mis-targeting (Bagcchi, 2014; Sun, 2010). Concerns regarding the programme’s operations 
have also been raised. Though designed to be cashless, due to lower educational and socioeconomic 
status, the RSBY covered patients are often unable to gain enough information or are unable to exercise 
their rights sufficiently (Dror and Vellakkal, 2012; Nandi et al., 2012). Examples of this include the 
implementation of unnecessary and invasive procedures to claim money from insurance companies, 
and charging patients for medicines or tests allegedly not covered by the scheme. Das and Leino (2011) 
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point out that insurance companies are largely preoccupied with “outright” fraud prevention rather 
than assessing the medical necessities of the many procedures that are performed. Additionally, private 
hospitals were found to be reluctant to treat RSBY insured patients because the fees are considered 
insufficiently generous or because of disputes with insurance companies over compensation (such as 
delayed payment, disagreement over necessity of certain procedures) (Nandi et al., 2012; Shoree et al., 
2014a). 
4.2  Data 
4.2.1  Data collection 
The data used in this paper were collected as a part of an evaluation of three CBHI schemes rolled 
out in Kanpur Dehat and Pratapgarh districts in Uttar Pradesh and in Vaishali in Bihar. The surveys were 
implemented among all Self-Help Group households in the three locations.40 Though the surveys did 
not collect information on BPL status, qualitative data collection suggests nearly two thirds of the sample 
own BPL cards and should be eligible for RSBY.41 
 The baseline survey was canvassed between March and May 2010 and covered 3,686 households 
(the full census of SHG related households in these districts). The follow up survey was conducted 
between March and April in 2012 during which 3318 households were revisited. During the same time 
the following year, 3307 households were re-interviewed for the third time. As some of our variables, 
related to insurance awareness, were only collected in the 2012 and 2013 surveys, we only use the latter 
two survey waves in our analyses of enrolment and dropout. The primary respondents were the SHG 
members themselves or the head of the household if the member was not available. 
4.2.2  Variables 
The household survey collected detailed information on demographic and socioeconomic status, as 
well as information on healthcare utilization, expenses and coping strategies for both out- and inpatient 
care. Given the focus on RSBY in this paper, we primarily focus on inpatient care data that was collected 
with a recall period of one year.
4.2.2.1  Determinants of RSBY membership and non-renewals 
To model the determinants of enrolment, we use data from 2012 and 2013 that contains an indicator of 
whether the household was enrolled in RSBY in the specific survey wave. To analyse factors associated 
with dropping out, we only consider households that were enrolled in 2012 and have dropped by the 
subsequent wave in 2013. 
40 A self-help group (SHG) usually consists of between 10–20 poor women living in the same village who come together and 
agree to save a specific amount each period. The savings of all SHG members are combined and deposited in a bank or a co-
operative organization. Members may borrow from the pooled savings when the SHG agrees to give the loans. SHGs are usually 
supported and trained by NGOs. According to Fouillet, Augsburg (2008), there are about 40 million SHG members in India.
41 Nearly 50% of the households in our sample with RSBY membership have reported per capita household expenditures that 
are greater than the rural poverty line in the respective states. This could indicate either mistargeting of the RSBY scheme, or 
mistargeting of the BPL cards. Reports of mistargeting and corruption in the issuance of BPL cards are well documented in the 
existing literature (Selvaraj, Karan 2012, Nandi et al. 2013).
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We consider four categories of variables as possible determinants of enrolment and dropout from RSBY 
(see Table 4.2 and Annex 4.1 for exact definitions). The first represents health related characteristics of 
the households: proportion of household members suffering from chronic illness42 and a binary variable 
depicting whether any members were hospitalized in the previous year. 
Table 4.2: Summary statistics of outcome variables in 2010
Definition HH with 
RSBY 
member-
ship
HH without 
RSBY 
member-
ship
Test:  
RSBY 
HH=Non-
RSBY HH
Test:  
RSBY 
HH=Non-
RSBY HH
Test:  
RSBY 
HH=Non-
RSBY HH
Pooled Data Uttar 
Pradesh
Bihar
P-value (1) P-value (2) P-value (3)
Proportion of household (HH) 
members with chronic illnesses
0.17 0.14 0.773 0.163 0.145
Any hospitalizations in the household 
(1/0)
0.19 0.19 0.105 0.510 0.102
Probability of incurring expenses due 
to hospitalization(1/0)
0.98 0.97 0.824 0.992 0.168
Direct hospitalization expenses (INR) 12034 14020 0.214 0.210 0.440
Standard Deviation (31846) (33290)
Average distance to facility (km) 27.23 37.02 0.000 0.461 0.000
Standard Deviation (24.42) (24.17)
Household with debt due 
hospitalization (1/0)
0.86 0.80 0.104 0.370 0.089
Debt amount (INR) 8187 8328 0.894 0.243 0.951
Standard Deviation (20096) (15790)    
Notes: Table shows summary statistics across RSBY and non-RSBY households in 2010. P-values 1 through 3 refer to 
t-tests comparing means of the enrolled and non-enrolled at the pooled level and by sites.
The second category represents healthcare supply side characteristics and includes the (logarithm of 
the) average distance members of a community have to travel to reach a hospital.43 Unfortunately we do 
not have information on whether the hospital is empanelled by RSBY in the survey.44 
42 Chronic conditions are defined as outpatient illnesses that have lasted longer than 30 days preceding the survey.
43 Since respondents only report distance (in kilometres) for the providers they actually visit, we impute the distance to the nearest 
hospital for those households that have not used inpatient care (Borah 2006, McFadden, Train 2000, Qian et al. 2009). We estimate 
a log linear model on the sample of hospital users and subsequently predict the distance (Qian et al. 2009, Raza et al. 2013). 
Covariates used to predict the distance include household level demographic, socioeconomic and regional indicators. 
44 We attempt to match the self-reported names of the hospitals visited to the list provided in the RSBY website to get an 
understanding of the extent of use of such empaneled hospitals, but were only successful in matching 20% of the used hospitals 
(Government of India, 2015).
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The third category contains household characteristics related to insurance literacy and risk aversion. We 
include an indicator of whether any members are enrolled in the CBHI scheme and an index depicting 
the understanding of insurance.45,46 Three questions were included in the index: whether the particular 
household was exposed to any insurance awareness campaigns; the respondent understands the 
concept of premiums and insurance in general; and whether the respondent believes such schemes 
can be beneficial. This index is represented in the models as tertiles of scores obtained from principal 
component analysis of questions applicable to insurance schemes. 
 The fourth category relates to demographic conditions such as the sex of the household head, 
household members’ age and sex distribution and socioeconomic characteristics including education, 
occupational and educational status of the household head, whether the household belongs to a 
scheduled caste or tribe (SCST), and tertiles of an asset index generated through principal component 
analysis.47 
4.2.2.2  Effect of RSBY on the use and financing of inpatient care 
After having established patterns of enrolment and dropout, we investigate whether participating in 
the RSBY is associated with a higher probability of any hospitalizations within the household, a lower 
probability of having any expenses when hospitalized, lower direct cost of the hospitalization, lower 
probability of resorting to debt to finance the hospitalization, and finally a lower amount of debt 
incurred (conditional upon incurring any debt).48 
4.2.3  Summary statistics
Table 4.1 shows rates of enrolment and non-renewals in 2010, 2012 and 2013. Among 3,685 households 
surveyed in 2010, 28% were already enrolled. In 2012, 14% of the households dropped out while the 
total proportion of enrolled increased to 31%. A considerable shift in enrolment is noted between 2012 
and 2013. The proportion of enrolled increases to 51% while dropout reduces to 8% in 2013. Over time, 
the differences in state-level enrolment rates diminish and (at baseline enrolment rates are 18% in UP 
and 41% in Bihar) the proportion of enrolled increased in UP by 2013. Although more households drop 
out of the scheme in Bihar in 2012 (19%) than in UP (14%), the rates are more comparable in 2013 (8% 
and 11% respectively). The enrolment rates at the village level vary considerably (between 7% and 78%). 
Overall, despite the relatively modest enrolment rates, the low drop-out rates are suggestive of the 
perceived positive effects of RSBY by the insured. 
45 The CBHI enrolment indicator is included as a proxy for the risk averseness of the household rather than to capture any 
substitution effects within the schemes given the RSBY coverage is considerably more generous and that the bulk of CBHI 
coverage pertains to outpatient care. 
46 In the way it is measured, insurance related awareness may be a consequence of enrolment into an insurance scheme rather 
than a determinant. We have confirmed robustness of results to omitting this potentially endogenous variable, and omit this 
variable from model 3 (described in Section 3.2) as the household fixed effects should capture awareness (to the extent that it is 
time-invariant).
47 The asset tertiles includes household level characteristics such as availability of running water, toilet, electricity, roof material 
and the ratio of cement to dirt floors. The index also includes durable assets such as livestock, fans, radio/televisions, sewing 
machines, bicycles/motorcycles, mobile telephones and generators. 
48 Direct costs refer to consultation fees, costs of medicine and lab/imaging tests, net of reimbursements from any schemes such 
as the CBHI.
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Table 4.1: Membership in RSBY
  Pooled Uttar Pradesh Bihar
  2010 2012 2013 2010 2012 2013 2010 2012 2013
Enrolled (renewal and new) 0.28 0.31 0.51 0.18 0.21 0.41 0.47 0.48 0.68
Dropped out (from previous 
period)
0.14 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.19 0.11
Not enrolled 0.72 0.55 0.41 0.82 0.69 0.51 0.53 0.33 0.21
Households in RSBY 1048 1039 1678 415 431 874 633 608 804
Observations 3,685 3,318 3,307 2,322 2,045 2,087 1,363 1,246 1,183
Means of health and health care use related outcomes in 2010 among those enrolled in RSBY and those 
not enrolled are presented in Table 4.2 (summary statistics of outcomes in 2012 and 2013 in the pooled 
sample are presented in Annex 4.2). Comparing RSBY and non-RSBY households in the pooled data 
suggests that only the average distance to facilities significantly differs between the two groups (27km 
and 37km respectively). Other factors such as the proportion of members with chronic illnesses (17% 
and 14%) and the likelihood of hospitalization (19% for both) are do not vary across the groups. When 
hospitalized, almost all households, both RSBY and non-RSBY covered, incur out of pocket payments. 
The amount of expenses incurred by RSBY and non-RSBY households (INR 12034 and INR 14020), the 
probability of incurring any debt (80% and 79%) and the amount of debt do not differ significantly. 
State-level disaggregation suggests the significant difference in the distance to facilities across both 
groups to stem from Bihar. Similarly, RSBY households in this state are marginally more likely to incur 
debt when dealing with the expenses of a hospitalization. 
 A similar comparison of household level characteristics among the two groups in 2010 is presented 
in Annex 4.1 (summary statistics of control variables in 2012 and 2013 in the pooled sample are 
presented in Annex 4.3). As 2010 represents the baseline of the CBHI scheme for which the information 
was collected, enrolment in the CBHI scheme is missing. Similarly, information related to insurance 
related awareness was not collected until 2012. Regarding demographic variations in RSBY and non-
RSBY households, the former have a higher proportion of working aged women (14-55 years) and a 
lower proportion of elderly women (55+ years). 
 RSBY enrolled household do appear to have lower socioeconomic status as those not-enrolled. 
Household heads among the non-enrolled are generally better educated (e.g., 45% of RSBY household 
heads have no education compared to 38% among non-RSBY) and belong to higher socioeconomic 
groups. Figure 4.1 shows distribution of insured households across wealth tertiles. While a clear and 
steep gradient is visible in Bihar where the highest proportion of enrolled households belong to the 
lowest asset tertile, trends in UP are not as clear (highest proportion belong to households in the 
middle tertile), potentially indicating problems with the targeting of the scheme (or the BPL cards) in 
UP. Enrolled households are more likely to belong to scheduled castes or tribes. A higher proportion of 
non-RSBY household heads are self-employed (43% vs 48%) whereas the opposite is true among the 
enrolled for casual wage labouring (32% vs 24%). 
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Figure 4.1: Timing of the surveys in relation to offer of enrolment
In sum, these descriptive statistics suggest relatively little differences between households enrolled 
in RSBY and those not enrolled, at least in 2010. This could be indicative of little problems of adverse 
selection, but also of little impact of the scheme. The following section describes the regression 
approaches used to identify the determinants of enrolment and non-renewals and to identify whether 
RSBY membership is associated with increased health care use and health care spending. 
4.3  Empirical Strategy
4.3.1  Determinants of RSBY membership and non-renewals
We first investigate factors correlated with membership, defined as household (i) having RSBY coverage 
at time (t) in village (v) using the following linear probability model:
rsby
itv 
= Γ’
itv
 β
1
+ β
2
 D
iv 
+ Π’
itv
 β
3
+ X’
itv
 β
4 
+ v
v 
+ t
t 
+ ε
itv
 [i = 1,…,N; t = 2012,2013]   (1)
where Γ’
itv
 represents a vector of health related variables, and D
iv
 represents the average distance to the 
hospitals. The household’s insurance awareness related characteristics are captured by Π’
itv
. A vector of 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics is expressed through X’
itv
. We control for time trends (t
t 
) 
and geographical variations through village fixed effects (v
v 
).49
 The probability of not renewing the subscription in 2013 (conditional upon being enrolled in 2012), 
is modelled using the same explanatory variables as in equation (1), set at their 2013 values, that is: 
Dropout
iv
 = Γ’
iv
 θ
1
 + θ
2
 D
iv
 + Π’
iv
 θ
3
 + X’
iv
 θ
4
 + v
v
 + μ
iv
  (2)
49 We prefer village over household level fixed effects because some of the more interesting determinants, like the SCST status do 
not change over time. We have checked and confirmed robustness of results to using household level fixed effects (see Annex 
4.4). While most results remain consistent, some differences arise for the coefficients on the insurance awareness indices and 
distance to healthcare facilities, which is related to their limited variation over time.
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4.3.2  Associations between RSBY membership and inpatient care use and 
spending
We estimate the effects of RSBY membership on a battery of outcomes related to inpatient care use 
and spending (probability of hospitalization, probability of having healthcare spending conditional on 
hospitalization, log of the amount of healthcare expenses conditional on any spending, probability of 
incurring debt to meet healthcare expenses and the amount of debt, conditional on having any debt). 
For every outcome (Y
itv 
) we estimate the following linear model with household fixed effects:
Y
itv
 = Ω
1
rsby
itv
 + X’
itv
 Ω
2
 + Ω
3
 δ
iv
 + t
t
 + a
i
 + ρ
itv
 [i = 1,…,N; t = 2010,2012,2013]  (3)
 
where t
t
 captures common time trends in healthcare use across households and a
i
 captures time 
invariant household level characteristics.50 rsby
itv
 is the key variable of interest that reflects whether the 
household i in village v is enrolled in RSBY at time t.51
 Ω
1
 identifies the effect of RSBY membership on outcome Y
itv
 under the assumption that there are no 
time-varying unobservables that correlate with both RSBY membership and the outcomes of interest. 
Given the targeting of the program to BPL households, and our inability to perfectly control for BPL 
status, and the voluntary nature of the program, this is a strong assumption. We expect our rich set 
of covariates to largely capture the self-selection into the program, especially because the program is 
highly subsidized and therefore attractive to the large majority of households.52 To reduce the potential 
bias due to unobserved differences in socioeconomic characteristics that arise from the targeting of the 
program, we test sensitivity of our results by restricting the sample to the bottom two wealth thirds.53 
It should be stressed though that our identifying assumptions might be violated, and we therefore 
interpret our results as associations rather than causal impacts.
 Robustness of results is confirmed using non-linear specifications for the binary outcomes (results 
available upon request). All analysis was done using STATA version 13.0.
4.4  Results
4.4.2  Determinants of enrolment 
Table 4.3 shows coefficients of the OLS model examining factors associated with enrolment in RSBY 
in 2012 or 2013. We find that the proportion of household members with chronic illness is positively 
correlated with the probability of being enrolled in RSBY (6pp). There is a negative correlation between 
distance to healthcare facilities and enrolment at the pooled level with a 1% increase in the distance 
50 As we are less interested in the coefficients on the household level covariates, we prefer using household fixed effects rather 
than village fixed effects as the former allow capturing more of the unobserved household level heterogeneity that may bias our 
coefficients on the RSBY variable.
51 Note this is different from difference-in-differences models in the sense that we use both households that enroll and drop out 
from one year to another as ‘treatment’ households, and those that are enrolled throughout or never enrolled as controls. 
52 Limiting the sample to those not enrolled in 2010 would not be particularly helpful in addressing the sample selection 
problem, because we do not know whether households have never enrolled, or have dropped out recently.
53 Qualitative data collection suggests that around two-thirds of our sample should possess a BPL card.
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reducing the probability of enrolment by 1pp. Insurance awareness is positively associated with RSBY 
membership (3pp). Households in the highest tertile of the index are 3pp more likely to be enrolled. 
Similarly, households who joined CBHI schemes are also more likely to be enrolled in RSBY (3pp), 
potentially indicating higher aversion to risk. 
Table 4.3: Determinants of RSBY membership in 2012 and 2013
  Pooled Uttar Pradesh Bihar
Variables Marginal 
effects
Standard 
error
Marginal 
effects
Standard 
error
Marginal 
effects
Standard 
error
Proportion of household 
members with chronic illnesses 
(% of household)
0.056** 0.027 0.030 0.034 0.097** 0.046
Log of average Distance from 
facility
-0.008* 0.005 -0.010 0.030 0.004 0.016
Low insurance index score(1/0) -0.010 0.035 -0.001 0.042 -0.038 0.063
High insurance index score (1/0) 0.026** 0.012 0.028* 0.015 0.019 0.021
Enrolled in CBHI(1/0) 0.032* 0.016 0.038* 0.021 0.016 0.027
Lowest asset tertile (1/0) -0.006 0.015 -0.014 0.019 0.001 0.025
Highest asset tertile (1/0) -0.039*** 0.014 -0.028* 0.017 -0.058** 0.028
Household belongs to a 
scheduled tribe/caste (1/0)
0.070*** 0.014 0.069*** 0.017 0.077*** 0.026
Primary education (1/0) -0.034* 0.019 -0.015 0.023 -0.071** 0.032
Secondary education (1/0) -0.042*** 0.016 -0.026 0.020 -0.069** 0.028
Higher secondary education 
(1/0)
-0.060*** 0.023 -0.014 0.027 -0.169*** 0.044
Other employment (1/0) -0.016 0.025 0.007 0.030 -0.065 0.048
Casual wage labourer (1/0) 0.023 0.016 0.028 0.020 0.012 0.026
Not working (1/0) -0.010 0.025 -0.035 0.028 0.068 0.050
Doing housework (1/0) -0.021 0.021 -0.016 0.026 -0.029 0.036
Female headed household (1/0) 0.009 0.020 0.012 0.025 0.013 0.033
Household size 0.011*** 0.003 0.010*** 0.004 0.016** 0.006
Female 0 to 13yrs (1/0) -0.103** 0.048 -0.108* 0.060 -0.084 0.083
Female older than 55 (1/0) -0.131*** 0.050 -0.125** 0.059 -0.140 0.097
Male 0 to 13yrs (1/0) -0.139*** 0.047 -0.145** 0.058 -0.141* 0.082
Male 14 to 55yrs (1/0) -0.037 0.048 -0.053 0.057 -0.006 0.090
Male older than 55 (1/0) -0.025 0.072 0.033 0.085 -0.157 0.133
Year: 2012 0.215*** 0.013 0.219*** 0.016 0.207*** 0.022
Observations 6,367 4,085 2,282
Notes: Table shows marginal effects of OLS models using village level fixed effects. The binary dependent variable 
whether a household is enrolled in RSBY in 2012 or 2013. Joint significance tests for the village dummies found to be 
significant at the 1% level for all models. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Associations between socioeconomic variables and RSBY membership confirm the pro-poor targeting 
of the scheme. Households in the highest asset tertile are 4pp less likely to be enrolled compared 
to those in the middle. Members of scheduled castes or tribes (SCST) are more likely to enrol in the 
programme (7pp). Household heads with primary secondary or higher-secondary education, are less 
likely to be enrolled (3pp, 4pp and 6pp respectively). 
 Regarding demographics, we find that larger households are more likely to enrol (1pp), which likely 
is related to the premium not rising with household size (up to 5 members). Interestingly, households 
with a higher proportion of children or older women are less likely to be enrolled. 
 There appears relatively little variation in these associations across states. Factors such as the 
insurance awareness and CBHI membership only play a part in enrolment decisions among households 
in UP (3pp and 4pp respectively). Any education among household heads is only negatively associated 
with enrolment in Bihar (7pp for primary, 7pp for secondary and 17pp for higher-secondary education). 
As already expected from Figure 1, RSBY membership, conditional on other characteristics, is more 
concentrated among the poor in Bihar as compared to UP.
4.4.3  Determinants of non-renewals
Table 4.4 presents results from an OLS model analysing the determinants of not renewing RSBY 
membership in 2013, conditional upon being enrolled in 2012. Households with members who are 
chronically ill are much less likely to drop out. An increase in the proportion of chronically ill members 
(by 1pp) reduces the probability of non-renewal by 12pp. Households belonging to SCST are also less 
likely (12pp) to drop out from the RSBY. Lastly, household size is negatively associated with the likelihood 
of dropping out at the pooled level (3pp).
 Variation across states is once again limited. Adverse selection is more pronounced in Bihar, while 
there is no significant correlation between the proportion of household members with a chronic illness 
and RSBY dropout in Uttar Pradesh. Overall, we find fewer significant effects in models of dropout 
as compared to those of enrolment, which might be related to the relatively low drop-out rates and 
smaller sample size. The presence of chronic illnesses, being a member of SCST and household size 
play a positive role in both enrolling and remaining in the scheme. Factors such as average distance 
from inpatient facilities, understanding of insurance, wealth and household demographics are related to 
enrolment but are not significantly related to of the probability of dropping out of RSBY.
4.4.4  Associations between RSBY membership and inpatient care use and 
spending
Table 4.5 presents results on the changes in health care use and spending that are associated with RSBY 
membership. The first row of results shows effects on the probability of hospitalization within a household 
over the preceding year. This is followed by the effects on the likelihood of incurring any expenses, 
and the amount spent, both conditional upon being hospitalized. We further investigate whether 
participation precipitates any change in the probability of incurring debt due to this hospitalization and 
the amount of debt, conditional on borrowing.
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Table 4.4: Determinants of non-renewals in 2013
  Pooled  Uttar Pradesh  Bihar 
Variables Marginal 
effects
Standard 
error
Marginal 
effects
Standard 
error
Marginal 
effects
Standard 
error
Proportion of household 
members with chronic illnesses 
(percent of household)
-0.118* 0.067 0.008 0.120 -0.195** 0.078
Any hospitalizations in the 
household (1/0)
0.048 0.041 0.081 0.075 0.047 0.048
Log of average Distance from 
facility
0.019 0.030 0.070 0.111 0.022 0.031
Low insurance index score(1/0) 0.037 0.142 -0.109 0.289 0.083 0.158
High insurance index score (1/0) -0.012 0.030 0.021 0.054 -0.031 0.035
Enrolled in CBHI(1/0) -0.006 0.040 -0.015 0.072 -0.003 0.048
Lowest asset tertile (1/0) 0.038 0.036 0.052 0.068 0.017 0.041
Highest asset tertile (1/0) 0.045 0.037 0.051 0.060 0.042 0.048
Household belongs to a 
scheduled tribe/caste (1/0)
-0.120*** 0.034 -0.139** 0.057 -0.113*** 0.044
Primary education (1/0) 0.071 0.046 0.090 0.083 0.051 0.055
Secondary education (1/0) -0.017 0.039 -0.019 0.067 -0.014 0.048
Higher secondary education 
(1/0)
0.070 0.060 0.059 0.093 0.059 0.087
Other employment (1/0) 0.005 0.076 -0.029 0.120 0.026 0.104
Casual wage labourer (1/0) 0.034 0.038 0.017 0.071 0.051 0.045
Not working (1/0) 0.022 0.065 0.195* 0.114 -0.094 0.077
Doing housework (1/0) 0.033 0.050 -0.008 0.094 0.046 0.058
Female headed household (1/0) -0.053 0.047 -0.007 0.087 -0.059 0.055
Household size -0.028*** 0.009 -0.041*** 0.014 -0.018 0.011
Female 0 to 13yrs (1/0) 0.122 0.121 0.312 0.210 0.027 0.153
Female older than 55 (1/0) 0.118 0.145 -0.047 0.257 0.210 0.174
Male 0 to 13yrs (1/0) 0.091 0.120 0.229 0.210 0.018 0.149
Male 14 to 55yrs (1/0) -0.14 0.134 -0.12 0.223 -0.15 0.170
Male older than 55 (1/0) 0.125 0.202 -0.156 0.338 0.338 0.256
Observations 956 408 548
Notes: Table shows marginal effects of OLS models using village level fixed effects. The binary dependent variable 
shows whether the household did not renew its subscription to the RSBY in 2013, conditional upon being enrolled in 
2012. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 4.5: Associations between RSBY membership and inpatient care use and spending
 Pooled UP Bihar
 Coefficient Standard 
error
Coefficient Standard 
error
Coefficient Standard 
error
Probability of hospitalizations 
(1/0)
0.000 (0.010) -0.010 (0.013) 0.015 (0.017)
Observations 10,125 6,359 3,766
Probability of having healthcare 
expenses conditional on use 
(1/0)
0.007 (0.026) 0.001 (0.042) 0.007 (0.031)
Observations 1,413 836 577
Log of healthcare expenses 
conditional on spending (INR)
-0.056 (0.170) 0.224 (0.296) -0.361* (0.190)
Observations 1,361 804 577
Probability of debt conditional 
on use (1/0)
0.061 (0.058) 0.059 (0.085) 0.017 (0.083)
Observations 1,413 836 577
Log of the amount of debt 
conditional on borrowing (INR)
-0.078 (0.206) 0.251 (0.353) -0.547** (0.232)
Observations 1,100 643 457
Notes: Table shows coefficients of OLS models using household level fixed effects. Logged forms of healthcare 
expenses and the amount of debt are used in the respective models. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively.
RSBY membership is not significantly associated with the likelihood of hospitalization or the likelihood 
of positive spending within a household, the latter most likely related to high likelihood of having 
expenses at baseline. This is true for the pooled sample, and for both of the state specific samples. We do 
however find RSBY membership to be associated with a reduction in OOP spending in Bihar (36%). RSBY 
households in Bihar concurrently experience a 55% reduction in the amount of debt incurred in dealing 
with the cost of hospitalization. We find no significant effects on financial protection in UP. We carry out 
additional sensitivity analysis by restricting the sample to households in the bottom two asset tertiles. 
Results in general are comparable and are presented in Annex 4.5. 
4.5  Discussion and concluding remarks 
The Government of India (GoI) initiated Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) in 2008 to provide 
inpatient insurance coverage to below-poverty-line (BPL) households in India. To date, the RSBY provides 
coverage to nearly 37 million BPL households across all 29 states. This paper examines three aspects of 
the programme taking place in the Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Bihar states of India. Using household level 
panel data, we first examine determinants of enrolment into RSBY followed by the determinants of 
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dropping out of the scheme. Lastly, the paper investigates whether RSBY membership is associated with 
increases in hospitalization rates and decreases in spending on inpatient care. 
 By 2013, more than half of our sample is enrolled in RSBY (51%). We do not have information on BPL 
status, but would expect about two-thirds of our sample to have BPL status, which would mean that 
coverage of RSBY in these states is reasonably high. While we do find coverage to be more concentrated 
among the poorest, the socioeconomic gradient is very weak in UP. This could be related to either some 
mistargeting of RSBY or mistargeting of BPL cards. Our findings correspond with observations made 
in similar studies. Sun (2010) for example speculated that the fact that the BPL list had been created 
nearly a decade prior to the launch of the RSBY considerably increased the potential for mistargeting. 
Subsequently, evidence of leakage was found by both Nandi et al. (2013) and Bagcchi (2014).
 Analysis of the determinants of enrolment into the scheme reveals several insights. Firstly, the positive 
correlation between existing chronic conditions and enrolment suggests problems of adverse selection 
which might threaten sustainability of the scheme. The programme’s pro-poor targeting is reflected in a 
higher concentration of poor wealth groups, lower educated households and SCST households among 
the enrolled. Insurance related awareness plays a considerable role in the household’s decision to join 
the scheme. Additionally, we find enrolment rates vary considerably across villages (ranges between 
7% and 78%), which might reflect geographical factors or variation in the efficacy of the RSBY partners 
(insurance companies) in enrolment activities. Distance to the nearest facility is negatively correlated 
to the likelihood of enrolling in the scheme. This indicates that the insured are indeed sensitive to 
accessibility and quality of care. Strengthening the health infrastructure by improving its quality and 
access will likely encourage more eligible households to join. 
 We find that the drop-out rates among RSBY households are relatively low (11% on average), 
suggesting that the program is considered to offer good value for (a limited amount of ) money. 
Households with chronic illnesses are less likely to drop-out, further suggesting problems of adverse 
selection. SCST households are more likely to retain their membership. 
 We do not find RSBY membership to be associated with an increased likelihood of using inpatient 
care. The association between RSBY membership and financial protection appears to differ across the 
states. While no effects are seen among RSBY households in UP, insurance coverage is associated with 
a substantial reduction in OOP (36%) and the amount of debt incurred (55%) in Bihar. This contradicts 
the findings of an earlier study focusing on Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu by Selvaraj and 
Karan (2012), who find that that weak scheme administration, lack of effective operational oversight and 
absence of accountability mechanisms led to increased expenses in inpatient care. This difference in 
results is likely driven by the fact that each state has a heterogeneous number of players and methods 
of implementation. The larger effect in Bihar, as compared to UP, could be related to the development 
efforts by the Bihar government since 2005.54 These efforts include attempts to improve upon and 
enlarge access to basic services such as transportation and primary, secondary and vocational education 
54 The departments heading the RSBY in Bihar (DoHFW) and in UP (DoRD) were different, thereby leading to line management 
differences in the initial implementation. Subsequently, RSBY in UP was implemented by DoHFW. Secondly, political governance 
and administration has had different trajectory in Bihar as compared to UP, with the latter facing scams involving National Rural 
Health Mission and its repercussions on community perceptions. In Bihar, the government ownership to RSBY at the district-level 
was relatively higher than UP. These observations were communicated by the field-partners and some officials engaged with the 
implementation of RSBY.
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(Singh, Stern 2013). Most importantly, the development efforts placed considerable focus on health 
through upgrading of health infrastructure and manpower, outsourcing diagnostic facilities, providing 
access to free medication, provision of emergency services, and maintenance of accountability through 
web-based monitoring (Planning Commission 2007). 
 Despite the positive effect on financial protection in Bihar, confirming the findings of Devadasan et 
al. (2013), we find that the programme does not provide cashless access to inpatient care. We find the 
probability of incurring any expenses for hospitalization to be close to one in both states for the whole 
sample. This might be related to RSBY not covering the full costs of treatment given to insured patients, 
or to problems of awareness among the low SES target group of RSBY.
 There are some limitations to this paper. First and foremost, the surveys did not collect information 
regarding the respondent households’ BPL status and the duration of enrolment in the RSBY. We are unable 
to ascertain whether the respondents, when hospitalized, in fact sought care from RSBY empanelled 
institutions. The data on which the paper is based were collected to gauge the impact of a CBHI scheme 
and is restricted to SHG households. Furthermore, as we have a relatively small sample of households 
which experienced hospitalization, models that are conditional on use may have low statistical power. 
RSBY was clearly not rolled out in a randomized way. While we do control for a rich set of observable 
characteristics and household fixed effects, there may still be unobservable time-varying characteristics 
that correlate with both the uptake of RSBY and the need for inpatient care. Notwithstanding these 
limitations, our study concludes that RSBY is indeed pro-poor, but there is evidence of adverse selection 
which might jeopardize long term sustainability. While insured households still need to make OOP 
payments for inpatient care in both states, RSBY is associated with increased financial protection in Bihar.
 RSBY has the potential to contribute to India’s move towards UHC. A further, more qualitative 
investigation, of the differences in RSBY implementation and management across the two states will 
provide useful insights on how to improve effectiveness of RSBY in UP. The focus on inpatient coverage 
might be a further point of concern. It is likely that generous inpatient care coverage in the absence of 
outpatient coverage might lead to inefficient and unnecessary use of hospital care.55 Like many LMICs 
India is experiencing an epidemiological shift towards non-communicable diseases (Quigley, 2006), 
and the management of such conditions, typically through outpatient based care, has been found to 
represent one of the largest shares of households’ health related expenditures (Dror and Vellakkal, 2012)
India’s Labour Ministry launched a hospital insurance scheme called Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana 
(RSBY. Moving forward to UHC will therefore also have to entail an extension of outpatient care coverage, 
either through RSBY or separate schemes (Dror and Vellakkal, 2012)India’s Labour Ministry launched 
a hospital insurance scheme called Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY. Improving the targeting of 
RSBY, through a revision of the BPL list, should also rank high on the policy agenda. 
55 Lessons from the Chinese New Cooperative Medical System for example suggests the absence of outpatient coverage is likely 
to increase incidences of out-of-pocket payments and reduce impact on financial protection (Wagstaff et al., 2009)
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5.1  Introduction
Extreme poverty is widespread and persistent in Bangladesh with more than a third of the population 
living under $1.25/day. In response, Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction (CFPR) programme 
was launched by BRAC. The programme provides income generating assets, multifaceted training on 
entrepreneurial activities, health, nutrition, social and legal awareness over a period of two years with 
the aim of merging them with the mainstream poor.56 A number of studies have investigated the effects 
of CFPR on the programme’s main intended outcomes such as income, asset holdings and occupation. 
They report strong positive short and long run impact of participation on income, productive asset 
holdings during the first phase of the programme using quasi-experimental methods (CFPR I: 2002-
2006) (Emran et al., 2014; Misha et al., 2014; Prakash and Rana, 2006; Raza et al., 2012).57 The second phase 
of the programme (CFPR II: 2007-2011) uses a randomized control trial (RCT) design to generate robust 
evidence on impact as well as its spill over effects.58 Results derived from this phase of the programme 
are comparable to the first (Bandiera et al., 2013; Das et al., 2009). Bandiera, Burgess et al., (2012) is the 
only study to report on the avenues and magnitudes of the spill over effects of CFPR II at the community 
level. The programme has received wide acclaim and is being replicated across 20 countries.59
 To the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence on the programme’s impact on secondary 
outcomes like malnutrition. While beneficiaries were given information on healthy lifestyles and good 
nutrition, especially for children, there were no transfers in terms of food. Establishing the effects of 
such an anti-poverty programmes on malnutrition is important, especially given the relatively high and 
persistent malnutrition rates in the country. Malnutrition is a major contributor to child morbidity and 
mortality in Bangladesh (Rahman et al., 2009).60 Nearly 39% of children younger than 5 in rural Bangladesh 
are underweight while 28% of women report thinness (body mass index [BMI] <18.5) (National 
Institute of Population Research and Training (NIPORT) et al., 2013).61 Inadequate nutrition increases 
the probability of contracting infectious diseases, stifles cognitive development and leads to growth 
faltering for children under 5 (Black et al., 2008; Haddad, 2003; Venis, 2003; World Health Organization, 
2013). Malnourished adults are susceptible to chronic illnesses such as high blood pressure, diabetes and 
heart diseases while economic costs can add up to 10% of lifetime earnings (Horton and Steckel, 2013; 
56 BRAC considers individuals earning USD $0.60-$0.70 per day to be ultra-poor (BRAC, 2013).
57 Income in the short run for example experienced a 56% increase over the baseline. While the difference continued to increase 
over the mid-run, it stagnates in the long term driven mostly by the catch-up among the control group (33% over the baseline) 
(Misha et al., 2014)providing multifaceted support in the form of asset-transfer, food-stipends, education, healthcare and social 
support for two years. Utilizing a four-round panel data spanning 9 years and combining regression and propensity score 
weighting, we evaluate CFPR\u2019s short and long term impact on income, employment, social status, food security and asset 
ownership. While remarkable effects of CFPR are evident in short and medium-term (up to 6 years since baseline. For other 
outcomes such as food intake, Haseen and Sulaiman (2007) find that programme participation led to both an increase in mean 
calorie intake from 1750 to 2138 per day, and in the quality of the calories consumed.
58 CFPR I reached approximately 100,000 households while CFPR II was scaled up to encompass nearly 800,000 households. 
59 Banerjee et al (2015) perform RCTs across six of these locations and find that driven by the rise in income, the programme 
produces significant and cost-effective impact on consumption and improves the psychological conditioning of the participants. 
60 Nearly 37% of children under 5 are undernourished worldwide, the highest concentrations in South Asia and Africa (UNICEF, 
2012).
61 Indication of long term malnutrition (stunting) for example in Bangladesh and Nepal are 41% compared to 44% in Pakistan and 
48% in India. (Chowdhury et al., 2013; UNICEF, 2013)
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Hunt, 2005; Saunders and Smith, 2010). Further discussion of the consequences of malnourishment are 
available in Isabel and Correla et al., (2003).
 Malnutrition is largely driven by poor maternal and child care practices, food insecurity and unsafe 
public health conditions (Gartner et al., 2005; World Health Organization, 2013). Exclusive breastfeeding 
plays a crucial role in determining early childhood nutrition status. In Bangladesh, while nearly all 
mothers initiate breastfeeding soon after birth, the average duration of exclusive feeding however is 
3.5 months, which is below the recommended WHO average of 6 months. Infectious diseases such 
as diarrhoea, malaria, pneumonia, and acute respiratory illnesses among children can diminish the 
absorptive capacities of vital nutrients leading to malnutrition and remains a major cause of morbidity 
(Brown, 2003). Though the prevalence of such diseases have dramatically reduced over the past decade 
and are now responsible for only 2 percent of under-5 deaths, the rate remains at 49 (per 1000 live births) 
despite the 50% decline over the past two decades. Nearly 99% of the rural population in Bangladesh 
has access to improved sources of drinking water such as a piped water source, tube wells or protected 
springs. The use of safe sanitary facility such as with a running flush, pit latrine and composting toilet is 
however restricted to only a third of the rural population (National Institute of Population Research and 
Training (NIPORT) et al., 2013). Though not considered the primary focus of CFPR, the health component 
of the programme targeting the aforementioned pathways could be expected to impact nutritional 
outcomes. In addition to facilitating access to sanitary facilities to the participants, the CFPR raised 
awareness on healthy behaviours (breastfeeding, handwashing), and provided participants with easier 
access to primary health care. 
 The health impact of CFPR is likely to extend to non-participants living in the targeted districts, 
either through economic spill-overs as identified in previous research (Bandiera et al., 2013), or through 
behavioural factors such as prolonged breastfeeding and increased hygiene practices. A considerable 
number of studies have drawn attention to the spill-over effects of anti-poverty programmes. PROGRESA 
(later renamed Oportunidades), a conditional cash transfer programme targeted at poor Mexican 
households, was found to have substantial impact on consumption of food and non-food items, asset 
ownership and increased schooling. Important spill-over effects of PROGESA have been identified on 
consumption62 (Angelucci and De Giorgi, 2006), asset ownership (Barrientos and Sabatés-Wheeler, 
2011), schooling (Bobonis and Finan, 2002) and preventive care (Bouckaert, 2014). 
 This study uses a two wave panel dataset from a randomly rolled out CFPR II programme across 13 
of the poorest districts in Bangladesh. We first evaluate the impact of the CFPR on the nutritional status 
of participant household members, and subsequently investigate spill over effects on non-participants. 
We distinguish between spill-over effects on the poor and non-poor. As gender inequality is high on 
the policy agenda in Bangladesh and the impact of anti-poverty programmes has been linked to the 
gender of the main recipients (Berger, 1989), we investigate the heterogeneity of impact across sex of 
the household head and the sex of the household member. Lastly, we identify potential pathways of 
both the main effects and spill-over effects. This paper adds to several strands of the literature. It is the 
first paper to look at the nutritional impact of such a large scale ultra-poverty alleviation programme. 
62 Magnitudes of effects on the non-treated are typically a third of the average treatment effects when it comes to consumption 
and more than a fifth for asset holdings (land and livestock). Magnitudes of spill-over effects for preventative care varies between 
12% and 80% of the main impact across outcomes. 
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Second, it adds to the understanding and pathways of spill-over effects on non-beneficiaries of such 
programmes.
 In the next section, we first describe the CFPR programme. This is followed by a description of 
the dataset and identification strategy. Thereafter results are presented and discussed, after which 
concluding remarks and policy recommendations are made.
5.2  CFPR Programme and pathways of spill-over effects
Evidence shows that NGOs traditionally find it challenging to reach the ultra-poor for various 
interventions as they typically lack the skills and the means to participate in such programmes (Hashemi 
and Rosenberg, 2006; Navajas et al., 2000). To explicitly reach this elusive population, the CFPR uses a 
three-step targeting procedure. Geographic selection, based on the World Food Programme poverty 
map, is first carried out to identify the poorest sub-districts of the country. Post-selection, BRAC officials 
from these sub-districts scope their respective areas and identify the most vulnerable areas within the 
communities. The last step combines the use of wealth ranking exercises (WRE) (see Participatory Rural 
Appraisal for details (Chambers, 1994)) and surveys in each of the communities to identify ultra-poor 
households. All households within each of the communities are then divided into 5 to 6 relative wealth 
ranks. Households in the bottom rank are considered the poorest and are subject to verification surveys 
to ensure eligibility.63 
 CFPR eases the innate restrictions of a resource and skill poor household through the provision 
of income generating assets64 valued at approximately USD $140 and a comprehensive livelihood 
development training programme to encourage entrepreneurship. Once selected, the participants 
enrol in the programme for two years. During this time, in addition to regular hands on training in 
maintaining the assets and developing entrepreneurial skills, the participants develop skills in education, 
social and political awareness, health and nutrition through bi-weekly training sessions with a BRAC 
programme official. The households in addition receive a small weekly sustenance allowance during the 
first year to counter potential opportunity costs. 
 Association with CFPR grants the participants access to the Essential Health Care package that includes 
health and nutrition education that covers topics such as importance of exclusively breastfeeding until 
the 6th month, child immunization, pregnancy care, oral rehydration therapy, provision of basic curative 
care for common illnesses at cost, or free if the patient is unable to pay, and the delivery of DOTS (Directly 
Observed Treatment, Short course) for tuberculosis patients. The rationale behind these components is 
to develop health awareness, change “unfelt need” to “felt need” and control disease transmission. All 
training sessions are done on a one-to-one basis, usually within the confines of the participant’s home.
63 The inclusion criteria include (3 of 5 have to be met): Household owns less than 10 decimals of land; Main source of income is 
by female member begging or working as domestic help; no active male adult (female household head); School-aged children 
working for pay; No productive or income generating assets. The exclusion criteria, of which all have to be met, include: No Active 
female member in the household; Microfinance participants; Household members receiving government benefits such as old 
age pensions.
64 These assets typically comprise of some combination of cows, goats, poultry or vegetation nurseries that best suited for the 
capacity of the participant and local conditions such as access to grazing grounds.
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The CFPR creates an influx of agricultural assets in the treated communities, precipitates a shift in the 
hours devoted from wage to self-employment among the poorest women in the community, and 
increases self-employment output (e.g. milk, eggs) in the local markets. Bandiera et al. (2012) purport 
this causes spill-over effects in local wages, output and livestock prices, leading to changes in the 
local market equilibrium. The spill-over effects studies in this paper are more behavioural in nature 
and we hypothesise pathways through which this may occur. As the CFPR revolves around repeated 
dissemination of messages through in-depth and repeated training sessions on various topics to ensure 
information retention. Social networks and the “word of mouth” are quite fluid in rural communities 
and information is transmitted through households within similar socioeconomic strata (Banerjee et al., 
2013; Scott, 2012). The importance of the knowledge gained through interventions results in explicit or 
implicit signalling by participants and its subsequent effects can instigate “demonstration effects” among 
non-participating households (Handa et al., 2001; Miguel and Kremer, 2004). While non-participant 
households do not receive direct transfers of goods, services or knowledge, information on nutrition, 
health and overall well being acquired by participants are easily transmitted among neighbours. As 
a proxy for these pathways, we investigate the effects on intermediary outcomes among the non-
participants. 
5.3  Data and methods
5.3.1  Evaluation design and data collection
The data for the study was collected from 40 BRAC field level branches encompassing 13 of the poorest 
districts in Bangladesh.65 Once the decision was reached as to which branches within the districts would 
receive the intervention, the evaluation team randomly selected 20 sub-districts with at least two 
branches. Using pair-wise randomization, each was randomly assigned as treated or control branch. 
Each of the branch offices within the sub-districts typically operate within a 5km radius while the 
branches on average are 12km apart. 
 Prior to the randomized assignment to treatment or control, wealth ranking exercises were carried 
out in each branch and final selections were made. To prevent anticipation effects, none of the surveyed 
households in either the treated or control area was aware of the CFPR at baseline. The control groups 
were oblivious to its existence until 2011, at which point they also were enrolled. Three groups of people 
were surveyed in each of the locations: (i) the ultra-poor (UP), (ii) the other-poor (OP), that is, those who 
were primarily selected during the WRE but later disqualified during the verification surveys and (iii) the 
non-poor (NP). The average treatment effects on the treated are identified by comparing the UP across 
treated and control communities. Spill-over effects are derived through the comparison between OP 
and the NP individuals across treated and control districts.
 Pre-intervention data from 2007 amasses information from 23,417 individuals (7,817 households) 
from UP households, 43,575 individuals (12,551 households) from OP households and 28,345 individuals 
65 Baseline survey branches were from 13 districts (Chapainobabgonj, Kishorgonj, Madaripur, Naogan, Netrokona, Sherajgonj, 
Thakurgaon, Ponchogorh, Nilphamari, Lalmonirhat, Kurigram, Gaibandha and Rangpur).
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(6,609 households) from NP households in treated and control areas.66 Attrition over the course of four 
years (17%, 16% and 15% respectively among UP, OP and NP households) led to a balanced panel of 
19,427 individuals in UP households, 36,476 members in OP households and 24,096 individuals in 2009. 
The primary respondent was the main female member of the household. All surveys were conducted 
between April and December in each of the respective years. Further details are available in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Sample
Category Baseline sample  
(individuals [households])
Additions† Attrition Balanced panel 
(individuals)
Ultra-poor 23417 [7817] 4187 3990 19427
Other-poor 43575 [12551] 7824 7099 36476
Non-poor 28345 [6609] 5984 4258 24096
Notes: Table shows sample details of population groups. † Individuals added on to households within the groups by 
the way of marriages or births. 
5.3.2  Variables 
Survey instruments collected information on height, weight, sex and age (in months for individuals 
under 5, in years for above) on all members of the household.67 We categorize our sample following the 
WHO reference population guidelines: 0 to 5 years; 6 to 19 years and 19+ years. 
 Anthropometric outcomes for children (under 5) are calculated using the WHO 2006 growth 
standards (Borghi et al., 2006). We calculate height-for-weight (WHZ), weight-for-age (WAZ) and height 
for age (HAZ) z-scores(de Onis et al., 2007; World Health Organization, n.d.) and consider children with 
z-scores below -2 standard deviations (SD) from the median of the reference population as respectively 
wasted, underweight and stunted (World Health Organization, 2010). Wasting indicates acute 
malnutrition, stunting reflects chronic malnutrition and underweight a combination of both acute and 
long term malnutrition (Borghi et al., 2006; Group, 1986; World Health Organization, 2010). Following the 
WHO recommendation, for the 6-19 years age group we use body mass index (BMI) z-scores, and an 
indicator of thinness (z-score below -2 SD) instead of the WHZ z-score and binary indicator. For adults 
older than 19 we use continuous BMI as a measure of nutritional status, and indicators of moderate 
and severe thinness defined as BMI below 18.5 and 17 respectively (Garrow and Webster, 1985; NIPORT, 
2013). 
 We follow the UNICEF (1990) nutrition framework to identify the most important determinants of 
nutritional status. The framework suggests insufficient breastfeeding, vitamin A and iron deficiencies 
among infants and children contribute to a low nutrition status. Infectious diseases such as diarrhoea, 
malaria, pneumonia, and acute respiratory illnesses among children can diminish the absorption 
capacities of vital nutrients leading to malnutrition (Brown, 2003). For adults, the framework suggests 
the combined effects of food insecurity, ill health and poor public health conditions culminate in 
66 See Table 5.2 for age-specific sample sizes. 
67 Recumbent supine length was collected for children under 24 months of age. 
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malnutrition. Using this framework as a guide, we assess the impact of CFPR on a number of intermediary 
outcomes that are hypothesized to affect the nutritional status of members in participant and non-
participant households: initiation and duration of exclusive breastfeeding68, vitamin A supplementation 
(for children aged between 6 to 59 months), and disease prevalence in the15 days preceding the survey. 
For children, information is collected on symptoms reflecting diarrhoea, malaria, pneumonia and acute 
respiratory illness, while for adults we use an indicator for any illness. General attributes of the household 
included whether the household has access to sanitary latrines and safe drinking water. 
5.3.3  Baseline characteristics
Table 5.2 shows baseline means of outcomes of interest across the various groups. Columns 1 and 2 
show means of individuals in UP households in treated and control areas followed by their normalized 
differences in Column 3. Normalized differences are calculated as the difference in means divided by 
the square root of the sum of their variances. Imbens and Wooldridge (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009) 
proposed this scale free measure as an alternative to using t-tests that increase mechanically with 
sample sizes. Authors suggest that only normalized differences above 0.25 are likely to be sensitive 
to specification changes. Columns 4 and 5 show outcome means across treated and control areas 
for individuals in OP households followed by their scale-free differences in Column 6. Outcomes 
appear to not significantly differ across treated and control areas among all age groups, suggesting 
that randomization was successful in creating similar groups. We generally expect members in OP 
households to be less malnourished given their higher socioeconomic status. 
 Panel A in Table 5.2 show corresponding baseline averages for the 6 to 19 years population, indicating 
similar degrees of malnutrition. While nearly a quarter of the sample across all groups are moderate to 
severely thin, nearly 40% are stunted. Panel B of Table 5.2 shows means of the BMI for adults and the 
likelihood of moderate and severe thinness. Trends show that nearly 2/3rd of the adults are moderately 
thin while a third are severely thin (summary statistics in 2011 are presented in Annex 5.3).
 The evaluation instrument collected detailed information related to demographic characteristics 
such as composition of the household, sex of the household head and the household size. Socioeconomic 
information detailed on education and employment status of all household members including sources 
of income with a recall period of 12 months. Detailed information on assets (land, livestock, and cash 
saving) were collected (see Annex 5.4). Comparison of baseline means show a higher probability of 
an UP household head working as a casual day labourer in treated areas than as control (46% versus 
30%). None of the other characteristics were significantly different from each other. Similarly for OP 
households, none of the differences in the covariates significantly differed between treated and control 
areas. 
68 The information was collected in days for less than one months and the number of months thereafter. For this study we convert 
the months to days by multiplying the number by 30.42.
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Table 5.2: Baseline summary statistics of outcome variables
 Ultra-poor households Other-poor households
 
Treated 
areas
Control 
areas
Normalized 
differences
Treated 
areas
Control 
areas
Normalized 
differences
 1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A: 6 to 19 years
Body mass index (BMI in SD) -1.37 -1.35 -0.02 -1.34 -1.28 -0.06
Thinness (BMI< -2SD) (1/0) 0.26 0.24 0.03 0.24 0.22 0.04
Height for age (HAZ) -1.63 -1.69 0.05 -1.53 -1.55 0.01
Stunting (HAZ<-2SD) (1/0) 0.39 0.40 -0.02 0.34 0.36 -0.03
Weight for age (WAZ) -1.97 -1.99 0.02 -1.88 -1.89 0.02
Underweight (WAZ<-2SD) (1/0) 0.50 0.49 0.01 0.46 0.47 -0.01
Observations 3620 2098 5103 5707
Panel B: 19 years +
Body mass index (absolute value) 18.26 18.40 -0.06 18.88 18.91 -0.01
Moderate thinness (BMI<18.5) 0.60 0.56 0.07 0.49 0.48 0.01
Severe thinness (BMI<17) 0.29 0.28 0.03 0.20 0.20 0.02
Observations 6,415 4,027  8,459 9,638  
Notes: Table shows baseline (2007) means of outcome variables. Columns 1 and 2 show means across treated and 
control areas for ultra-poor households. Columns 4 and 5 show outcome means across treated and control areas 
among other-poor households. Columns 4 and 6 present normalized differences between the respective groups, 
calculated as the difference in means in treatment and control areas, divided by the squared root of the sum of their 
variances. 
Nutritional status indicators for children below 5 are graphically represented in Figure 5.1 (see Annex 
5.1 for details). At baseline approximately a fifth all children are wasted, nearly half are stunted and 
underweight across the treated and control areas for UP and OP households. Similarly, continuous 
z-scores indicating malnutrition (weight-for-height, height-for-age and weight-for-age) are considerably 
below the WHO reference median across all groups. 
5.3.4  Empirical strategy
5.4.1  Analytical technique
To identify impact of the programme on the ultra-poor, we compare trends in nutritional outcomes of 
ultra-poor individuals between treated and control communities. We estimate a difference-in-difference 
(DiD) model for each outcome Y
i
 to control for group-level compositional changes across treated and 
control areas. Using ordinary least squares for the sample of UP households, we calculate the DiD using 
the following functional form:
Y
it
 = α + X’
i0
 β
1
 + Y’
i0
 β
2
 + β
3
 D
it
 + γ
i
 + t
t
 + ε
it
  (1)
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X’
0 
represents a vector of baseline household characteristics and Y’
0
 represents baseline outcomes (Y’
0
). 
Given the broad scope of CFPR, we prefer to control for baseline, rather than time varying characteristics 
as these could potentially be affected by the treatment. γ
i
 represents village level fixed effects69 and t
t
 
represents the time trend in nutritional status common to both groups. D
it
 is equal to one if the household 
is residing in a treated district at time t. The coefficient of interest (β
3
) represents the treatment effect of 
the CFPR. Spill-over effects are identified using the same specification (1), but estimated on the sample 
of OP individuals. Standard errors are clustered at the branch level. 
 The women-centric application of the CFPR resulted in greater socioeconomic gains for female 
headed households during the first phase of the programme (Misha et al., 2014). On the other hand, 
gender based discrimination in favour of males, especially in terms of food consumption and in 
relation to children, are not uncommon in Bangladesh (WFP, 2012). To investigate the gender related 
heterogeneity of the effects of CFPR on nutritional outcomes, we extend model (1) through the inclusion 
of two interaction terms:
Y
i
 = α + X’
i0
 θ
1
 + Y’
i0
 θ
2
+θ
3
 D
it
 + θ
4
 D
it
 * HH
it
 + θ
5
 D
it
 * Gen
it
 + γ
t
 + ε
it
  (2)
where HH
it 
= 1
 
if the head of the household is male. Similarly, Gen
it
 = 1
 
if the individual is a male. In model 
(2), θ
3  
gives the unique average effect of CFPR on a female respondent in a female headed households. 
The average effect on the treated is obtained though averaging the partial effect of CFPR across treated 
areas and subsequently combining θ
3
 with θ
4
 and θ
5
. Similarly, the impact on individuals in female 
headed households (θ
4
) is given by averaging the partial effect of CFPR in treated areas for the particular 
subgroup. Standard errors are estimated using the delta method and are clustered at the branch level. 
 To deal with Type 1 errors (α) due to multiple hypothesis testing, the critical value at which the null 
hypothesis is rejected are adjusted downward using the Bonferroni correction procedure (Gibson et al., 
2011; Sankoh et al., 1997)70 All analysis is done using STATA 13.
69 We prefer using village fixed effects over individual fixed effects as the latter cannot be identified for those individuals ‘outgrow’ 
a specific age-group, or are born into the youngest group later on in the survey. We confirmed robustness of results to using 
household fixed effects, and to using non-linear models. Results are available upon request.
70 Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 examine the impact and spillover effects of CFPR on multiple outcomes, giving rise to the possibility 
of Type I errors (α). Typical thresholds of α=0.05 equates to 1 in 20 null hypothesis being rejected by chance. The probability 
increases to 0.27 for 6 outcomes. We use Bonferroni correction procedures for multiple hypothesis testing following Gibson, 
McKenzie and Stillman (2011). The correction accounts for family-wise correlations between outcomes. For outcomes related 
to ages 0 to 19 years, the correlation  m is 0.13 and 0.23 for adult (19+ years) outcomes. Although the Bonferroni procedure is 
considered quite conservative for correlated outcomes, our results are robust to the correction (McKenzie 2012; Perneger 1998). 
Factoring in family-wise correlations in the calculations yields the following set of critical values: 
Critical threshold (α) Bonferroni corrected critical threshold (αB)
0-19yrs 19+ years
0.100 0.021 0.046
0.050 0.011 0.023
0.010 0.002 0.005
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5.4.2  Attrition
The rate of attrition in our sample (16% and 17% for participant and non-participant household 
members respectively) is not uncommon for programmes such as the CFPR (Banerjee et al., 2010). 
Models investigating the correlates of attrition among both UP and OP households are presented in 
Annex 5.5. Generally we find limited correlation among the covariates with the likelihood of attrition. 
Household heads working in agriculture or as semi-skilled workers among UP households are less likely 
to attrite. Household heads with primary education among OP households are similarly less likely to 
attrite. We subsequently test whether the relationship between the covariates and attrition vary across 
the treatment status. The null hypotheses of this test was not rejected. Attrition could bias our impact 
estimates if it is related to unobservable time varying variables that also correlate with treatment. To 
test for attrition bias we utilize the Verbeek and Neijman (1992) test where we add a leading selection 
indicator to the DiD model (1) and test the significance of this indicator (Jones et al., 2013). Results 
indicate the attrition to be random as the null of no effect was not rejected for any of the outcomes 
(results available upon request). 
5.5  Results
5.5.1  Impact of CFPR on participant households
Table 5.3 presents the average treatment effect on UP households. The estimates are subsequently 
disaggregated to show the heterogeneity of impact across the sex of the household head and 
subsequently across the gender of each of the members. Panel A presents the impact of the CFPR on 
under-5 children. The weight-for-height z-scores in children increase by 0.78 SD and represents nearly 
60% change over the baseline mean. This correspondingly precipitates the reduction in the probability 
of wasting (WHZ<-2SD) by 8 percentage points (pp). Children in treated areas experience an increase 
of 0.52 SD in the weight-for-age indicator (25% increase from baseline) with a corresponding reduction 
in the likelihood of being underweight (WHZ<-2SD) by 19pp. No impact is seen in the height-for-age 
indicator or the probability of stunting. Results investigating the heterogeneity of impact show greater 
reduction in the probability of being underweight in female headed households. The impact of CFPR 
does not vary by the sex of the individual.
 Panel B presents impact of CFPR on the nutritional status of individuals aged 6 to 19 years. The BMI 
among individuals in this age group increase by 0.36 SD (27% over the baseline) with an 11pp reduction 
in the likelihood of being thin. Though the weight-for-age does not increase significantly, the probability 
of being underweight (WAZ<-2SD) reduces by 10pp. Height-for-age or the likelihood of stunting (HAZ<-
2SD) are not affected by CFPR participation. Heterogeneity of effects confirm that individuals in female 
headed households experience a greater reduction in the probability of thinness. 
 Impact on individuals aged above 19 years are presented in Panel C. Results show that the BMI 
among adults in treated communities increases by 0.57. The probability of being moderately thin 
(BMI<18.5) reduces by 11pp and the likelihood of being severely thin (BMI<17.0) by 8pp. Heterogeneity 
in impact reveal greater gains in BMI among men. Similarly, adults living in male headed households are 
more likely to experience larger reduction in the probability of moderate thinness. We subsequently test 
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whether women are impacted differently across male or female headed households. Results reveal no 
significant differences (results available upon request).
 Overall, considerable effects are seen for individuals living in participating households, the results 
most pronounced among the children under-5. 
5.5.2  Spill-over effects of CFPR 
The spill over of effects of CFPR on OP households are presented in Table 5.4. The weight-for-height 
z-scores for children under-5 increase by 0.45 SD, resulting in a 12pp drop in the probability of being 
wasted. While the magnitude of impact on the continuous indicator is nearly half in comparison to 
the impact on the ultra-poor, the magnitude of the effect on the variable indicating wasting is in 
fact larger than the ATET (12pp versus 8pp). The weight-for-height indicators increases by 0.28 SD 
(compared to 0.52SD for the UP). This results in the reduction in probability of being underweight by 
9pp in comparison to 19pp among the UP. Impact on height-for-age or the probability of stunting is not 
significantly different from 0. Heterogeneity of effects across the sex of the household head show the 
effects on the weight-for-height indicator to be more than four times greater among the female headed 
households. Similar results are found for the probability of wasting. Furthermore, the z-score for weight-
for-height among female children increase nearly twice as much. Similar trends are also noticed for the 
weight-for-age indicator. 
 Effects are smaller for the 6-19 years age group (Panel B). The z-score for BMI increases for this 
population by 0.19 SD and the probability of being thin reduces by 4pp. The magnitudes of these 
effects are nearly half of the impact for the UP (0.36 SD and 11pp respectively). No impact is seen for the 
height-for-age or the weight-for-age indicators. While no heterogeneity is detected across the sex of the 
household head, gains in BMI among female members are significantly higher.
 Panel C shows the impact on adults older than 19 years. The BMI among adults increase by 0.23 
(roughly a third of the impact on UP households). The correspondent likelihood of being moderately 
thin (BMI<18.5) reduces by 4pp and the probability of severe thinness diminishes by 3pp (corresponding 
figures for participant adults are 11pp and 8pp respectively). While no heterogeneity of effects are 
apparent across the sex of the household head, the BMI among the female members are three times 
their male counterparts. The likelihood of severe thinness decreases considerably more for the women. 
No impact of CFPR is seen among members of NP households (see Annex 5.6). Overall, significant 
improvements are seen in the nutritional status among the OP, the size of the magnitudes being typically 
half of those for the participants. 
5.5.3  Pathways of spill over effect in non-participant children 
We use the UNICEF nutrition framework (1990)including blindness. The triple A approach includes: 1 to 
identify potential avenues for spill-over effects. The framework identifies factors such as the increased 
likelihood and duration of exclusive breastfeeding, diminished exposure to infectious diseases and 
access to vitamin A supplements as contributing to better nutritional outcomes among children. At 
baseline, proportion of mothers who breastfeed are nearly universal (see Annex 5.2). Among the UP, 
more than 95% of the mothers in treated areas breastfeed their children compared to 97% in control. 
The duration of exclusive breastfeeding among the UP in treated and control areas are 103 days and 
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5
94 days respectively. While 28% of the mothers administered vitamin A to their children after birth in 
treated areas, the proportion among the control are 34%. The prevalence of breastfeeding and the 
duration are comparable in OP households, the proportions of children who receive vitamin A are 38% 
and 34% in the treated and control areas respectively. Lastly, the prevalence of children under-5 with 
infectious diseases is 3% for both UP and OP households in both treated and control areas. 
 The framework similarly identifies illnesses, lack of food security and poor public health conditions 
(e.g. access to sanitary latrines) as detrimental to adult nutritional status. At baseline, the likelihood of an 
illness averages at around 27% and 26% among the UP and OP respectively. While 47% of UP in treated 
areas can typically manage 2 meals a day, their counterparts average at 36%. Approximately 66% of OP 
in treated areas can manage two meals day, the average among those in the control areas are 57%. 
Nearly 55% of households in treated areas use sanitary latrines compared to 47% among the control. Use 
of sanitary latrines among the OP are 65% and 60% respectively for treated and control areas. Access to 
safe drinking water however is nearly universal across all groups.
 Table 5.5 shows the impact of CFPR on intermediary outcomes affecting the nutrition status of 
members in both UP and OP households. Considering the high prevalence of breastfeeding during the 
baseline, the lack of impact is not surprising. The impact on the duration of exclusive breastfeeding is 
large. CFPR causes mothers in ultra-poor households to increase the duration of exclusive breastfeeding 
by 73 days (75% increase over the baseline), while the spill over effect to other-poor is 52 days (49% 
increase over the baseline). Similarly, the probability of a child receiving a vitamin A supplement 
increases by 26pp and 20pp among UP and OP households respectively. 
 If the duration of breastfeeding is an important pathway of the nutritional impact of CFPR, we 
should see larger effects of CFPR on children under 24 months. We investigate the heterogeneity of 
impact across two age groups: 0-24 months years and 25-60 months (see Annex 5.7) and find that 
indeed underweight weight-for-height and probability of being underweight are more strongly 
affected for the younger group (0-24 months) among both the UP and OP households. The differences 
in the magnitudes of impact for the ultra-poor and other-poor households are comparable to the main 
findings.
 Adults among ultra-poor households are less likely to fall ill by 2pp, though no impact is seen among 
the other-poor adults. In terms of food security however, both groups experience an increase in the 
probability of generally being able to secure at least two meals every day (by 14pp and 6pp for the 
ultra-poor and other-poor respectively). Lastly, the use of sanitary toilets increase by 18pp and 11pp 
respectively for the ultra-poor and other-poor respectively. 
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Table 5.5: Impact on intermediary outcomes
 Ultra-poor households Other-poor households
 
Marginal 
effects
Standard  
error
Marginal 
effects
Standard  
error
Breastfeeding and vitamin A supplements
Probability of breastfeeding (1/0) 0.012 0.013 0.018 0.011
Duration of exclusive breastfeeding (days) 72.681*** 0.025 59.521*** 0.080
Administration of Vitamin A (1/0) 0.264*** 0.069 0.196** 0.080
Observations 2,300 4,894
Illnesses
Likelihood of contracting an infectious 
disease (children) (1/0)
-0.052 0.048 -0.005 0.030
Observations 1,363 2,714
Likelihood of falling ill (adults) (1/0) -0.020* 0.006 -0.006 0.004
Observations 21,841 36,760
Food security
Members can generally manage two meals 
a day (1/0)
0.143** 0.059 0.061* 0.030
Observations 4,296 8,896
Safe water and hygiene practices
Use of sanitary toilet (1/0) 0.179*** 0.055 0.108** 0.049
Safe drinking water (1/0) -0.005 0.008 -0.011 0.008
Observations 4,296 8,896
Notes: Table shows marginal effects of OLS models using village level fixed effects. Results represent the impact 
of CFPR on intermediary outcomes that may affect nutritional status in ultra-poor and other-poor households and 
the sample is restricted to households with children under 5. Standard errors clustered at the branch level. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
5.5  Discussion and concluding remarks
Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction (CFPR) was implemented by a NGO called BRAC with 
the target of alleviating ultra-poverty in Bangladesh. The CFPR provides income generating and 
multifaceted training in entrepreneurial activities, health, and nutrition, social and legal awareness to its 
participants over a period of two years. Utilizing the randomized rollout of the programme, this paper 
uses a two round panel data across four years to first identify the impact of CFPR on the nutritional status 
among the ultra-poor (UP) participant households. Second, we estimate the spill-over effects of the 
programme on other-poor (OP) and non-poor (NP) households. Heterogeneity of impact is measured 
across male and female headed households followed by the sex of the respondent. Lastly, through the 
measurement of intermediary outcomes that affect the nutritional status, we analyse pathways through 
which the impact and spill-over effects take place. 
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We find considerable impact on the nutritional status among UP household members, most pronounced 
for children under-5. In addition to improvements in the weight-for-height and weight-for-age indicators, 
the likelihood of wasting and being underweight reduces by 8pp and 19pp respectively. Among 6-19 
years age group, the likelihood of thinness drops by 4pp, followed by a 10pp reduction in the probability 
of being underweight. While gains are generally higher among individuals in female headed households, 
we find no differences in impact across gender of the specific individual. Nutritional status among adults 
in ultra-poor households similarly gain from CFPR, leading to decreases in the likelihood of moderate 
and severe thinness (by 11pp and 8pp respectively). 
 We find that the CFPR generates spill-over effects among non-participating households in 
treatment areas, the benefits however restricted to other-poor households as opposed to the non-poor. 
The magnitudes of the impacts on OP are generally half of the UP households and are typically most 
pronounced for children. We find that the likelihood of wasting or being underweight reduce by 12pp 
and 9pp respectively for children in this group. The probability of thinness reduces by 4pp among the 
6-19 year olds. In line with findings from the ultra-poor, individuals in female headed households gain 
the most. While the gains in nutritional status among children under-5 are more favourable towards 
females, males aged 6-19 years fare better. Other-poor adults (19+ years) on average experience a 4pp 
and 3pp drop in the likelihood of being moderately and severely thin.
 Analysis of the pathways provides important insights. Results indicate that increased durations of 
exclusive breastfeeding and vitamin A supplements among both the ultra-poor and other-poor. For 
adolescents and adults in ultra-poor households, several factors contribute to the improved nutritional 
status. In addition to the rise in income as noted by Bandiera et al (2013), we find evidence of improved 
food security, lower likelihood of falling ill and improved hygiene practices. For the other-poor, results 
show improved food security and improved hygiene practices. While the rise in income for this group 
as small in magnitude (Bandiera et al., 2013), Angelucci et al (2006), studying the spill-over effects of a 
cash-transfer programme (PROGRESA) on the nutritional status of non-participants, offer an alternative 
explanation as to how this takes place. They state that despite the nominal rise in income among 
non-participants, the consumption among these households increase considerably more. Due to the 
liquidity injection among the participants, the non-participants receive more transfers and can borrow 
more when hit by a negative shocks, thereby reducing their precautionary savings to increase current 
consumption. 
 There are some limitations to this study. Given the lack of birth registration practices, especially 
among lower socioeconomic groups, we use approximate ages (in nearest months) when calculating 
the z-scores used in the models. Pathways of impact and spill-over effects measured in this paper are not 
comprehensive. There may be other unaccounted ways through which these effects occur and merit 
further research. Notwithstanding these limitations, several important points emerge from our analysis. 
We find that the CFPR not only has considerable impact on the nutritional status of its participants, but 
also creates positive spill-over effects among non-participants. The magnitude of impact on the non-
participants in treated areas is typically half of the impact on participants. In line with previous literature 
showing that women in charge of allocating productive and financial assets of a family are likely to 
garner greater positive change, we find individuals in female headed households fare better (Baden and 
Milward, 1995). The fact that there is limited indication of gender differentials in impact in an important 
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finding. Gender based discrimination biased towards males, especially for children is not uncommon in 
Bangladesh (WFP, 2012). The results may be indicative of the success of a large number social awareness 
programmes, including CFPR, working to reverse these trends (Kabeer et al., 2013). Lastly, the impact 
and spill-over effects, especially among infants (through increased durations of exclusive breastfeeding), 
are driven by behavioural changes, without financial incentives. This shows that unlike other nutrition 
oriented programmes that typically adopt a one-off push71, repeated exposure to CFPR over a two year 
period is likely to have played a key role in instilling the messages among the participants, ultimately 
leading to behavioural changes. Similar exposure and longer periods of “demonstration effects” play a 
large role in precipitating similar changes among the other-poor households in the treated communities.
 Overall, in spite of accounting for actual impact and spill-over effects, longer term impact of CFPR 
may be underestimated, especially for children. In the short run, resources typically dedicated to dealing 
with illnesses brought on by increased vulnerabilities will likely be allocated to more fruitful avenues. 
Increased cognitive acumen through improved nutrition will increase performance in productive 
activities. Longer term impact as adults will likely lead to higher professional productivity and financial 
gains. 
71 The Gates Foundation funded programme Alive and Thrive for example aims to improve infant and child feeding practices 
in Bangladesh through increasing the rates of exclusive breastfeeding and complementary feeding practices. Evaluation of the 
large scale programme reported that while the programme was able to induce earlier breastfeeding practices, the duration of 
exclusive feeding remained unaffected (Saha KK, Bamezai A, Khaled A, Subandoro A, Rawat R 2008). A number of studies on the 
other hand report the absence or even negative effects of food subsidy programmes on nutrition (Jensen and Miller, 2011, 2008; 
Shankar Shaw and Telidevara, 2014).
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6.1  Introduction
Located in the heart of South Asia, Bangladesh has achieved miracles in terms of poverty alleviation. 
However, not out of the woods yet, the country still has a long way to go and grounds to cover. Of the 
153 million people in Bangladesh, 40 per cent live in poverty using the upper poverty headcount, while 
25.1 per cent of the population live below the lower poverty headcount using the same method (BBS, 
2007). Lipton (1986) defined ultra-poor as receiving less than 80 per cent of the minimum caloric intake 
while spending more than 80 per cent of income on food. By that account, close to 20 per cent of the 
population of Bangladesh live in ultra-poverty.72 Due to the widespread nature of poverty across the 
country, there has been a great influx of poverty reduction programmes in Bangladesh.
 Bangladesh has a comprehensive portfolio of safety net interventions such as conditional and 
unconditional cash/food transfers, and sometimes a combination of both in exchange for employment 
through employment generation programmes. According to Ahmed et al. (2009) there are around 27 
such safety-net programmes run by the Government of Bangladesh.73 However, many of these public 
interventions often fail to reach the ultra-poor (Hashemi, 2001). As evidence states, people who live 
far below the poverty line – that is, the ultra-poor – are likely to require a combination of vigorous 
interventions to cross a certain threshold to emerge from poverty within a generation (Hulme et al., 
2001). Braun (1995) states that ‘higher casual wages plus access to several years of post-primary education 
plus access to meaningful transfers such as pensions and child allowances plus land redistribution’. These 
programmes along with similar food-for-work programmes should not be considered as alternatives but 
as compliments to other such initiatives (Ahmad et al., 1991).
 Another popular alternative to directed employment generation programmes is the microfinance 
option for the poor. However, despite the fact that microfinance intends to target the poor, in practice 
it often fails to reach those living in ultra-poverty (Hashemi, 2001; Hulme and Mosley, 1997; Rahman 
and Razzaque, 2000; Wood and Sharif, 1997). A classical catch-22, a circular constraint binds the extreme 
poor. On one hand, they cannot access institutional credit because of their insufficient asset base (that 
is, the lack of credit worthiness); and, on the other, they cannot accumulate assets because of the 
insufficient capital base. Furthermore, due to their immediate consumption needs, they also tend to 
save less, thereby increasing their vulnerabilities to shocks and disasters.
 Income Generation for Vulnerable Group Development is another safety-net programme that 
was implemented in Bangladesh by BRAC during the 1990s for the ultra-poor who were not able to 
participate in mainstream microfinance.74 The programme aimed at transferring staple food items such 
as wheat. However, it was realised that the Income Generation for Vulnerable Group Development 
programme was inadequate for reaching certain groups of the poor, especially those suffering from 
ultra-poverty (Hashemi, 2001; Matin and Hulme, 2003; Webb et al., 2002).
72 According to BBS (2007), approximately 19.50 per cent of Bangladesh’s population lives on under 1805 kcal per day.
73 According to World Bank (2006), poverty eradication in Bangladesh only through investment in social assistance would require 
about 35 per cent of public expenditure. However, the actual rate of investment in social protection in 2004 was only about 5 per 
cent of public expenditure.
74 BRAC, formerly known as Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, is one of the largest non-governmental organisations 
in the world.
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In light of its learning from Income Generation for Vulnerable Group Development and over three 
decades of past field-level experience, BRAC addressed this issue through an innovative programme 
called Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction (CFPR). Programmatic details such as the exclusion 
and inclusion criteria, typical costs per beneficiary of operating such programmes, background services, 
and so forth, are provided in Annex 6.1. Numerous studies have reported various positive impacts of 
CFPR on the participants (Ahmed et al., 2009). But these studies showed only short-run impact of the 
programme. Krishna et al. (2012) showed longer-term impact of the programme but this study has some 
methodological limitations. Despite the non-randomised evaluation design of the programme and in 
many instances the comparison group being better off than the intervention group at baseline, their 
study used the difference-in-difference technique for assessing programme impacts.
 In this paper, we analyse the core impacts of CFPR on the lives and the livelihoods of its participants 
in both the short run and the long.75 It must be mentioned here that in terms of the short run we refer 
to the period 2002-2005; and for the long or longer run, we refer to the period 2002–2008. In this study 
we mainly assess the livelihood impacts in terms of income, assets and food security of the participant 
households. Using panel data and propensity score matching, this study shows that impact on the 
per-capita income, asset and food security is substantial and has sustained over the longer term. As 
mentioned in Annex 6.1, after two years of the programme cycle the participant households are eligible 
for BRAC microfinance. As we shall mention in the following section, for the impact assessment we 
use sample households who received programme support in 2002 (that is, completed the programme 
cycle at the end of 2003) and we use three rounds of survey data (2002-2005-2008). This implies 
that our assessments would capture both the effect of the grant-based support packages as well as 
their subsequent participation in BRAC microfinance. It also needs to be mentioned here that while 
participating in microfinance is an added benefit to the participants if they choose to do so after the 
completion of the programme, it is not mandatory. Shams et al. (2011) showed that by the 2005 mark, 
49 per cent of our sample households (that is, those who were provided support in 2002 and completed 
the cycle at the end of 2003) participated in BRAC microfinance, although the proportion increased to 
some extent by 2008. 
 The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a detailed description of the data and the 
methodology used for the paper, Section 3 provides the results and discussion, and Section 4 concludes.
6.2  Methods
6.2.1  Data
The CFPR programme was launched in 2002 in the three poorest districts (Rangpur, Kurigram and 
Nilphamari) of Bangladesh. As part of the evaluation of the programme, a baseline survey was carried 
out during June-August 2002 in these three districts. As mentioned in Annex 6.1, the participant 
households were selected through a participatory wealth-ranking process. Usually households in the 
75 A recent study (Das and Misha, 2010) looked into the sustainability of livelihood impacts of the CFPR. However, there is 
methodological limitation; a simple difference-in-difference technique was used despite the comparison being better off than 
the treatment group in many socio-economic aspects.
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poorest category of wealth rankings were considered the ‘ultra-poor’, although sometimes households 
in the poorest two categories were also considered. Among the ultra-poor, the group of households that 
meet the selection criteria received programme supports. These beneficiaries were called ‘selected ultra-
poor’ (SUP) and the rest of the ultra-poor were called ‘not selected ultra-poor’ (NSUP). The baseline survey 
represented both the SUP and NSUP households. The NSUP households were surveyed to construct the 
comparison group for impact assessment. For the rest of the paper, SUP and NSUP households are used 
interchangeably with treatment and comparison households.
 The sample size for baseline survey was 5626 households, of which 2633 were SUP and 2993 were 
NSUP households. This was followed by a second-round survey in 2005. In the 2005 follow-up survey, 
2474 SUP and 2754 NSUP households were successfully re-surveyed. The third-round survey was 
conducted in 2008 where a total of 4549 households were successfully re-visited, and among them 
2251 were SUP and 2298 were NSUP households. The attrition rate was thus 7 per cent during 2002-2005 
and 19 per cent during 2002-2008. The present study is based mainly on 2002, 2005, and 2008 panel 
data consisting of 2251 SUP and 2298 NSUP households. To verify whether the households surveyed 
in the baseline suffering from attrition contained any inherent biases (that is, non-random attrition) 
that could potentially skew the results in one way or another, we have analysed the baseline data for 
those who were not available for re-interviewing during the follow-up surveys against those who were 
(Annex 6.2). Results from Annex 6.2 give us a strong indication that most of the variables tested were not 
statistically different within the groups. As for those variables that were found to be statistically different 
from each other, the magnitude of difference was found to be quite small, thereby giving indication that 
our impact estimates are likely to be free from potential biases due to attrition.
 For food expenditure and calorie intake analysis, we have used a subsample from the above-
mentioned baseline survey. From the full baseline representation, a subsample of 400 households (200 
SUP and 200 NSUP households) was selected for collecting data on food consumption. These households 
were surveyed in 2002, 2004, and 2006. In the 2006 survey, 160 SUP and 138 NSUP households were 
successfully re-visited. Therefore, food expenditure was analysed using a panel of 160 SUP and 138 NSUP 
households. The food expenditure data was collected using a three-day recall method. The surveys were 
conducted by the Research and Evaluation Division of BRAC. The survey questionnaire was administered 
to the main female member of the household. 
6.2.2  Analytical technique
As mentioned earlier, the comparison group for impact assessment of the CFPR constituted those 
households who were identified as ultra-poor during the community wealth-ranking exercise, but 
failed to pass the final selection process. Expectedly, the NSUP households were different from the SUP 
households in terms of various socio-economic characteristics and in many instances were better off than 
their SUP counterparts (Annex 6.3). For example, per-capita income of the SUP was BDT 2493 (US$35.74), 
while for NSUP it was BDT 2785 (US$39.93).76 For any impact assessment, we need to consider the 
counterfactuals of what would have happened to the intervened households if the intervention did not 
take place. As such, we would require constructing a comparison group that is similar to the treatment 
group. However, the NSUP households are unlikely to control for such counterfactuals as they are better 
76 Conversion rates from USD to BDT.
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off than the treatment group. This implies that use of a simplified difference-in-difference technique to 
investigate the efficacy of the CFPR may not be appropriate. The strong evidence base suggests that 
when it comes to nonrandomised datasets, traditional difference-in-difference methodologies do not 
necessarily address the potential systematic differences that may be inherent within the dataset (Rubin, 
1997; Trojano et al., 2009; Yanovitzky et al., 2005). An alternative method is the propensity score matching 
technique that constructs a comparative comparison group who are likely to be similar to the treated, 
contingent on their participation probability densities.
6.2.3  Propensity score matching
Under the propensity score matching method, a control or comparison group is constructed based on 
observable characteristics by ‘matching’ the treatment households with comparison households. Our 
use of propensity score matching to assess the impacts of the CFPR programme involves a number 
of steps. First, using a probit model, the propensity scores for participation in the programme were 
estimated. Second, we tested the balancing properties of the data by testing that treatment and 
comparison groups had the same distribution (mean) of propensity scores and of control variables 
within groupings (roughly quintiles) of the propensity score. Control variables not satisfying this test 
were subsequently dropped or replaced with alternative variables and the specification was rechecked.
 Third, according to Heckman et al. (1998, 1997), the quality of the match can be improved by ensuring 
that matches are formed only where the propensity score densities have ‘common support’, or where the 
distribution of the density of the propensity scores overlap between treatment and comparison groups. 
However, the common support can be improved by dropping treatment observations with propensity 
score ‘greater than the maximum’ or ‘less than the minimum’ of the comparison group propensity scores. 
Similarly, comparison group observations with a propensity score ‘below the minimum’ or ‘above the 
maximum’ of the treatment observations can be dropped.77
 One limitation of this approach is that treatment observations near these cut-off points face a 
potential comparison group with propensity scores that are either all lower or all higher than that of 
the treatment observation (Heckman et al., 1997). To account for this problem, we modify this ‘min/
max’ approach to identifying a region of common support following Ahmed et al. (2009). A probit 
model is first estimated for programme participation and then we identify the lower and upper cut-off 
points of common support in the comparison or treatment groups. Subsequently some of the primarily 
comparison observations were dropped from the left of the distribution while treatment observations 
were dropped mainly from the right. Then we added back the 5 per cent of observations from each tail 
that had been dropped that were closest in terms of propensity score. 
 Furthermore, we trimmed the treatment observations from the interior of the propensity score 
distribution that had the lowest density of comparison groups (that is, lowest common support) to 
improve the quality of the match, where we have dropped 2 per cent of the treatment observations. On 
this common support sample, the probit model was then re-estimated to obtain a new set of propensity 
scores to be used in creating the match. 
77 The distribution of propensity scores for the comparison group often lies to the left of the distribution for the treatment group 
for targeted programmes, such as the CFPR programme. As a result, the highest propensity scores tend to come from treatment 
observations, while the lowest are dominated by comparison observations. Such a pattern indicates effective targeting.
502047-L-sub01-bw-Raza
Chapter 6
94
We then match the treatment and comparison observations through local linear matching with a 
tricube kernel using Stata’s PSMATCH2 command (Leuven and Sianesi, 2015). Heckman et al. (1997) and 
Smith and Todd (2005) argue in favour of local linear matching over other matching techniques. Local 
linear matching performs well in samples with low densities of the propensity score in the interior of the 
propensity score distribution. Standard errors of the impact estimates are estimated by bootstrap using 
100 replications for each estimate.
 We estimated two probit models for matching the households. The first model uses the full sample 
(pertains to the majority of the analysis; that is, the livelihood factors) while the second uses the subsample 
(pertains to the food security and calorie intakes). To match the households we included a wide range 
of variables that include household’s physical, financial and human assets, demographic characteristics 
of the household head and main female (that is, respondent) of the households. These variables also 
include the specific indicators used to select the ultra-poor households, except one indicator – school-
going aged children engaged in paid work, because in some of the surveyed households there were no 
school-going-aged children. While it may be such that the exclusion and inclusion criteria may alienate 
the SUP and the NSUP into non-overlapping groups, this may not necessary be the case. This is because, 
firstly, the matching does not include one of the eligibility criteria of programme participation (that is, 
children’s engagement in paid work). Secondly, eligibility does not always necessarily ensure programme 
participation.
 The reason for this being the case is that although some households were finally selected by the 
programme, they had refused the support on various social and religious grounds. Our comparison 
group (that is, NSUP) includes this group of households. Annex 6.4 provides differences of the variables 
used in the propensity score matching regressions between the participant and non-participant 
households. It can be seen that non-participant households in some instances are likely to be better off 
than the participant households. For example, the mean amount of land holding was 6.14 decimal for 
non-participant households while that of the participant households was 2.4 decimal. Probit regression 
results for the propensity scores can be seen in Appendices 5.5 and 5.6.
6.3  Results and discussion
6.3.1  Impact on income and assets
The results, as mentioned earlier, encompass the information from the CFPR beneficiaries who had 
completed the programme intervention at the end of 2003. This means that results for 2002–2005 
would show the short-term effects (that is, a year after programme completion) while the results from 
2002 to 2008 will show the longer-term impact. Furthermore we also analysed the differences between 
the short-run and long-run effects to give us an indication of how the transformation of the growth 
is happening. In essence, the changes in the level of the treatment effect between the time periods 
of 2002-2005 and 2002-2008, if statistically significant, will tell us that the short-run impact is different 
from the long-run impact (the direction contingent on its sign). Results from Table 6.1 show that the 
difference-in-difference in per-capita income between 2005 and 2002 was BDT 794 and BDT 1654 
between 2008 and 2002. Both the amounts were found to be highly significant (p<0.01 for both). The 
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level of the change in the treatment effects between the short run and the long run was found to be 
BDT 860 (significant at 1% level). This iterates that the programme participants have been able to sustain 
this acceleration in their per-capita income trajectory.
Table 6.1: Double difference PSM results on per capita income and assets
Outcomes Average Treatment Effect Changes in treatment 
effect between  
2005 and 2008
2005 over 
2002
Standard 
error
2008 over 
2002
Standard 
error
2008 over 
2005
Standard 
error
(1) (2) (3=2-1)
Per capita real income (2002 
price) (BDT)
794*** (89.50) 1654*** (115.56) 860*** (115.50)
Own homestead land 
(decimal) 
0.16 (0.109) 0.49*** (0.148) 0.323** (0.138)
Own cultivable land 
(decimal) 
-0.137 (0.172) 0.535*** -(0.207) 0.6712*** (0.202)
Mortgaged-in/rented-in 
land (decimal)
2.048*** (0.407) 3.313**** (0.511) 1.264** (0.542)
No. of goat/sheep 0.40*** (0.029) 0.41*** (0.034) 0.009 (0.035)
No. of duck/hen 0.52*** (0.110) 2.01*** (0.110) 1.494*** (0.162)
No. of cow/bull 1.60*** (0.029) 1.15*** (0.027) -0.454 (0.035)
No. of big tree 0.12 (0.110) 0.47*** (0.145) 0.359*** (0.119)
No. of radio 0.01* (0.005) 0.02*** (0.005) 0.011* (0.007)
No. of bed 0.131*** (0.026) 0.21*** (0.026) 0.074*** (0.026)
No. of Rickshaw/van 0.044*** (0.011) 0.051*** (0.013) 0.007 (0.011)
Market value of the house 
(BDT)
320*** (90.614) 985*** (206.897) 654.7*** (222.290)
Outstanding credit from 
formal source (BDT)
806.38*** (51.970) 634.27*** (78.590) -172.11** (82.270)
Outstanding credit from 
informal source (BDT)
-117.86** (55.240) -187** (96.680) 69.14 (94.540)
Note: Figures in the parenthesis are the standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.
Similar results were found for most of the assets we analysed. One thing that must be kept in mind is that 
some of these assets (particularly the livestock and poultry) were provided to the participants as direct 
transfers due to programme participation, which may explain the positive treatment effect between 
2002 and 2005. However, any effect beyond 2005 could be directly assumed to be a net impact of the 
CFPR, thereby also shedding a positive light on the sustainability aspect of the programme. Results show 
that the short-term impacts on the number of livestock and poultry holdings (cow/bull, goat/sheep and 
chicken/ducks) are positive and significant (p<0.01 for each) during 2002-2005. Longer term impacts 
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were also found to be positive and statistically significant. More importantly, the treatment effect for 
ducks/hen has been found to be higher in the long run compared with the short run, indicating that 
the participant households have managed to multiply these asset holdings since the time they received 
them from the programme. As for the impact on the number of cow/bulls and goats/sheep in the long 
run, the level of impact has remained consistent with the shorter run, enumerated by the fact that 
differences between the treatment effects were not found to be statistically significant. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that participants had not multiplied these assets after 2005 because it may 
be such that they actually did and sold those to have cash for household expenditure or even to buy 
other types of assets.
 While livestock and poultry and any produce in general are unique in that they can be used for 
both family consumption and income generation, assets such as rickshaws/vans are solely income-
generating assets. Short-term results of such assets were found to be statistically significant (p<0.01). We 
speculate that the treatment households had been able to generate enough income through CFPR’s 
assistance to be able to purchase a comparatively expensive productive asset such as a rickshaw or a van 
to diversify their income sources.
 One of the background components of the CFPR is that when the programme staff meet on a regular 
basis with the participant women, time is often dedicated to formulating a viable and secure financial 
future. This is especially important as the ultra-poor have suffered from such abject poverty until they 
joined the CFPR that they have been conditioned repeatedly to be helpless when it comes to their own 
well-being; often they find it difficult to think past immediate needs such as where they may get the 
next meal. Planting seedling for generating big trees is one such item that the CFPR staff encourage as 
a means for long-term investment, and often provides seedlings to plant around the homestead to get 
them started off. A small investment often leads to significant long-term financial gains. Results show that 
although the difference-in-difference for the number of big trees was statistically insignificant between 
2002 and 2005, it was significant (p<0.01) during 2002=2008, indicating a positive programmatic effect 
in the long run. 
 Analysis of various forms of land holdings has pertinent implications in terms of programmatic 
effects. Access to cultivable land is paramount in a country like Bangladesh – it is significantly and 
positively related to poverty in the rural areas of the country. Buying and selling of land is quite limited in 
Bangladesh and a number of factors (such as remittance inflow) contribute to an ever-inflating price of 
land in the country.78 In light of this, treatment households’ being able to acquire land can be considered 
a remarkable achievement of the programme. Results show that in terms of the amount of homestead 
land owned, although the difference-in-difference was found to be insignificant in the short run, the 
long-run effect was found to be significant at the 1% level.
 Expansion of the amount of homestead land of the treated households signals a steady income 
stream. Empirical evidence shows that the incremental increase in income leads to purchase of necessary 
products and services such as food, household repair, children’s schooling, and so forth. The purchase of 
homestead land usually falls later in the requisites, indicating a secure income stream (Krishna, 2007).
78 One example is remittance inflow, which provides pressure on land prices. Bangladesh received over $9192.16 million in the 
form of remittances in 2009.
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We also analysed the amount of cultivable land holdings and the amount of mortgaged-in/shared-in 
land. Results, following the trend of the homestead land, show that although treatment effect on the 
amount of cultivable land was statistically insignificant in the short run, it was positive and statistically 
significant during the longer run. But the effect on mortgaged-in/rented-in land was found to positive 
and significant both in the short run and the long run. More importantly, long-run impact was found 
to be higher than the short-run impact, an indication of sustainability of longer-term impact of the 
programme.
 The ultimate goal of the CFPR programme is to lift its participants out of ultra-poverty so that they 
may be able to take advantage of the mainstream poverty alleviation schemes such as microfinance. As 
mentioned earlier, the ultra-poor are often excluded from these activities due to structural constraints 
from both the demand and supply sides. In an attempt to facilitate this transition to an upper rung in 
the poverty ladder, programme participants are offered BRAC’s microfinance services after two years of 
programme participation. The idea is that after the two years of participation, the households would 
have a productive asset base and the confidence and ideas to better use the credit. BRAC’s microfinance 
component designs special loans for the CFRP participants with some flexibilities such as smaller loans 
and smaller groups with more intense supervision than typical Village Organizations to be able to cater 
more carefully to the needs of those just coming out of ultra-poverty.79 These loans allow them to 
utilise the training on their income generating assets, and confidence they have gained by joining the 
programme. Analysis of the informal loans (that is, from moneylenders, relatives, friends, shops) shows 
that the programme had negative impact on this, both in the short and the long run. This is a very 
encouraging trend given that informal loans are often from local money lenders with very high interest 
rates. Mallick (2009) showed that the interest rate for a moneylender loan is 103 per cent. As for the 
formal loans – that is, from various microfinance institutions and banks – the treatment effects were 
found to be positive, both in the short and the long run, but the effect was found to be gradually 
reducing. At a glance it may appear that the lower amount of financial market participation is in contrast 
to the programme objectives. However, evidence suggests that the relationship between the demand 
for microfinance loans and the working capital (typically personal saving for this case) are in fact quite 
elastic, meaning that an incremental increase in income or savings will lead to the fall of demand for 
borrowed money (Salazar et al., 2010)understanding the price elasticity of demand for microcredit is 
exceptionally relevant in designing appropriate microfinance institution (MFI. As a result, our results may 
be interpretable as that, given the initial boost in income and savings and its sustained nature in the 
longer term, the participants will be progressively borrowing less. However, further research should be 
undertaken to ascertain the veracity of these findings.
 Radios and beds are often considered to be luxury items, especially given the context of the 
ultra-poor in rural Bangladesh. Ownership of such goods suggests that these households have been 
able to move past the initial vulnerable stages of abject poverty and now are comfortable enough 
financially (Bandiera et al., 2009). Analysis shows that the difference-in-differences for both the items 
79 Village Organizations are associations of women created by BRAC to strengthen the capacity of the poor for sustainable 
development and create a link between the rural people and BRAC. There are 220,000 Village Organizations in Bangladesh that 
reach 6.37 million BRAC members (Barua and Sulaiman, 2006).
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were statistically significant over both the short and long run. More importantly, long-run impacts were 
found to be higher for both items. 
6.3.2  Impact on food security
Per-capita calorie intake is one of most popular measures of poverty and vulnerability. In a country 
like Bangladesh, consumption below 1805 kcal is considered to be hard core poor (BBS, 2007). The 
baseline information of the participant and non-participant households showed that their per-capita 
calorie intakes were 1730 kcal and 1818 kcal, respectively. Considering this level of energy consumption, 
an increase would suggest that the initial degree of vulnerability in terms of food security has been 
addressed by the programme. Impact estimates show that the participant households increased their 
energy consumption as a result of programme support, and they were able to sustain the increased 
consumption for at least two years after their end of programme participation (Table 6.2). Analysing per 
capita food expenditure we find similar results – impact on per-capita food expenditure in the short run 
sustained in the long run. One can thus speculate that an increase in energy consumption would help 
the household members’ nutritional status, which would further increase their productivity and thus 
longer-term gains.
Table 6.2: Double difference PSM results on per capita calorie intake and food expenditure
Outcome variables Average Treatment Effect Changes in treatment 
effect between  
2005 and 2008
2005 over 
2002
Standard 
error
2008 over 
2002
Standard 
error
2008 over 
2005
Standard 
error
(1) (2) (3=2-1)
Per capita food expenditure 
(2002 price) (Tk.)
2.98** (1.507) 3.55*** (1.132) 0.577 (1.578)
Per capita calorie intake 
(kcal)
259.6** (131.20) 356.9** (152.50) 97.294 (145.80)
Note: Figures in the parenthesis are the standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.
6.4  Conclusion
In an effort to combat extreme poverty in Bangladesh, BRAC initiated the CFPR programme. The ultimate 
objective of this programme is to improve the lives of its beneficiaries by creating sustainable pathways 
out of ultra-poverty through a holistic approach. CFPR is a grant-based approach, striving to achieve its 
objectives through the transference of income-generating assets, thorough training on how to utilise 
these assets optimally, confidence-building training and the provision of health and social development 
supports. The core objective of this paper is to assess the longitudinal impacts of the CFPR programme. 
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More specifically, we looked at the programme’s impacts on indicators such as income, assets holdings 
and vulnerability in terms of food security of the participant households.
 Using three rounds of panel data and analysing it using a propensity score matching technique, we 
found that the difference in per-capita income between the programme participants and comparison 
groups have been increasing at an accelerating pace, insinuating that the beneficiaries were able to 
effectively use the training and assets, and outpace their non-participating counterparts in terms of per-
capita income. Similarly, we found significant impacts on productive assets such as livestock and poultry 
holding. This is partly attributable to programme outputs through the grant endowment. But what is 
impressive to note is that four years on after the end of the programme support, the targeted households 
were found to possess a substantial productive asset base. It was noticed that other income generating 
assets such as cultivable land holdings and rickshaws/vans, which were not part of the programme’s 
transfers, also experienced positive impacts. For other assets such as homestead land holdings, which 
not only provide shelter for the beneficiary families but also income-earning opportunities through 
vegetable gardening and planting trees, the programmatic effect was found to be positive. Similar 
outcomes were also documented for luxury items such as radios and beds.
 As for the level of participation in both formal and informal financial markets, an important finding 
is that, over time, the amount of average informal loans of the participant households appears to be 
decreasing due to the intervention. We also found, however, that the programme had an impact in 
increasing amount of loans from formal financial institutions but this is decreasing overtime. We 
speculate this may be due to the fact that the programme beneficiaries now have enough of a financial 
standing to finance their own businesses. However, further investigation needs to be undertaken to 
determine its root causes. Similarly for vulnerability in terms of the level of calorie intake and per-capita 
food expenditure, the CFPR participants had cleared both in the short run and as well as over the long 
run.
 Significant investments are being made in fighting poverty all over the world but sustainably 
addressing the problems of the ultra-poor remains a key concern. Public expenditures for the poor are 
not insignificant. For example, the Government of Bangladesh spends about 5 per cent of its public 
expenditure for the poor. But numerous accounts suggest that these programmes often suffer from 
substantial leakages either through corruption or mismanagement, rendering them toothless. However, 
a judicious and evidence-based use of such small amounts of money may bring greater benefits. What 
is necessary for sustainable reduction in extreme poverty is to design the mechanism for the delivery of 
the funds so that the outcome is maximised. This paper finds that the CFPR approach as implemented 
by BRAC is clearly an effective strategy to fight ultra-poverty in a sustainable manner.
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7.1  Introduction
Despite numerous development interventions implemented across the world, poverty remains endemic 
with more than a billion people living under the $1.25 poverty line. Over the past decade however, 
increasing attention had been directed towards the extreme poor, most recently epitomized by the 
World Bank president Jim Yong Kim declaring the goal to eradicate extreme poverty by 2030 (The World 
Bank, 2013). Extreme poverty diverges from typical poverty in degrees of deprivation, duration and in 
magnitude (Chronic Poverty Research Centre, 2008). The absence of formal or informal safety nets makes 
it difficult for the extreme poor to access basic essentials like education, healthcare and finance, making 
them highly vulnerable to even the slightest shock that then results in a downward spiral of further 
deprivation.
 Despite having one of the poorest economies in the world, Bangladesh is acclaimed for its impressive 
progress in poverty reduction and achieving many of the Millennium Development Goals (Chowdhury 
et al., 2013). Although the number of people living in poverty and ultra-poverty decreased substantially 
between 2000 and 2010, the proportion of the ultra-poor remains considerable at 21 percent (Gimenez 
et al., 2013; National Institute of Population Research and Training (NIPORT) et al., 2013). Given the 
distinctive characteristics of the extreme poor, they are often circumvented by the conventional 
development interventions and financial services. Programs need to be designed with specific targeting 
mechanisms to prevent the poorest from being excluded or from opting out voluntarily (Navajas et al., 
2000). Hailed as one of the biggest breakthroughs against poverty, the microfinance programs that 
serve over 25 million poor people in Bangladesh have been found to have positive impacts on both 
income and vulnerability (Hashemi and Rosenberg, 2006). A wide body of evidence confirms its efficacy 
for the moderate poor. In most cases however, the ultra-poor are unable to derive any benefits from it 
due to entry restrictions into such programs, while at the same time, many of the ultra-poor are reluctant 
to join such programs in the first place due to social and economic restrictions (Evans et al., 1999; Hulme 
et al., 2001; Matin and Hulme, 2003).
 BRAC, one of the largest non-government organizations (NGOs) in the world, has been directing 
its resources to mitigate the multifaceted aspects of poverty in Bangladesh since inception in 1972. 
BRAC recognized that most interventions precluded the participation of the ultra-poor which led to the 
inception of the program Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction: Targeting the Ultra-Poor (CFPR) in 
2002 with the explicit intention of reaching down to the ultra-poor and pushing them out of ultra-poverty 
and ready them to join some of the mainstream poverty alleviation programs such as microfinance. It is 
important to note that BRAC’s definition of ultra-poverty diverges from the $1.25/day definition of World 
Bank’s extreme poverty. The ultra-poor are defined by BRAC to be the lower subset of the extremely 
poor, earning less than $0.60-$0.70 per day (BRAC, 2013). The CFPR required the participants to enroll 
for a period of two years during which time they were provided a productive asset base, continuous 
and intensive training sessions, both in-class and hands on, on maintaining such assets, a food subsidy, 
education, and social and legal support. They were also provided with nutritional supplements and 
had access to BRAC’s own panel doctors free of charge throughout the duration of participation. So far 
success of the CFPR program has been well recognized and replicated within and outside Bangladesh. 
More than eight organizations have adopted and are currently implementing versions of the program 
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in Bangladesh. BRAC is also providing technical assistance to organizations in Afghanistan, Canada, 
Ethiopia, Haiti, Honduras, India, Pakistan, Peru and Yemen for program implementation.
 The program combines a number of targeting methods and poverty assessment tools to ensure 
high inclusion rates of the ultra-poor (Sulaiman and Matin, 2006).A number of studies have confirmed 
the positive effects of CFPR on participants’ health and health related expenditures (Ahmed and Hossain, 
2007; Ahmed, 2006; Prakash and Rana, 2006) food security status (Ahmed and Rana, 2005; Haseen and 
Sulaiman, 2007), and socioeconomic status measured through income and the type of employment 
(Rabbani et al., 2006). While most of the studies looked at short term impacts (2002-2005), some have 
investigated medium term effects (2002-2008). Raza, Das, and Misha (2012), Das and Misha (2010) and 
Krishna, Poghosyan, and Das (2012) found the program to have significant and consistent positive 
impacts on per capita income, income generating assets and food security during the six year period. As 
the main goal of CFPR was to give the ultra-poor a big push to break the cycle of poverty, it is important 
to establish the program’s impact in the longer run. This paper is the first to demonstrate impact of 
CFPR seven years after completion of the program. We study effects on a large battery of outcomes; 
both directly incentivized by the program and more general indicators of socioeconomic status, 
and investigate heterogeneity of effects across baseline employment status and gender. This paper 
is arranged as follows: Section 2 describes the CFPR program and gives an overview of the literature 
evaluating its effectiveness, Section 3 describes the data and the methods, Section 4 presents the results 
and Section 5 provides a discussion and conclusion. 
7.2  CFPR Background
7.2.1  Description of the program
The CFPR program was first launched in Rangpur; Kurigram and Nilphamari districts of northern 
Bangladesh as a pilot in 2002 that was scaled up subsequently to cover 15 more districts and 100,000 
participant households or nearly a half million population over the next four years.80 The northern 
districts of Bangladesh typically suffer from acute seasonal unemployment post-cropping seasons, more 
commonly referred to as monga. As the program explicitly targeted the poorest of the poor, a thorough 
multi-step targeting procedure was utilized. Based on the poverty and vulnerability mapping by the 
World Food Program, the poorest districts and sub-districts were initially identified. Subsequently, in 
consultation with field level BRAC staff who have an in-depth knowledge of the localities, specific villages 
were designated as targets. Prior to the identification process, BRAC field staffs spent a few days in each 
location building rapport and gathering information on every single household and their inhabitants. 
This allowed them to identify the invisible households who often fail to show up in survey or census data 
(Sulaiman and Matin, 2006). Special attention was paid to female headed households as they generally 
80 Positive short term impact and learnings from the first phase paved the way for CFPR Phase II, which was operational from 2007 
to 2011 and encapsulated approximately 300,000 households across 40 districts. Issues specifically faced during the first phase 
such as heterogeneity among the ultra-poor were incorporated into a diverse intervention package. This paper however deals 
exclusively with the first phase of the program.
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are the most vulnerable and are most likely to be overlooked (Sulaiman and Matin, 2006).81 During the 
next stage of the targeting process, a community wealth ranking exercise known as Participatory Rural 
Appraisal was carried out (Chambers, 1994). According to these wealth rankings, a little more than 25% 
of the households were initially identified as ultra-poor. The community defined ultra-poor were then 
re-checked against the inclusion and exclusion criteria.82 A final round of verification was carried out by 
senior level BRAC field staff to generate the final list of households eligible for CFPR support. This final 
verification was conducted using a structured questionnaire to collect information on, among others, 
demographic characteristics, land ownership and cultivation, housing, income, assets, NGO involvement 
and loans, and benefits from government or other sources.
 The program operated on a two year cycle during which time the participants received a multitude 
of services. The initial 18 months included the transference of a choice of income generating assets 
(IGAs) such as livestock, poultry, vegetable gardening and nursery, small grocery shop, inputs (such 
as vaccinations and housing for the animals) and intensive training to maintain the IGAs, business 
development training, subsistence allowance so that the participants can devote time to look after the 
assets, access to health care, and awareness training. The last 6 months involved weaning the participants 
from the program support through extensive confidence building workshops and mobilizing local 
social support. 
 Post selection into the program, the first step was identification of the most appropriate IGA for a 
participant taking into account prior experience, capability of enterprise management as well as local 
market, environment, and social factors. The most popular IGAs were livestock and poultry rearing. 
Participants received training customized according to the enterprise they chose with an average value 
of the assets transferred of Bangladeshi Taka (BDT) 6,000.83 Upon receipt of the IGAs, the participants 
began receiving additional inputs required to maintain the assets such as vaccinations, housing for 
the animals, weekly follow-up by BRAC staff for technical advice and supervision, and receive a weekly 
subsistence allowance of BDT 70 to make up for any earnings foregone as an opportunity cost of taking 
care of the assets. Additionally, the participants were required to save BDT 10 each week. 
 The health support package included BRAC-supported health volunteers, Shasthya Shebikas, in 
the villages, CFPR program staff, and a panel doctor at the local BRAC health program. The Shebikas 
were selected from each locality and trained as front-line providers of preventive and curative services 
for common illnesses (Standing and Chowdhury, 2008). In cases of a severe illness, members in the 
participant households received services from the panel doctor free of charge. Free antenatal and 
postnatal care including various supplements were also provided to expectant mothers.
 The social development (SD) component of the program was designed to create knowledge and 
awareness among the participants about their rights. In addition to providing regular awareness on 
topics such as dowry and child marriage, the SD component also mobilized local elite support for the 
81 These households often reside within other households maintaining a clientelistic relationship with the latter, though in all 
intents are purposes are individual economic entities (Emran et al., 2014).
82 The inclusion criteria include (3 of 5 have to be met): Household owns less than 10 decimals of land; Main source of income is 
by female member begging or working as domestic help; no active male adult (female household head); School-aged children 
working for pay; No productive or income generating assets. The exclusion criteria, of which all have to be met, include: No Active 
female member in the household; Microfinance participants; Household members receiving government benefits such as old 
age pensions.
83 The exchange rate in 2002 was USD $1=Bangladesh Taka (BDT) 69.28 while the PPP $1=BDT 16.25 during the same time.
502047-L-sub01-bw-Raza
Long-term effects of CFPR
105
7
participants to counteract possible crowding out of informal insurance because of program participation. 
A forum of the local elites called Gram Daridro Bimochon Committee (GDBC or Village Poverty Alleviation 
Committee) formed in every intervention village helped in this regard. 
 Soon after the two year period, soft and flexible microfinance loans were availed to the interested 
participants to further incentivize investment in income generating activities, and discourage detrimental 
sources of finances such as high interest money lenders (Huda et al., 2011).
 The expenditures per participating household for the two year duration were approximately BDT 
20,000 (or US$ 292). This figure includes the costs related to the income generating assets provided, 
administration and also for all the support provided over the entire duration of the program. 
7.2.2  A review of the short and medium term effects of CFPR
A number of studies have evaluated the impacts of CFPR on the short and medium term on various 
outcomes. Most of this literature relies on a comparison (over time) between those households selected 
into CFPR and those identified as poor by the PRA but not selected into the program. We come back to 
the comparability between both groups in the methods section.
 A qualitative study by Ahmed and Hossain (2007) found that the free health care services provided 
by the panel doctors were quite helpful in the sense of the service being available and easily accessible. 
Positive effects (8% increase) were found on women’s self-reported health status in the short run (2002-
2004) (Ahmed, 2006; Prakash and Rana, 2006) and substantial improvement was found in both self-
reported and measured food-security status with the average calorie intake going up from 1750 to 2138 
per day during 2002-2005 (Ahmed and Rana, 2005; Haseen and Sulaiman, 2007). 
 In the short term (2002-2005), participation had significant positive effects on income and food 
security, household durables, and livestock, but no discernible impact on ownership of cultivable land, 
physical value of the household and other productive assets (Emran et al., 2014; Haseen and Sulaiman, 
2007; Rabbani et al., 2006; Walker and Matin, 2006). Raza, Das, and Misha (2012) additionally report an 
increased probability of having savings from less than eight percent in 2002 to 94 percent in 2005 and 
98 percent in 2008. 
 It was found that after two years of program support and provision of some flexibilities in borrowing 
from BRAC microfinance, in the short and medium run (2002-2008), more than two thirds of CFPR 
graduates could participate in the formal credit markets (Shams et al., 2011). Overall, participation in 
the CFPR program benefitted the participants significantly over the short term and up to 5 years after 
graduation. 
7.3  Methods
7.3.1  Data
This paper utilizes a four round panel data set collected in three northern districts (Nilphamari, Kurigram 
and Rangpur) of Bangladesh, generally characterized as among the poorest in the country (National 
Institute of Population Research and Training (NIPORT) et al., 2013). The baseline survey canvassed 
5626 households during the first quarter of 2002. The second survey took place around the same time 
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in 2005 consisting of 5228 households. The third round was undertaken in 2008 comprising of 4549 
households following which, the final survey of 4144 households was implemented in 2011. No new 
households were added on in between the waves and no households that drop out re-appear in any 
of the following waves. Tests for attrition bias are discussed in section 3.3. Respondents were typically 
the main female member of the household. The surveys were held with the entire group of households 
identified as the poorest within the village through the PRA exercises, so the sample includes both those 
households that were selected into the program and those that were identified as poor but were not 
selected for program participation.
 For the purpose of this paper, the main outcomes of interest were divided into two groups: primary 
outcomes that were immediately affected by program participation (number of livestock, poultry 
and big trees and financial market participation) and secondary ones, affected over time, that relate 
to households’ social and economic status (per capita income, having any cash savings, occupation, 
ownership of homestead or cultivable land, ownership of other income generating assets such as 
rickshaws and luxury items such as radios or TVs, characteristics of the household dwelling (roof ), food 
security status and social capital). Directly influenced outcomes are defined net of program transfer. 
While previous papers on the program’s impact in short and medium terms have not distinguished 
between directly or indirectly affected outcomes, the outcome indicators measured have largely 
remained consistent (Das and Misha, 2010; Krishna et al., 2012; Raza et al., 2012).
 Landholdings not only aid the livelihood, but also convey additional status and prestige in a 
predominantly agrarian country such as Bangladesh (Krishna et al., 2012). However, due to high inflow 
of funds from sources such as remittances, land prices face constant inflationary pressure and in general 
were seen to be beyond the reach of the participants prior to the program.84 Considering the little 
variation in the amount of landholdings in our sample85, we investigate effects of CFPR on the probability 
of owning any homestead or cultivable land. We use tin (corrugated iron sheet) for roof material as a 
proxy to gauge the quality of living conditions. 
 Occupational choices are important targets of the CFPR program. The explicit intention is that the 
program engenders self-reliance in terms of the participants’ occupational choices and at the same time, 
a move away from crisis or dead-end occupations such as day labouring, working as household maids 
or begging. Information on employment activities and income earned (also the value of income in-kind) 
was obtained from all members of the household with respect to the year preceding the survey. The 
amounts were aggregated to arrive at the total household income. Avenues that yielded the highest 
remuneration over the preceding year were designated as the main source of income in this study. Self-
employment in either the agricultural or non-agricultural sector was grouped together and labeled as 
entrepreneurs.86 Those begging or working as maid in other households were grouped together as they 
predominantly represented female headed households and sample sizes by themselves limit separate 
84 Despite the global economic downturn, Bangladesh received over USD $7 billion during the latter half of 2013 as remittances, 
nearly 13% of the national GDP (Gimenez et al., 2013).
85 Ninety-seven percent of respondents own less than 10 decimals of homestead land while more than half reported owning 
none at the baseline. Ninety-seven percent of the surveyed responded negatively to owning any amount of cultivable land.
86 Entrepreneurial activities also include households that have skilled labor such as carpenters and blacksmiths to households that 
sell milk from livestock or eggs from poultry.
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analysis. As day labourers represent a substantial proportion of the sample, they were designated a 
stand-alone category while an ‘other’ category consisted of miscellaneous forms of employment.
Socioeconomic hierarchy plays a significant role in everyday life for the members of these 
communities. As a proxy for social capital, information was collected on whether the members of the 
households had been invited to others’ homes or at social gatherings. 
As for food security, the questionnaire asked if the households were able to manage at least two full 
meals daily. Financial market participation is measured by whether or not households have formal loans, 
typically from microfinance institutions, or informal loans, from money lenders or loan sharks, generally 
at high interest rates. 
All models control for baseline household information on demographics, socioeconomic status and 
regional characteristics. Furthermore we include indicators that reflect whether or not households meet 
the CFPR selection criteria. The exact definition of all outcome and control variables is provided in Tables 
7.1 and 7.2. 
7.3.2  Analytical Techniques
The effect of CFPR participation is identified by comparing the trend in outcomes of those households 
identified as poor but not selected into the program with those that were selected into the program. 
While according to the program description, households selected for the CFPR need to meet 3 of the 
5 inclusion criteria and all exclusion criteria, we find limited differences in the distribution of these 
characteristics across the treated and control groups (see Figure 7.1). This suggests that the in- and 
exclusion criteria are not implemented very strictly and precludes the application of a regression 
discontinuity analysis. Although three quarters of the participants fall within the poorest quartile, Emran, 
Robano, and Smith (2014) also confirm there are a considerable number of households who met all 
the selection criteria but were excluded from the program and vice versa (Sulaiman and Matin, 2006).87
Figure 7.1: Distribution of propensity score across treated and control group
87 Emran et al (2014) use these assignment errors as an instrument to identify impact of the program. This approach however leads 
to small samples of treated and controls, and does not identify the effect of the program on the full sample of treated.
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We estimate effects of CFPR using difference-in-differences (DiD) regression with weights obtained 
from propensity score matching (Ho et al., 2007; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Combining regression 
and propensity score weighting has the advantage of only requiring one of the two approaches, the 
specification of the propensity score or the regression model, to be correctly specified – the “double 
robustness” property. We first estimate propensity scores (p(X
0 
;γ)) from a probit model of the treatment 
indicator on the baseline values (X
0
) of all outcome variables presented in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 (see 
Annex 7.1 for the results of the probit model). Figure 7.1 illustrates the overlap in the distribution of the 
propensity scores across treated and control groups, with 1120 households not being on the common 
support. In a second step, we use linear regression where we weigh the objective function by the inverse 
probability of treatment or non-treatment. More specifically, we construct weights equal to 1 for treated 
observations and p (X
0
; γ^)/(1 – p (X
0
; γ^)) for control observations. The regression model we estimate is the 
following:
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                      i = 1,…,N; t = 2005,2008,2011 (1)
where the subscript i refers to households and t to the year. Y is the outcome of interest, and D represents 
the treatment group indicator. Y
i0
 refers to the outcome in the year we are comparing with. In a first step 
we compare outcomes in 2005, 2008 and 2011 to those in 2002 to establish effects in respectively the 
short, medium and long term, and thereafter we compare 2008 with 2005 and 2011 with 2008 to quantify 
the incremental effects. The average treatment effect on the treated is captured by δ
t
. Controlling for 
baseline characteristics X
0
 weakens the identifying assumption to the requirement that, conditional on 
baseline observables88, outcomes for the treated group would have evolved in the same way as those 
of the controls in the absence of treatment. We cannot formally test for the plausibility of this parallel 
trends assumption, nor do we have pre-treatment trends in outcomes, but the substantial overlap in the 
distribution of the propensity scores does suggest that both groups are comparable in observables at 
baseline. Note that model (1) is only estimated on the sample that is on the common support.
 To explore heterogeneity of effects across type of employment and the gender of the household 
head, we estimate the propensity scores and regression models separately for each subgroup.
 Robustness of results is confirmed to using non-parametric matching techniques combined with 
DiD (Blundell and Dias, 2009). Results are reported in the Annex 7.2. We use a Nearest Neighbor (NN) 
matching (using 5 neighbors) algorithm as this resulted in the largest average bias reduction (21.9 
percent to 1.1 percent, with the bias no longer significant). Table 7.3 illustrates the reduction in bias 
obtained from the matching for each of the variables included in the propensity scores. While we 
acknowledge that t-tests are heavily dependent on the sample size (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009), it 
is reassuring that differences in observables between matched treated and controls are small and in no 
instance statistically significant. The average treatment effect on the treated from the NN matching with 
DiD is obtained as follows (Blundell and Dias, 2009).
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88 We prefer controlling for baseline characteristics as opposed to time-varying characteristics because with such a comprehensive 
intervention the latter could be affected by program participation. 
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7
where T and C represent the treated and control group, wij is the weight placed on comparison 
observation j for the treated observation i, and w
i
 accounts for the reweighting that reconstructs the 
outcome distribution for the treated sample.
Table 7.3: Summary statistics across treated and control group and bias reduction after matching
Variable Treated Control Difference Percent Bias Reduction in  
Bias (%)
percapinc 2502 2507 -6 -0.30 97.8
csav 0.08 0.09 0.00 -1.10 96.7
forinformaloan 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.20 99.2
owl_h_c 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.40 98.7
hvlu 865 884 -19 -0.80 97.3
entrepreneur 0.18 0.18 0.00 -0.40 98.3
dayl_beg_maid 0.78 0.78 0.00 0.30 98.9
cowbull_a 0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.30 98.9
goatsheep_a 0.10 0.11 -0.01 -1.80 72.8
rickvan_a 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 100.0
radiotv_a 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.50 94.2
wcal 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.30 97.4
duckhen_a 0.86 0.87 -0.01 -0.40 98.0
egg 0.43 0.46 -0.03 -1.50 86.4
metduck 15.88 15.18 0.70 0.10 99.2
less10 0.95 0.94 0.01 3.50 88.8
nogovbenf 0.80 0.80 0.01 2.40 33.5
fem14to55 0.35 0.36 0.00 -0.90 96.2
hhedusex 0.28 0.30 -0.02 -1.00 95.4
twicemeal 0.53 0.51 0.02 4.30 87.8
pro_asset 0.42 0.44 -0.01 -2.90 91.8
prohvlu 425 440 -16 -0.70 97.7
rooftin 0.43 0.41 0.02 4.60 79.0
rickvan 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -1.00 93.4
Notes: Results show means of and differences in baseline characteristics for the treated and controls in the matched 
sample (using nearest neighbour matching with 5 neighbours). The Percent Bias refers to the percentage difference 
of the sample means of the treated and control as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample 
variances among the treated and control (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003).
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7.3.3  Attrition
As the data covers a time span of 9 years, the rate of attrition is relatively high with 72 percent of the 
households being observed in every wave. Households that drop out of the survey at any of the waves 
are less likely to own physical assets such as livestock or homestead land at baseline, but none of the 
other baseline characteristics were significant predictors of attrition later on in the panel (see Annex 7.1). 
In our models, attrition is only a problem to the extent that it correlates with participation in the CFPR 
program. The rate and pattern of attrition across the years were found to be comparable across treated 
and control group (a total of 32 percent and 33 percent respectively across the 9 year period).89 To test 
for attrition bias we use the test suggested by Verbeek and Neijman (1992); we add a leading selection 
indicator to the DiD model (1) and do a t-test for the significance of this indicator (Jones et al., 2013). The 
null of no effect was rejected only for the models on entrepreneurship (p-value=0.03) and having a tin 
roof (p-value=0.07), suggesting very limited problems of attrition bias. 
7.4  Results
7.4.1  Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics of all control variables across survey waves and across treated and controls are 
presented in Table 7.1. Focusing on the baseline statistics, we see that working aged women (14-55 
years) represent about a third of the sample (36 and 31 percent respectively for the treated and control 
groups). Female headed households are more prevalent in the treated group (73 percent) as compared 
to the control group (57 percent). The household size is significantly smaller for the treated households 
throughout the years (3.55 versus 3.80). In terms of education, the control group appears to fare better 
in general. Nearly 92 percent of household heads in the treated group have had no education compared 
to 87 percent in the control group at the baseline. Trends in control variables are relatively limited and 
similar across treated and control group, confirming limited problems of selective attrition. 
 Summary statistics of outcome variables are presented in Table 7.2. Results illustrate that the 
treated are significantly worse off than the control at the baseline in terms of livestock ownership. By 
2011 however, the treated are more likely to have a greater number of cows/bulls (0.72 versus 0.42 
for the control) and a greater number of poultry (1.95 versus 1.83 for the control). The treated are also 
disadvantaged in terms of participation in financial markets at baseline. The percentage of households 
having cash savings is more than double in the control group compared to the treated (21 percent 
versus 9 percent respectively). Only 4 percent of the treated (versus 32 percent of controls) reported 
participating in the formal financial market such as NGOs while 37 percent (versus 30 percent of treated) 
reported borrowing money from high interest money lenders in the year preceding the survey. By 2011 
the proportion of formal loans has increased drastically among the treated (up to 53 percent), compared 
to both baseline and the control.
89 The rate of attrition for the treated and controls were 6.16 and 7.99 percent respectively until 2005. Between 2005 and 2008, the 
rates were around 10 percent for both groups, while between 2008 and 2011, the attrition was around 15 percent for both groups. 
The attrition rate was the highest during the last interval due to one of the local BRAC branch offices closing down, leading to 
similar declines in the number of observations for both the treated and the control groups. 
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Similar trends were also seen for the other outcomes. While treated individuals had lower per capita 
income than controls at baseline (BDT 2530 and BDT 2825 respectively), their income increased 
significantly faster over time (BDT 9051 for the treated and BDT 8264 control in 2011). The treated 
sample had lower rates of self-employment (20 percent) than controls (31 percent), and higher rates of 
unyielding occupations (18 versus 9 percent). By 2011 however, the treated have become more likely to 
be self-employed (to 31 percent) and less likely to be working as beggars or maids (to 15 percent), while 
there have not been much changes regarding employment among the controls. The majority of the 
respondents among both groups depended on day labouring as the main source of their income (60 
and 54 percent for treated and controls respectively), and this proportion fell by 10 percentage points 
(pp) for the treated by 2011.
 Regarding land and asset ownership, the treated were worse off at baseline with only 45 percent of 
the treated having any homestead land compared to 60 percent of controls. By 2011, this proportion 
had gone up by 15pp within the treated sample, while not much happened within the control group. 
The proportion owning any cultivable land was quite low for both the treated and control groups at 
baseline (2 percent and 8 percent respectively), and increased only slightly for the treated group by 
2011. Owning houses with roofs made of tin was more common within the control group at baseline 
(10pp difference), but by 2011 the large majority of both groups had them (over 90 percent for both 
groups).
 Finally, respondents in the treated group had a lower degree of food security at baseline, with 52 
percent being able to manage two meals a day (versus 67 percent of controls). By 2011, the treated 
group had caught up. Similar patterns emerged for the probability of being invited to village social 
events. 
 In sum, we see a pattern of the treated group being worse off at baseline but catching up, and even 
overtaking, the controls by 2011. Table 7.3 shows baseline characteristics across both groups within 
the matched sample (using NN matching), and confirms that no significant differences between both 
groups are left post-matching.
 In the next section, we present which part of the difference in trends between both groups can be 
attributed to participation in the CFPR program.
7.4.2  Impact of CFPR participation
The upper panel of Table 7.4 shows CFPR impact on primary outcomes primarily affected by program 
participation, as estimated by the weighted regression models. Analysis reveals that, net of program 
transfer, CFPR had led to an increase in the number of cows or bulls owned by 1.5 by 2005, but this effect 
decreased by 0.5 in each of the following waves leaving the overall effect over the full period to be only 
0.4. Also the number of goats and sheep, increased by 0.39 by 2005 but this effect somewhat dissipated 
by 2011. As for the number of poultry, the largest effect was observed in 2008 (1.6) and diminishes 
afterwards. It should be noted that the decline in effects on the number of livestock over time is not so 
much driven by a reduction within the treated group, but rather by a catch up among the controls.90
90 The average number of cows/bulls increased 20 fold during the entire period whereas the number of goats/sheep and poultry 
more than doubled.
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Table 7.4: Effects of the CFPR program across different time periods
Variables D1 (2005-2002)
D2 
(2008-2002)
D3 
(2011-2002)
D4 
(2008-2005)
D5  
(2011-2008)
Primary outcomes
Livestock and nursery
cowbull_a 1.466*** 0.936*** 0.392*** -0.529*** -0.537***
goatsheep_a 0.387*** 0.289*** 0.023 -0.095** -0.252***
duckhen_a 0.453*** 1.630*** 0.389*** 1.187*** -1.214***
bigtree_a 0.014 0.289* 0.032 0.285** -0.242
Financial Participation
csav 0.619*** 0.559*** 0.374*** -0.061*** -0.176***
formalloan 0.324*** 0.227*** 0.132*** -0.098*** -0.098***
informalloan -0.114*** -0.109** -0.083*** -0.013 -0.027
 Secondary outcomes
Socioeconomic Status
percapinc 826.587*** 1,493.693*** 1,295.178*** 675.893*** -120.614
Occupation
emp_entrepreneur 0.077*** 0.155*** 0.039** 0.065*** -0.118***
emp_begging_maid -0.054*** -0.064*** -0.024* -0.012 0.046***
emp_daylabourer -0.029* -0.084*** -0.028 -0.056*** 0.049**
Asset holdings
owl_h 0.048*** 0.087*** 0.072*** 0.038** -0.009
owl_c 0.009 0.040*** -0.002 0.030*** -0.038*** 
rickvan_a 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.006 0.004 -0.022**
rooftin 0.066*** 0.036*** 0.023** -0.031** -0.016
radiotv_a 0.007 0.019*** 0.003 0.013* -0.013
Food Security
twicemeal 0.140*** 0.083*** 0.023* -0.055*** -0.064***
Social Capital
invited 0.085*** 0.110*** 0.007 0.027 -0.099***
Notes: Results obtained by linear regression with inverse propensity weighing. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Regarding financial participation, we find that the program substantially increased the probability 
of having any cash savings (62pp). This effect diminishes somewhat in later years, but even when 
comparing 2011 to 2002, the effect of CFPR remains substantial at 37pp. Program participation also 
increased the probability of borrowing from formal sources (by 32pp) by 2005 while at the same time 
reduced the probability of borrowing from informal sources (by 11pp). Mid-term effects are smaller at 
23pp and 11pp respectively, and long-term effects are further reduced but remain significant, at least for 
taking up formal loans (13pp). Again these diminishing effects appear to be driven by a catch up of the 
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controls rather than a decline in the percentage with cash savings, and formal or informal loans among 
the treated.
 In general, we see quite strong effects on most of the directly incentivized outcomes in the short 
and medium term, and some decline in effects in the long term. This is not necessarily undesirable if it 
reflects households using some of the assets and credit to develop alternative activities that also lead to 
welfare improvements. The following paragraphs discuss effects on the secondary outcomes that reflect 
household socioeconomic and social status (lower panel of Table 7.5).
 At par with the existing evidence, the effects of CFPR on per capita income are very large and 
increasing over the medium term until 2008 (BDT 827, which represents 33% of the baseline average in 
2005 and an additional effect of BDT 675 by 2008). We find no significant change in the impact between 
2011 and 2008, although the sign is negative, which appears related to some catch up among the 
controls in the later period. 
 Moving to the effects on the primary source of income, we find the program to increase the 
probability of engaging in entrepreneurship in either the agricultural or non-agricultural sector until 
2008 (9pp by 2005 and an additional 7pp by 2008). However, this effect diminishes significantly by 
12pp by 2011, which renders the long-term effect to be rather limited (4pp). Program participation 
also significantly decreased the probability of households undertaking unyielding occupations such 
as day labouring, working as maids or begging as the main source of income until 2008 (8 pp by 2005 
and an additional 7pp by 2008), however, the effects also taper off by 2011. Given the relatively stable 
employment patterns that are observed in the control group (Table 7.1), it appears that while the 
program caused an initial shift to more entrepreneurial employment activities, by 2011 many treated 
households reverted back to their baseline occupations. 
 CFPR participation increases the probability of owning homestead land by 5pp by 2005 and by 
an additional 4pp by 2008, and the effects stagnate afterwards. Effects on the probability of owning 
cultivable land, which would typically be more expensive, are smaller, with only a significant effect of 
4pp by 2008 that disappears by 2011. Program participation increased the probability of having a tin roof 
in the short term (7pp), but this effect reduces by half in 2008 and further by 1pp in 2011, which appears 
to be driven by a catch up in the control group as by 2011 the majority of households in both groups 
have a tin roof. While we find very little impact on ownership of radios or televisions (2pp in 2008), the 
effects of program participation on food security are quite substantial in the short term. The probability 
of being able to secure two meals a day is increased by 14pp in 2005. By 2008 however, the effect is 
reduced by 6pp and disappears by 2011 as close to 90 percent of households in both the treated and 
control group are able to manage two meals a day by 2011.
 Finally, participation in the CFPR program increased the probability of being invited to others’ houses 
or social event in the short (9pp) and medium-term (11pp). By 2011, the control group is also more 
socially involved, which causes the CFPR effect to disappear. 
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7.4.3  Heterogeneity of impact on income and employment
Having established average treatment effects on the full sample of treated, we now investigate 
heterogeneity of these effects across baseline employment and across the sex of the head of the 
household. Female headed households, generally more vulnerable and disadvantaged, constitute 
an important group in the CFPR target population and because of their distinct socioeconomic and 
cultural characteristics; it is interesting to investigate whether CFPR participation affects them differently 
as compared to their male counterparts (see Annex Table 7.3 for baseline comparisons). We focus on 
effects on income and employment, both for reasons of parsimony, but also because these could be 
considered most important reflections of (long term) socioeconomic status.
 The first rows of Table 7.5 and 7.6 show the heterogeneity of CFPR impact on income by baseline 
employment status and sex of the household head. Results reveal that while short term income effects 
are relatively similar across employment categories (approximately BDT 850 on average), they diverge in 
the following years. Between 2005 and 2008, baseline entrepreneurs experience an increment of BDT 727 
and day labourers an increase of BDT 626, the increment for beggars or maids are no longer significant 
(and even negative). In the subsequent period between 2008 and 2011, only baseline entrepreneurs 
gain a further BDT 784. 
 Table 7.6 shows income effects across female and male headed households. It appears that in the 
short term, the income effect for female headed households is more than double that of male headed 
households (BDT 1279 and BDT 525 respectively). Additional gains made in the following period (2008 
to 2011) are comparable between the female and male headed households (BDT 562 and BDT 654 
respectively) while neither group experiences further significant gains in the long run. This finding 
somewhat contradicts those from the heterogeneity by baseline employment characteristics, which 
suggested that the program is most effective in the long term for those households that could be 
considered better-off at baseline. Next we investigate to what extent the changes in income effects can 
be related to changes in the employment trajectory.
 The bottom four rows of Table 7.5 show how the employment trajectories caused by the program 
vary across baseline employment categories. For those already engaged in entrepreneurial activities 
at baseline (columns 1-3), we see a pattern in the short term of CFPR sustaining their business (as 
compared to the control group). The treated are 13.1pp more likely to have remained entrepreneurs, 
and less likely to have become day labourers, as compared to the control group. Thereafter we see 
relatively little changes in occupation, except for a 7.4pp increase in the probability of having other types 
of professions (such as those with salaried employment, part-time workers, politicians) as compared 
to the controls between 2008 and 2011. The stability in entrepreneurial activities and a move to other 
professions, within this subgroup of baseline entrepreneurs does seem to coincide with long lasting 
income effects as was discussed before. 
 Households that were mainly begging or working as maids at baseline (columns 4-6) were initially 
pushed by CFPR towards entrepreneurship (16pp increase) or day labouring (8pp increase). This effect 
of increasing entrepreneurial activities seems to have persisted in 2008, with a further move from those 
that initially had gone into day labouring to starting their own business. However, by 2011 it appears that 
of those who were working as maids or begging in the baseline and had subsequently switched over 
to entrepreneurship over the years, nearly all had reverted back to their original profession or shifted to 
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day labouring. This pattern could explain the absence of income effects after the initial period discussed 
before.
Table 7.6: Heterogeneity of impact by gender of household head
  Female headed households Male headed households
Sub-groups  
(defined in 2002)
D1  
(2005-2002)
D2  
(2008-2005)
D3  
(2011-2008)
D1  
(2005-2002)
D2  
(2008-2005)
D3  
(2011-2008)
Per capita income  
(N: 1,509)
1279*** 563** -216 525*** 654*** -10
emp_entrepreneur  
(N: 1,282)
0.138*** 0.088*** -0.131*** 0.057*** 0.058*** -0.098***
emp_begging_maid 
(N: 1,495)
-0.107*** -0.007 0.061* -0.002 -0.015* 0.041***
emp_daylabourer  
(N: 1,292)
-0.009 -0.070** 0.014 -0.058*** -0.041** 0.054**
emp_other (N: 1,514) -0.023 -0.01 0.056** 0.003 -0.002 0.002
Notes: Results obtained by linear regression with inverse propensity weighing. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
We see a similar trend for those households that start off as day labourers, although changes are less 
drastic. CFPR participation causes a 6pp increase in the probability of becoming entrepreneurs by 
2005, and this probability further increases by 8pp by 2008, but starts to decrease by 2011 (11pp). This 
decrease appears to be driven by a move back to day labouring, and some households even go into 
begging or working as maids. Again this pattern could be related to the pattern in income effects, which 
had increased over the first two periods but started to decrease by 2011 (although not significantly).
 Changes in employment trajectories across the gender of the household head (last four row of 
Table 7.6) reveal that program participation caused female headed households to move from begging 
or working as a maid to undertaking entrepreneurship (14pp increase) by 2005. The probability of 
entrepreneurial activities further increased by 9pp between 2005 to 2008 precipitated by a move 
away from working as day labourers. Between years 2008 and 2011 however, the probability of 
entrepreneurship dropped again by 13pp while the probability of working as maids or begging 
increased by 6pp, indicating that some of these households reverted back. This is also reflected in the 
income effects, that become negative (although not significantly) by 2011. 
 Male headed households participating in CFPR are also initially more likely to move to entrepreneurial 
activities (from day labouring), but effects are smaller than for female headed households which could 
explain the smaller short term income effects for this group. Similar as their female counterparts, the 
trend of increased entrepreneurial activities is sustained in 2008, but reverts thereafter. By 2011, most of 
those households that started a business have moved back to day labouring or even begging/working 
as maid. 
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7.5  Discussion and concluding remarks
The program Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction (CFPR): Targeting Ultra Poor was initiated in 
Bangladesh in 2002 by BRAC, one of the largest non-governmental organizations in the world. The CFPR 
program was implemented with the explicit goal of targeting the ultra-poor and graduating them to a 
socioeconomic status where they could avail themselves to mainstream poverty alleviation programs 
such as microfinance. A number of studies have confirmed its short (2002-2005) and medium term 
(2005-2008) positive impacts on income, ownership of productive and non-productive assets, food 
security and health (Ahmed et al., 2009; Ahmed, 2006; Haseen and Sulaiman, 2007; Rabbani et al., 2006; 
Raza et al., 2012). This study is the first to use a 4 round panel data over 9 years to identify the effects of 
the program in the long run (2002-2011). Furthermore, this paper investigates heterogeneity of program 
impact across baseline employment characteristics and gender of the household head. 
 In line with existing studies, we find that outcomes that are directly affected through different 
program inputs such as the livestock, cash savings and financial market participation are positively 
affected in the short term (Raza et al., 2012). Between medium and long term, however, effects often 
start to slow down. This is driven more by a catch up of the control group than by a fall-back among 
participants. Similar trends were observed for some of the other outcomes such as income, land and 
asset holdings, food security and social capital. Income effects for example, were very substantial in the 
short and medium term with CFPR leading to income gains of respectively 33 percent (by 2005) and 
60percent (by 2008). Thereafter though still significantly higher, income growth among the controls 
seems to have caught up, causing the CFPR effect to appear less striking. 
 There are perhaps a couple of reasons for the control group to catch up. Firstly, the catch-up may 
largely be attributable to actions taken by BRAC. Prior to launching of the CFPR, BRAC launched a 
systematic awareness campaign throughout the country that considerably raised the public discourse 
about the plights of the ultra-poor, especially in the monga affected areas (BRAC, 2013). These campaigns 
led to an considerable influx of public and private funding geared towards the eradication of ultra-
poverty and ultimately led to trebling of public spending in social safety nets in the study districts in 
the 2002-2011 periods. Similarly, the number of NGOs catering to the ultra-poor in this district nearly 
quadrupled (Ahmed and Bari, 2011; Khandker, 2012), which led to a universal increase in welfare in the 
region. In 2000, the World Food Program had estimated that the rate of extreme-poverty in 20 of the 
23 sub-districts were between  35-55 percent, but dropped considerably by 2010 (World Food Program 
et al., 2014). Secondly, as both treated and control households are located in close proximity to one 
another, there is the possibility of spill over effects of CFPR, especially in the long run. Looking at short 
term spill over effects within the second phase of the CFPR program, Raza and Das (2014) find significant 
increases in livestock rearing as one of the main sources of income among control households.91 
Qualitative evidence shows that the information provided by CFPR on vaccines for livestock, and on 
proper housing models for animals is easily disseminated among neighboring households. This increase 
in knowledge and understanding leads to an overall growth of such industries within the communities 
91 In some localities in Kurigram and Nilphamari district, a watered-down version of CFPR has been implemented in the 2007-
2011 period. This could potentially bias downward our impact estimates. We have conducted a separate analysis for the Rangpur 
district, in which no such programs were implemented before 2011 and confirmed that estimates were qualitatively similar to 
those in the full data, and quantitatively slightly larger (see Annex 7.4). 
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(Hossain and Matin, 2007). This was also found to be true for social capital as forums such as the Village 
Poverty Alleviation Committees or GDBC are purposefully formed for this function. GDBCs have been 
seen to visibly reduce discrimination against poorer social classes in almost all villages they operate in 
and ensure increased social status (Rafi et al., 2010). This finding of ‘catching up’ by control households 
due to the program itself (CFPR in our case) is a new dimension in the impact assessment of development 
programs. This demands further analysis and studies.
 The decline in long term CFPR effects on employment status appears not so much driven by 
catch up among the controls due to spill overs. We see a shift from begging, working as maids and 
day labouring to entrepreneurial activities in the short and medium term, but many CFPR households 
revert back to their baseline employment by 2011. To the extent that moving away from unyielding 
occupations was an important aim of CFPR, this finding suggests that its long term capacity building 
may require further thought and consideration. Recent qualitative studies provide some insights for this 
shift. Intergenerational transfer of assets is extremely common in Bangladesh. Case studies show that 
once the children are married, especially sons, the parents are likely to transfer most of their assets to 
them, including homestead land and continuing with their initial occupation on the side. Alternatively, 
as the project concluded seven years prior to the last round of the survey, household members who 
had traditionally assisted in maintaining the program assets had moved (marriage, death, employment 
related migration and so forth) and the original receivers may have lost control over the assets. In cases 
where the assets actually remained with them, lack of assistance had forced them to get rid of these 
assets and go back to the de facto occupations (Bandiera et al., 2013; Das and Misha, 2010). 
 Results also show that initial income gains are quite similar across different categories of baseline 
employment, but in the long run, CFPR impact on income is greater for those households who were 
entrepreneurs at the onset of the program than for those starting off as beggars or day labourers, 
confirming earlier findings of Emran, Robano, and Smith (2014) of CFPR benefitting most of those in the 
upper income deciles. Furthermore, we also find that those working as day labourers in the baseline are 
more likely to switch over to entrepreneurship and remain so in the long run compared to those who 
worked as maids or begged for a living before the program.
 As female headed households are typically amongst the most vulnerable, special attention is 
paid to them during the course of the program. Despite being worse off at the baseline, the female 
headed households appear to substantially outperform their male counterparts, both in income and 
employment effects, over the short term while the income gains are comparable in medium and longer 
terms. This could be due to the fact that with handholding they are more likely to move to (and remain 
engaged in) entrepreneurial activities as compared to their male counterparts. Anecdotal evidence and 
field based experiences indeed suggest how that for these female headed households, participating in 
programs such as the CFPR is often the only opportunity to improve their livelihoods in a meaningful 
way and thus acts as a strong motivation to perform well. Additionally, it has also been seen that women, 
when in charge of allocating productive and financial assets of the family, are more likely to precipitate 
greater positive change (Baden and Milward, 1995). Depleting long term effects, however, are likely 
to precipitate by the vulnerabilities the female headed household faced in the first place and further 
handholding, beyond the 24 month period, may be in order to push them forward. 
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There are some limitations to this paper. Most importantly, the selection of treated and control groups 
was not done in a randomized way, leaving the possibility for unobservable heterogeneity to violate the 
parallel trends assumption. The substantial overlap in the propensity scores and similarity of baseline 
characteristics across both groups in the matched sample does, however, suggest that the matching 
techniques used can adequately correct for baseline differences in observable characteristics. A second 
limitation, which is almost inevitable with data over such a long time period, is the possibility of other 
events disproportionally affecting either the treatment or control group. Findings from the second 
phase of CFPR, which was set up as a randomized control trial (RCT), do confirm the short and midterm 
effects on income and employment, which suggests that our results are not merely an artefact of the 
purposive selection of treated and controls (Bandiera et al., 2013). 
 In sum, the evidence in this paper presents an interesting picture on the impact of CFPR. While 
confirming earlier positive findings, we also see that effects tend to decelerate over the long term, driven 
mainly by catch-up among the control households. The success of the program can be considered three-
fold. Firstly, the program itself was successful in bringing its participants out of ultra-poverty and keeping 
them so nine years after participation.92 Secondly, through spill over effects, CFPR positively affected 
households in the program’s vicinity. Lastly, substantially raising public discourse precipitated greater 
efforts from both state and non-state bodies to join the movement against ultra-poverty. However not 
without its caveats, CFPR effects, especially on employment, are more likely to be maintained in the long 
term for those households that could be assumed to have more intrinsic capabilities (entrepreneurs) or 
motivation (female headed households). This brings into light the conundrum of whether encouraging 
entrepreneurship as an occupation is suitable for all. Rigorous qualitative investigations to identify 
reasons why many households revert back to their original occupation would be crucial for formulating 
policy advice regarding CFPR. These results raise the question of whether one big push can be sufficient 
to alleviate ultra-poverty across the board, and whether more frequent support sustained over a longer 
time period can have more long-lasting impact.
92 While the average per capita income per day among the treated was $0.43, by 2011, it increased to $1.53. 
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This thesis evaluated two forms of social safety-nets in South Asia. Chapters 2 through 4 dealt with 
health insurance schemes in India while Chapters 5 through 7 evaluated an integrated approach to 
ultra-poverty alleviation in Bangladesh. 
8.1  Evidence from health insurance schemes in India
The analysis of the two health insurance schemes, namely the Community Based Health Insurance 
Schemes offered in three sites (Kanpur Dehat, Vaishali, and Pratapgarh) and the nationally implemented 
Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) focused on the effects of the scheme on healthcare utilization 
and financial protection. 
 In terms of design features, the CBHI schemes evaluated here are supported by NGOs but entirely 
financed and run by the local community in which they operate. The schemes provide outpatient 
coverage from Rural Medical Practitioners (RMPs) on a capitation basis. This mode of contract offers 
patients unlimited consultations and free medicines from the RMPs. The schemes also offer cover 
inpatient costs of up to Rs. 4000 per person per year (PPPY) at a cost of about Rs. 195 PPPY (1.5% of 
annual per capita expenditure). Using a randomized control trial, we found no tangible effects of CBHI 
on healthcare utilization or financial protection in two of the three sites (Kanpur Dehat and Vaishali). 
In the third site (Pratapgarh), the CBHI scheme was associated with a drop in the likelihood of seeking 
outpatient care.
 The subsequent chapter studied a number of aspects of the RSBY in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. 
The programme targets households below the poverty line (BPL) and provides cashless protection 
against hospitalization costs. Families of up to five persons pay an annual premium of INR 30 per year 
for protection against hospitalization costs of up to INR 30,000 in any RSBY designated hospitals. We 
began by assessing the determinants of enrolment and dropout, followed by an assessment of the 
link between scheme membership and healthcare utilization and financial protection among below-
poverty-line (BPL) households. We found that those in poorer wealth groups, lower educated households 
or belonging to scheduled castes/tribes were more likely to enrol and stay in the programme. However, 
presence of adverse selection is apparent given households with a higher proportion of members with 
chronic conditions were more likely to enrol and had a lower likelihood of dropping out. Insurance 
related awareness played a role in determining a household’s decision to enrol and continue with RSBY’s 
coverage. Results also indicated that insurance uptake is influenced by accessibility to the empanelled 
hospitals. Association between RSBY membership and healthcare utilization for insured seemed to 
be rather limited. With regard to financial protection, only insured households in Bihar experienced a 
reduction in out-of-pocket spending and lower debt as a result. 
 What do the results tell us about the usefulness of such schemes in terms of reaching Universal 
Health Coverage (UHC)? In their current form both schemes fall short of expectations. The CBHI has 
a number of attractive features that, if executed as designed, should yield benefits for the insured. 
However, the absence of external financing coupled with voluntary enrolment translated into limited 
uptake, a shallow risk-pool and low coverage (the ceiling for inpatient coverage for example was a 
third of the average expenses per hospitalization). Utilizing the existing microfinance infrastructure 
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to roll out the scheme is attractive given that the groups already have some degree of cohesion and 
insurance related information is easily disseminated. However, the fact that these local partner NGOs are 
primarily project driven means the schemes will cease to operate once the funding has depleted. This 
is highlighted by the fact that two of the three schemes shut down by the time the project ended in 
2014. The capitation system, while attractive on paper considering the insured would be able to consult 
the RMPs on demand for basic medication and referrals, did not perform as expected, mostly due to 
disincentives (these providers were contracted at the rate of Rs. 40 per insured per month compared 
to an average cost of Rs. 125 per visit). The providers as a result reneged on the contract by diminishing 
the quality of care and medication provided, thereby deterring the patients from visiting them. As for 
the RSBY, one of its largest blind-spots is its voluntary enrolment. Despite considerable subsidisation, the 
voluntary nature of the scheme inevitably precludes the participation of the poorest or the healthier 
members of the target population. To the detriment of the scheme, this gives rise to adverse selection 
as shown in the thesis. 
 The analysis presented in the thesis yields several implications if the Government of India intends to 
use RSBY or for that matter, other publicly-funded insurance schemes as a way to reach UHC. One of the 
main shortcomings of both the schemes studied here is their attempt at inducing demand for health 
care in the presence of considerable supply-side constraints. Healthcare facilities in India are largely 
unregulated, resulting in considerable variation in quality of services. This issue is further pronounced in 
poor rural areas. While the CBHI schemes examined in this thesis lack the scope and size to foster such 
changes, the RSBY has distinct advantages in this arena. The fact that the RSBY performed better in Bihar, 
where scheme roll-out was matched with supply-side investments, than Uttar Pradesh suggests that 
easing supply-side constraints through physical and human resource investments are likely to increase 
the attractiveness of insurance. Excellent examples are available from neighbouring countries. When 
Thailand began planning the Universal Coverage Scheme in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis 
of 1997, the GDP per capita was only $1900 (System Health Insurance Research Office, 2012). Through 
massive overhaul of the existing healthcare system and financial commitment, the scheme set an 
important precedent for its middle-income peers. 
 Second, considering the increasing prevalence of non-communicable diseases which mostly 
require outpatient care, suggests that any insurance scheme attempting to reach UHC should also cover 
outpatient care which is not the case with regard to RSBY. This shortcoming is highlighted by the fact that 
CBHI participants in Vaishali, where RSBY penetration was quite high, opted only for outpatient coverage. 
The absence of outpatient care has more perverse consequences. In the Chinese New Cooperative 
Medical System for instance, Wagstaff et al. (2009) find that the lack of outpatient coverage increased 
out-of-pocket payments and reduced impact on financial protection. Insurance coverage is likely to be 
effective in a context where supply is available and providers have the appropriate financial incentives. A 
recent collaboration across seven Asian countries entitled ‘Health, Equity and Financial Protection in Asia’ 
concluded that provider incentives are equally important in terms of facilitating access and providing 
financial protection as the insurance coverage itself (HEFPA, 2013). Finally, serious thoughts must be 
given to extend facilities to address related vulnerabilities such as lack of education (to understand and 
fully utilize the available options of the programme), and ways to enhance accessibility (for instance 
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through reimbursement of transportation costs, compensation for lost wages and empanelling local 
hospitals that are easily reachable).
8.2  Integrated approach to ultra-poverty reduction in Bangladesh 
The latter half of the thesis evaluated the impact of an integrated approach to ultra-poverty alleviation. 
Entitled, Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction: Targeting the Ultra-Poor (CFPR), the programme 
was launched in the poorest districts of Bangladesh in 2002. The programme provided income 
generating assets valued at approximately USD $140 and a comprehensive livelihood development 
training programme to encourage entrepreneurship. Once selected, the participants enrolled in the 
programme for two years. The evaluation examined the effect of the programme on various outcomes 
and across different time periods: short term (two years post- graduation), medium-term (four years 
post-graduation) and long-term (seven years post-graduation).
 Using a randomized control trial, we first evaluated the short term effects of CFPR on the nutritional 
status of the participants and spill-over effects on households in communities where the programme 
took place. Though not explicitly a target of the CFPR, considerable improvement was seen among ultra-
poor household members, most pronounced for children below 5 (the likelihood of being underweight 
among these children for instance reduced by 19 percentage points). Results also indicated that 
the programme had positive externalities. Nutritional status among non-participants in treatment 
communities experienced an increase in nutritional indicators, once again most pronounced for those 
under 5 (corresponding reduction in the likelihood of being underweight by 9 percentage points). 
Two factors are important to note: first, magnitudes of the spill over effects were generally half of the 
effects on the treated, and second, the spill-over effects were restricted to other poorer households in 
the community. The increase in children’s nutritional status was largely driven by increased duration 
of exclusive breastfeeding. For older individuals, improvements were created through increased food 
security and hygiene practices. Assessment of the heterogeneity of impact showed greater benefits 
among female headed households while the effects were found to be gender neutral among individuals.
The two subsequent chapters assessed the impact of the project over the medium and long term using 
quasi-experimental methods. These outcomes included income, employment choices, productive and 
non-productive asset holdings, food security and social capital. We found that the effects of CFPR nearly 
doubled between the short and medium terms. The effects on income levels for instance, increased 
to BDT 1493 (in the medium term) compared to BDT 826 during the short term. The participants 
increased their productive asset base (such as livestock, rickshaws and cultivable land) and expanded 
their businesses through increased financial market participation. In the long-term, while the outcomes 
for the participants remained substantially higher than the control, there were no incremental effects 
between the medium and long term (income, for instance, was BDT 1300 higher among the treated and 
significant at conventional levels). 
 There are several potential explanations for these long term trends. First, we found that the reduction 
in the effects over time were largely driven by a catch-up among the controls rather than receding 
effects for the participants. To the extent that this catch up was driven by controls disproportionally 
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benefiting from other social safety programs or benefiting from spill-over effects of CFPR, this may have 
led to an underestimation of the true long term effects of CFPR. Bandiera et al. (2013) for example, using 
a randomized control trial of a subsequent phase of the CFPR programme, found that incomes increased 
and more hours were devoted to working among non-participants in treated areas. The fact that we also 
saw a reversal to less entrepreneurial type of occupations in the long term among the participants, while 
employment patterns among the controls are very stable over time, does however suggest the effects 
of CFPR will taper off in the long run.
 Another explanation could be found in the fact that participants transferred the CFPR endowments 
to their children when they were no longer able to care from them on their own. This hypothesis is 
supported by the fact that CFPR’s effects on income (including transfers) remain stable during the later 
years, while the productive asset base diminishes.
 Lastly, our results suggest that entrepreneurial aptitude played a role in sustaining the earlier gains 
made from CFPR. This is reflected by households working as entrepreneurs were more likely to continue 
and maintain a higher level of income. Additionally, non-entrepreneurial households may have cashed 
out in the long-term altogether due to absence of skills that contributed to their de facto socioeconomic 
status in the first place.
 Widely regarded as a successful intervention in fighting ultra-poverty, the CFPR has encompassed 
nearly a million households in Bangladesh alone since 2002 and has been replicated across 20 countries. 
Our findings from this thesis merit further discussion and suggest some policy suggestions. Of note are 
the impact and spill-over effects on nutritional status. Malnutrition is an endemic issue in Bangladesh 
despite the various interventions that have been implemented (see Alive and Thrive implemented by the 
Gates foundation for example). The fact that CFPR not only positively affected its participants, but also 
those in the vicinity is very encouraging. While it is difficult to distil the impact of individual components 
of the programme, weekly meetings on healthy behaviours of BRAC officials with participants are likely 
to have driven the nutritional improvements, especially those among young children. The relatively 
large spill-over effects on the other poor living in the same communities, both on healthy behaviours 
such as breastfeeding and nutritional outcomes, does suggest that the effects of CFPR can be long 
lasting and affect the wider community positively. A more focused investigation of which component 
of the program is driving the nutritional increases among both the treated and control groups could 
provide useful evidence to support the continuing efforts in combating malnutrition. Second, the long-
term impact trajectories create a sobering effect. However, these trends need to be taken with a grain 
of salt considering the study relies on quasi-experimental design with a control group that may have 
been contaminated due to spill-over effects. We strongly suggest using the subsequently implemented 
randomized control trials to verify these trends. On a more cautious note, while implementing CFPR, 
BRAC does assume some degree of homogeneity among the participants across the country. As the 
thesis suggests, especially for the long-term, a “one size fit all” policy may not necessarily be the best way 
forward considering not all ultra-poor participants are uniformly equipped to maintain entrepreneurial 
activities by themselves. Finally, the CFPR is a capital intensive programme (approximately USD$292/
participant household). Sinha et al (2005) for instance conduct a short-term cost effectiveness study 
of CFPR and conclude $5.01 return for every dollar invested. Using a randomized control trial across six 
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countries where the CFPR was replicated, Banerjee et al (2015) arrive at similar conclusions. However, in 
light of the long term trends, a study on returns over the longer term is warranted. 
8.3  Conclusion
While both the social safety net programmes examined in this thesis target marginalized households 
and both focus on women to deliver their services, they are very different in scope and size. While the 
first set of schemes focuses on ex-ante protection against healthcare expenditures and facilitating access 
to care, the latter provides ex-post support to ultra-poor households to bring them out of a resource and 
skill poor environment. Though both types of programmes are designed to assist the most marginalized, 
the desired outcomes are not equally achieved. The relatively high initial uptake of the CBHI program is 
likely related to its small scale and local context specific features. The small size of the program has also 
led to a limited budget, shallow benefit package, and weak provider incentives which have hampered 
the impact of the scheme on access to affordable health care. Also the RSBY, which is much larger in 
terms of population and service coverage, falls short of its full potential due to supply side constraints 
and weak regulatory framework. 
 The CFPR addresses a variety of vulnerabilities using an integrated approach. Not only does the 
programme succeed in achieving its primary goals, it also demonstrates positive externalities. The 
findings of this thesis, however, raise concerns regarding the sustainability of the scheme, both from the 
demand and the supply side. On the one hand, the considerable expenses of implementation are cost-
effective until the medium-term. The long term impact however questions whether further investment 
is needed to re-invigorate the lost momentum for the participants. 
 In the case of Bangladesh, social protection mechanisms implemented predominantly by non-
government organization, are largely responsible for bringing essential services such as education, 
healthcare and access to finance to millions. However, complacence from the public sector leaves the 
population open to a range of vulnerabilities. For instance, healthcare expenditures in Bangladesh are 
almost entirely out of pocket (93% in 2013). The poor and the near-poor are exposed to risks of falling 
further into poverty due to catastrophic healthcare costs. Furthermore, being a rapidly urbanizing 
country is increasing the prevalence of non-communicable diseases (NCDs). Much like India, it can be 
expected that NCDs will eventually claim the lion’s share of healthcare expenses in Bangladesh, thereby 
further exacerbating the situation (Dror and Vellakkal, 2012). Finally, the thesis highlights the importance 
of designing credible evaluation strategies a priori, so as to provide meaningful feedback before scaling 
up proposed interventions. For instance, the scale-up of CFPR was heavily driven by scientific evidence 
which led to changes in scheme design. For considerably larger scale programmes such as the RSBY, 
integrating evaluation strategies and programme implementation at the outset is even more important. 
Indeed, it may be argued that it should be a priority to embed credible evaluations in programme 
implementation strategies so as to avoid having to re-invent the wheel. 
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Annex Tables
Annex 2.1: Pooled and site level pattern of healthcare seeking behaviour in the sample areas
Description Pooled Kanpur Dehat Pratapgarh Vaishali
Probability of seeking care for acute illnesses 
(past month) (1/0)
0.86 0.81 0.87 0.90
Probability of seeking care for chronic 
illnesses (past month) (1/0)
0.70 0.70 0.65 0.76
Type of health worker seen for acute 
illnesses 
None 0.14 0.19 0.13 0.10
Other 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03
NDAP 0.48 0.52 0.47 0.44
Pharmacist 0.09 0.04 0.13 0.11
Public 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.04
Private 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.28
Type of health worker seen for chronic illnesses 
None 0.30 0.30 0.34 0.24
Other 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
NDAP 0.21 0.25 0.20 0.17
Pharmacist 0.10 0.04 0.13 0.09
Public 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08
Private 0.27 0.28 0.20 0.40
Type of health facility visited for inpatient care 
PHC/CHC 0.07 0.12 0.04 0.05
District Hospital 0.15 0.19 0.21 0.07
Private Hospital 0.44 0.52 0.40 0.41
Nursing Home 0.34 0.17 0.35 0.47
Notes: The sample for chronic illnesses and inpatient care exclude children younger than 13 years of age.
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Annex 3.1: CBHI package details in 2012 (wave 2)
Sites Pratapgarh Kanpur Dehat Vaishali
Annual CBHI premium per person/per year (INR ) 250 192 197
Coverage for hospitalization      
Fees (maximum coverage per episode, INR ) 4000 3000 -
Family Coverage 30,000 25,000 -
Wage loss (per day, INR )1 100 50 100
Transport (maximum coverage per episode, INR )2 100 250 -
Accident Coverage
Family Coverage
-
-
400
1000
-
-
Coverage for outpatient care      
Fees (INR ) Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited
Lab tests (per year, INR )3 - - 200
Imaging tests (per year, INR )4 - - 300
Coverage for maternity care -  - - 
Caesarean (per episode, INR ) - - -
“-” indicates “Not Included in package”; 1 For Pratapgarh wages losses covered for the 3rd-7th day, for Kanpur Dehat 
3rdh-6th day, for Vaishali 4th-9th day; 2 For hospitalization of more than 24 hours. 
Annex 3.2: Self-reported reasons for choosing a healthcare provider for acute, chronic
 Individuals Households
Baseline survey 2010 21,372 3,685
Offered insurance in 2011 – wave 1 7,716 1,334
Second survey 2012 18,405 3,318
Offered insurance in 2012 – wave 2 6,493 1,183
Third survey 2013 18,322 3,307
Offered insurance in 2013 – wave 3 5,695 997
Notes: 4,285 individuals were added on to the surveys in 2012 and 2013 respectively by means of marriage, birth and 
split households. By 2012, a total of 14,209 individuals (7,716 + 6,493) or 2,517 (1,334 + 1,183) individuals had been 
offered insurance and are considered the treatment group while those who had not been offered insurance by 2012 
are considered the control group. At the time of the baseline survey the number of individuals in wave 1 and wave 2 
were 7,716 and 7,178, respectively or 14,894 individuals were expected to be treated by 2012 but due to attrition the 
actual number was 14,209 individuals. The pooled sample consists of 58,099 individuals (21,372 + 18,405 + 18,322). 
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Annex 3.5: First-stage regression results 
 Outpatient Uptake† Inpatient Uptake¥
 Marginal 
effects
Standard  
error
Marginal 
effects
Standard  
error
Female children 0-13 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.005
Female older than 55 years 0.003 0.005 -0.001 0.005
Male aged 0-13 years 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.005
Male aged 14-55 years 0.012** 0.006 0.007 0.005
Male older than 55 years 0.013* 0.007 0.006 0.007
Household size -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Female headed household -0.007 0.006 -0.006 0.006
Household belongs to a scheduled tribe/caste 0.018 0.012 0.023 0.014
Primary education -0.007** 0.003 -0.006* 0.003
Secondary education -0.004 0.004 -0.005 0.005
Higher secondary education -0.004 0.007 -0.006 0.007
Self-employed in non-agriculture -0.017 0.01 -0.021* 0.011
Other employment -0.001 0.012 -0.002 0.012
Casual wage labourer -0.003 0.006 -0.004 0.006
Not working 0.000 0.005 -0.002 0.005
Doing housework 0.006 0.008 0.003 0.008
Student 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004
Expenditure tertile: Low -0.003 0.01 -0.005 0.011
Expenditure tertile: High -0.003 0.008 0.000 0.008
Offer 0.336*** 0.039 0.324*** 0.032
Observations  58,099 38,045
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. In addition to the variables displayed in the table, both models include village 
level fixed effects and time effects. For outpatient care uptake the sample consists of observations from all three sites. 
For inpatient care uptake the sample consists of observations only from Kanpur Dehat and Pratapgarh.
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Annex 4.4: Determinants of RSBY membership in 2012 and 2013
  Pooled Uttar Pradesh Bihar
Variables Marginal 
effects
Standard 
error
Marginal 
effects
Standard 
error
Marginal 
effects
Standard 
error
Proportion of household members with 
chronic illnesses (percent of household)
0.046* 0.041 0.032* 0.051 0.055 0.068
Log of average Distance from facility 0.024 0.024 0.080 0.052 0.006 0.029
Low insurance index score(1/0) -0.061 0.045 -0.076 0.054 -0.036 0.079
High insurance index score (1/0) 0.021 0.016 0.024 0.019 0.012 0.027
Enrolled in CBHI(1/0) 0.019* 0.023 0.050* 0.028 -0.026 0.038
Lowest asset tertile (1/0) -0.03 0.022 -0.025 0.028 -0.032 0.036
Highest asset tertile (1/0) 0.013 0.022 0.007 0.026 0.022 0.040
Primary education (1/0) -0.030 0.032 -0.019 0.042 -0.054* 0.050
Secondary education (1/0) -0.005** 0.036 0.013 0.046 -0.027 0.059
Higher secondary education (1/0) 0.054 0.058 0.091 0.071 0.001 0.105
Other employment (1/0) -0.010 0.038 0.044 0.047 -0.097 0.067
Casual wage labourer (1/0) -0.009 0.023 0.008 0.029 -0.035 0.038
Not working (1/0) 0.006 0.037 0.017 0.044 -0.011 0.071
Doing housework (1/0) -0.020 0.029 -0.002 0.036 -0.053 0.049
Female headed household (1/0) 0.023 0.036 0.093* 0.048 -0.053 0.057
Household size 0.023*** 0.007 0.028*** 0.009 0.020 0.014
Female 0 to 13yrs (1/0) 0.006 0.087 -0.053 0.110 0.083 0.144
Female older than 55 (1/0) -0.279*** 0.107 -0.262** 0.126 -0.374* 0.214
Male 0 to 13yrs (1/0) -0.212* 0.115 -0.184 0.142 -0.306 0.197
Male 14 to 55yrs (1/0) -0.139 0.095 -0.038 0.117 -0.337** 0.169
Male older than 55 (1/0) -0.064 0.147 -0.054 0.182 -0.065 0.253
Year: 2013 0.178*** 0.038 0.176*** 0.045 0.186*** 0.070
Observations 6,367 4,085 2,282
Notes: Table shows marginal effects of OLS models using household level fixed effects. The binary dependent variable 
shows whether a household is enrolled in RSBY. Data is pooled across the three survey years. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Annex 4.5: Effects of RSBY
 Pooled UP Bihar
 Coefficient Standard 
error
Coefficient Standard 
error
Coefficient Standard 
error
Probability of hospitalizations (1/0) 0.000 (0.013) -0.011 (0.017) 0.014 (0.020)
Observations 6,755 3,973 2,782
Probability of having healthcare 
expenses conditional on use (1/0)
0.014 (0.039) -0.007 (0.078) 0.043 (0.045)
Observations 897 476 421
Log of healthcare expenses 
conditional on spending (INR)
-0.278 (0.195) 0.577 (0.438) -0.675*** (0.234)
Observations 858 455 403
Probability of debt conditional on 
use (1/0)
0.047 (0.074) -0.013 (0.115) 0.174 (0.100)
Observations 897 476 421
Log of the amount of debt 
conditional on borrowing (INR)
-0.166 (0.269) 0.347 (0.572) -0.611*** (0.277)
Observations 740 385 355
Notes: Table shows coefficients of OLS models using household level fixed effects. Association between RSBY 
membership and inpatient utilization/financial protection identified for the bottom two-third of the households. 
Logged forms of healthcare expenses and the amount of debt are used in the respective models. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Annex 5.1: Baseline summary of outcome variables for children under-5 years
 Ultra-poor households Other-poor households
 
Treated 
areas
Control 
areas
Normalized 
differences
Treated 
areas
Control 
areas
Normalized 
differences
 1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A: 0 to 5 years
Weight for height z-score (WHZ) -1.20 -1.25 0.05 -1.17 -1.13 -0.03
Wasting (WHZ<-2SD) (1/0) 0.20 0.23 -0.07 0.21 0.18 0.06
Height for age z-score (HAZ) -2.01 -2.02 0.01 -1.92 -1.95 0.03
Stunting (HAZ<-2SD) (1/0) 0.51 0.52 -0.01 0.48 0.50 -0.04
Weight for age z-score (WAZ) -1.98 -2.02 0.04 -1.92 -1.89 -0.03
Underweight (WAZ<-2SD) (1/0) 0.48 0.50 -0.04 0.47 0.46 0.01
Observations 1,900 1,075 2,700 2,998
Notes: Table shows baseline (2007) means of outcome variables. Columns 1 and 2 show means across treated and 
control areas for ultra-poor households. Columns 4 and 5 show outcome means across treated and control areas 
among other-poor households. Columns 4 and 6 present normalized differences between the respective groups, 
calculated as the difference in means in treatment and control areas, divided by the squared root of the sum of their 
variances.
502047-L-sub01-bw-Raza
Annexure
155
Annex 5.2: Baseline summary of intermediary variables
Ultra-poor households Other-poor households
 Treated 
areas
Control 
areas
Normalized 
differences
Treated 
areas
Control 
areas
Normalized 
differences
 1 2 4 5 6 8
Breastfeeding and vitamin A supplements ¥
Probability of breastfeeding (1/0) 0.97 0.97 0.02 0.98 0.97 0.04
Duration of exclusive 
breastfeeding (days)
103 94 0.10 105 99 0.08
Administration of Vitamin A (1/0) 0.28 0.34 0.13 0.38 0.34 0.09
Observations 1,032 548 1,541 1,774
Illnesses ¥
Likelihood of contracting an 
infectious disease (children) (1/0)
0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02
Observations 4,071 2,551 5,194 6,044
Likelihood of falling ill (adults) (1/0) 0.278 0.29 0.030 0.254 0.261 0.017
Observations 14,624 8,783 20,448 23,127
Food security †
Members can generally manage 
two meals a day (1/0)
0.467 0.364 0.220 0.657 0.566 0.180
Observations 4,440 2,875 5,382 6,227
Safe water and hygiene practices †
Use of sanitary toilet (1/0) 0.55 0.47 0.17 0.65 0.60 0.11
Safe drinking water (1/0) 0.99 0.99 0.07 0.98 0.99 0.09
Observations 4,440 2,875  5,382 6,227  
Notes: Table shows baseline (2007) means of intermediary variables. Columns 1 and 2 show means across treated 
and control areas for ultra-poor households. Columns 4 and 5 show outcome means across treated and control areas 
among other-poor households. Columns 4 and 6 present normalized differences between the respective groups, 
calculated as the difference in means in treatment and control areas, divided by the squared root of the sum of their 
variances. Normalized differences greater than 0.25 indicates statistically different means. ¥ Analysis conducted at the 
individual level. † Analysis conducted at the household level.
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Annex 5.3: End-line summary of outcomes
 Ultra-poor Other Poor
 Treated 
areas
Control 
areas
Normalized 
differences
Treated 
areas
Control 
areas
Normalized 
differences
 1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel B: 6 to 19 years
Body mass index (BMI in SD) -0.90 -1.27 35.00 -1.06 -1.23 16.30
Thinness (BMI< -2SD) (1/0) 0.13 0.23 -25.40 0.17 0.22 -12.70
Height for age (HAZ) -1.81 -1.85 3.30 -1.69 -1.67 -1.60
Stunting (HAZ<-2SD) (1/0) 0.44 0.47 -4.20 0.40 0.40 0.60
Weight for age (WAZ) -1.73 -2.15 38.50 -1.84 -1.98 12.50
Underweight (WAZ<-2SD) (1/0) 0.39 0.58 -38.90 0.43 0.49 -10.70
Observations 3,220 2,016 4,853 5,330
Panel C: 19 years +
Body mass index (absolute value) 19.51 19.04 17.20 19.91 19.69 7.80
Moderate thinness (BMI<18.5) 0.38 0.47 -17.40 0.33 0.36 -6.00
Severe thinness (BMI<17) 0.15 0.22 -17.50 0.12 0.14 -6.50
Observations 5,806 3,693  7,835 8,947  
Notes: Table shows end-line (2011) means of outcome variables. Columns 1 and 2 show means across treated and 
control areas for ultra-poor households. Columns 4 and 5 show outcome means across treated and control areas 
among other-poor households. Columns 4 and 6 present normalized differences between the respective groups, 
calculated as the difference in means in treatment and control areas, divided by the squared root of the sum of their 
variances.
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Annex 5.4: Baseline summary of control variables
 Ultra-poor households Other-poor households
 Treated 
areas
Control 
areas
Normalized 
differences
Treated 
areas
Control 
areas
Normalized 
differences
 1 2 3 4 5 6
Demographics
Female headed household (1/0) 0.23 0.32 -0.19 0.08 0.09 -0.02
Household size 4.15 4.07 0.07 4.52 4.46 0.03
Socioeconomics
Per capita income (BDT) 5170 6477 -0.13 3256 3765 -0.05
Standard deviation
Education of household head:
No education (1/0) 0.73 0.77 -0.09 0.60 0.60 0.00
Primary education (1/0) 0.22 0.18 0.09 0.29 0.28 0.01
Secondary education (1/0) 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.09 -0.01
Tertiary education (1/0) 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.03
Employment of household head:
Household work (1/0) 0.12 0.14 -0.06 0.04 0.06 -0.06
Casual day labourer (1/0) 0.46 0.30 0.34 0.64 0.59 0.10
Agricultural worker (1/0) 0.37 0.48 -0.24 0.26 0.29 -0.08
Semi-skilled worker (1/0) 0.03 0.04 -0.06 0.04 0.04 0.02
Other employment (1/0) 0.03 0.04 -0.09 0.02 0.03 0.03
Asset
Owns any land (1/0) 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.21 0.18 0.05
Owns any livestock (1/0) 0.53 0.50 0.06 0.71 0.70 0.00
Has any savings (1/0) 0.38 0.36 0.06 0.58 0.58 0.02
Observations 14,624 8,793  20,448 23,127  
Notes: Table shows baseline (2007) means of control variables. Columns 1 and 2 show means across treated and 
control areas for ultra-poor households. Columns 4 and 5 show outcome means across treated and control areas 
among other-poor households. Columns 4 and 6 present normalized differences between the respective groups, 
calculated as the difference in means in treatment and control areas, divided by the squared root of the sum of their 
variances. Normalized differences greater than 0.25 indicates statistically different means.
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Annex 5.5: Determinants of attrition
  Ultra-poor Households Other-poor Households
  Marginal effects Standard errors Marginal effects Standard errors
Ultra-poor households (1/0) 0.009 0.017
Other-poor households (1/0) 0.005 0.017
Nutrition indicators
Height (in cm) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weight (in kg) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Age (in months) -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Demographics
Female headed household (1/0) 0.011 0.012 0.021 0.015
Household size -0.005 0.003 0.000 0.002
Socioeconomics
Per capita income (BDT) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Education of household head:
Primary education (1/0) -0.022 0.014 -0.030*** 0.010
Secondary education (1/0) 0.003 0.028 0.013 0.013
Tertiary education (1/0) -0.083 0.044 0.013 0.020
Employment of household head:
Casual day labourer (1/0) -0.053 0.017 -0.034 0.019
Agricultural worker (1/0) -0.067*** 0.017 -0.088 0.016
Semi-skilled worker (1/0) -0.080** 0.028 -0.068** 0.025
Other employment (1/0) 0.000 0.024 -0.026 0.012
Asset
Owns any land (1/0) -0.012 0.010 -0.006 0.008
Owns any livestock (1/0) -0.012 0.011 -0.011 0.012
Observations 20,357 37,192
Notes: Table shows marginal effects of a probit model. The dependent variable, attrition, is equal to 1 if the individual 
is not observed in 2011 and 0 otherwise. The models are analysed using village level fixed effects and the standard 
errors are clustered at the branch level. The null hypothesis of whether the covariates and attrition vary across the 
treatment status was not rejected. 
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Annex 5.6: Spill-over effects of CFPR on nutritional status of non-poor households
  Marginal Effects Standard errors
Panel A: 0 to 5 years
Weight for height (WHZ) -0.081 0.089
Wasting (WHZ<-2SD) (1/0) 0.046 0.028
Height for age (HAZ) 0.098 0.137
Stunting (HAZ<-2SD) (1/0) -0.050 0.045
Weight for age (WAZ) 0.039 0.090
Underweight (WAZ<-2SD) (1/0) -0.017 0.044
Observations 3,124
Panel B: 6 to 19 years
Body mass index (BMI in SD) -0.017 0.066
Thinness (BMI< -2SD) (1/0) 0.029 0.021
Height for age (HAZ) -0.063 0.081
Stunting (HAZ<-2SD) (1/0) -0.002 0.029
Weight for age (WAZ) 0.002 0.119
Underweight (WAZ<-2SD) (1/0) -0.000 0.072
Observations 4,625
Panel C: 19 years +
Body mass index (absolute value) -0.009 0.075
Moderate thinness (BMI<18.5) 0.003 0.012
Severe thinness (BMI<17) 0.002 0.007 
Observations 20,489
Notes: Table shows marginal effects of OLS models using village level fixed effects. For ages 0 through 19, effect on the 
continuous z-scores should be interpreted in terms of standard deviations from the median of the WHO international 
reference group. Results for the group 20+ years show absolute values of BMI and binary outcomes (BMI<18.5 and 
BMI<17.5) indicating moderate and severe thinness. Errors are calculated using the delta method and clustered at the 
branch level. Critical values at which the null hypothesis is rejected is adjusted down using the Bonferroni correction. 
***, **, * indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% per cent respectively. Bold indicates significant difference between 
male and female headed households; and between male and female respondents at the 10% level. 
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Annex 6.1: Challenging the frontiers of poverty reduction (programme background and description)
The CFPR programme is/has been especially designed to meet the needs of the ultra-poor households 
who are too poor to access or adequately use the conventional development interventions such as 
microfinance. Main objective of the CFPR is to strengthen the livelihoods of the ultra-poor through asset 
transfer, enterprise development training, special health services, social capital development services 
and subsistence allowance.
6.1.1  Selection process
The selection process is the key to the success of the programme as the costs of leakages are extremely 
high. The selection process of the beneficiaries of the CFPR takes place as part of a three-stage process. 
Initially, based on the poverty mapping conducted by the World Food Programme, the poorest districts 
and subdistricts are identified. Based on experience from other BRAC programmes in those localities, 
further geographical selection is carried out within each sub-district, which helps the CFPR team to 
identify the poorest sections of the locality. The second stage involves a community wealth-ranking 
exercise to identify the ultra-poor within the community itself known as the Participatory Rural Appraisal, 
developed by Robert Chambers (1994). A particular emphasis is placed on capturing the ‘invisible’ 
households; that is, those households that do not show up on different surveys including the preliminary 
household identification process. In the wealth-ranking exercise, households are clustered into several 
groups and the bottom two groups (often bottom group) of wealth ranks are then surveyed by a small 
questionnaire to check their eligibility against five inclusion and three exclusion criteria.93 In fact, a study 
found that almost 3 per cent of the finally selected households for the CFPR were from the ‘invisible’ 
households (Sulaiman 2009).94 A targeting effectiveness study CFPR using a poverty index created by the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor showed that more than 80 per cent of those selected fell within 
the bottom two deciles of the index (Sulaiman and Matin 2008).
6.1.2  Training and assets transfer
The Enterprise Development Training is designed keeping in mind that the members are able to 
develop transferable skills that they can maximise while managing any form ofincome-generating 
enterprises that BRAC provides (Raza 2008). There are nine options among which the choices must be 
made through discussion by the member and the field staff.95 The training mainly falls into two parts; 
that is, in-class and hands-on training. The in-class training lasts from three to six days, contingent on the 
93 The five inclusion criteria for the CFPR programme include: (i) the household owns less than 10 decimals of land; (ii) the 
household is dependent upon female domestic work or begging; (iii) no male adult active members in the household; (iv) 
children of school going age have to take paid work; and (v) no productive assets in the household. Three exclusion criteria were 
used: (i) household does not have an active female member; (ii) any of the household members is participating microfinance; and 
(iii) household is enjoying any intervention from other development programmes.
94 There are a number of reasons that contribute to these households being invisible. Firstly, these household members sometimes 
reside in other households’ backyards. Although the community may assume them to be part of the resident household, for all 
practical purposes they have an independent ‘economy’. Secondly, for those who are floaters with no specified place to sleep at 
night, the community does not usually consider them to be a household at all. And because these two groups do not qualify as 
households in surveys, they become excluded from a myriad of interventions de facto.
95 Goat-rearing, cow-rearing, livestock (a combination of cow-rearing and goat-rearing), Black Bengal goat-rearing (special 
farm), cow and poultry combination, vegetable cultivation, horticulture nursery, non-farm activities and lastly poultry for egg 
production.
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type of enterprise assets the members receive. As a part of the compensation package, they receive food 
and transportation costs. Following the initial training period is when they receive their assets along with 
corrugated roofs to house their cows and or goats and a free cage for the birds.
6.1.3  Subsistence allowance
A weekly stipend was also provided to the CFPR participants in an effort to create a holistic support 
package for the extreme poor of approximately BDT 70 (US$1.00). The reason why the CFPR provides 
this allowance is to help smooth consumption during the time beneficiaries spend taking care of the 
assets provided by the programme as opposed to earning income. Additionally, providing a subsistence 
allowance also acts as a deterrent against selling the IGAs for meeting immediate consumption needs. 
This stipend is provided to them for eight to 12 months depending on the type of IGA (income-
generating assets) they have received; that is, until the assets begin to yield an income.
6.1.4  Health support
BRAC’s healthcare programme aims to realise sustained health impacts by reducing maternal, infant and 
child mortality and fertility, and by improving health and nutrition in children, adolescents and women. 
The CFPR accomplishes these goals through two sets of strategies. The first strategy incorporates 
education and information dissemination. The programme staff educate individuals and communities 
about important healthcare and nutritional issues. The second strategy comprises the provision of 
healthcare services. The CFPR offers reproductive and family planning services; pregnancy and basic 
curative care; and treatment of tuberculosis. Furthermore, also as a core part of the programme, hygiene 
related items such as sanitary latrines and tube-wells are supplied, the uses of which are strongly 
encouraged.
6.1.5  Social development
To effectively address the holistic approach of the CFPR, the Social Development Programme (SDP) aims 
to build and secure the human and socio-political asset base of the rural poor, especially of women, 
as well as to enable them to improve their well-being, reduce vulnerabilities, take advantage of new 
opportunities, exercise their rights and play a more active role in public life. One of the avenues through 
which the SDP tries to accomplish their targets is through building rural institutions to ensure stronger 
accountability of the local government to the poor, especially to women. One important component 
of the SDP is the Gram Daridro Bimochon Committee [Village Poverty Reduction Committee]. This 
committee re-invents the use of the services of the rural elite to support the beneficiaries of the 
programme. Although discarded in the early 1970s, the idea of using the local elites to ensure the 
success of the beneficiaries by acting as social protection agents was reintroduced as a part of the 
CFPR to assist the beneficiaries with issues such as providing social security for the participant members 
among a myriad of other things.96
96 They also assist them in resolving their problems and taking necessary actions against exploitation or oppression, providing 
assistance with financing or accessing medical care as necessary, encouraging and facilitating the school admission and 
attendance of ultra-poor children and helping the participant members address households’ water and sanitation problems by 
assisting with installing tube wells and latrines.
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Access to information on the rights and entitlements of the poor is essential for building confidence, 
gaining greater control over their lives and ensuring accountability of local government services and 
resources. This target is met through the use of popular theatre to disseminate information to the 
communities through entertainment.
6.1.6  Human rights and legal services
One of the important components of the Human Rights and Legal Services includes legal aid classes 
to boost awareness on topics such as constitutional laws, family and inheritance laws for Hindus and 
Muslims to empower the poor and marginalised through community mobilisation and capacity-
building. Additionally the Human Rights and Legal Services also works to provide support to the CFPR 
beneficiaries through assistance in conflict resolution, legal representation and also to compel the legal 
system to reduce violence against women and children.
6.1.7  Graduation
After 24 months of the programme, the participants begin preparing for their graduation from the 
programme through confidence-building training. Their initial dependence on the CFPR staff is 
methodically weaned off as they move towards their graduation. At the 24th month mark, the participants 
are considered graduates as they have by then completed the requisite training and have enough of 
an asset base to move up the poverty ladder. At this juncture, several benchmarks are expected to be 
met. These benchmarks include intangible assets such as more confidence in their own abilities to make 
a sustainable living for themselves with a higher capital base that would translate into higher income 
and greater food security. Side by side, it is expected that they will also be able to afford at least basic 
health services, have access to clean drinking water and better sanitation, and also be better educated 
and more aware in their social surroundings for both the participant women and their children in terms 
of their rights. Eventually, it is hoped that all these factors in combination will lead to economically and 
ultimately socially empowered women.
6.1.8  Costs
The cost per beneficiary comes to approximately US$292 for the duration of two years, during which 
the programme participants receive income-generating assets and background support services as 
described previously. Additionally, the costs of administration for such a thorough programme are 
immense due to the high level of involvement by the programme staff. One of the components here 
is to understand that although it is said that the US$292 is per participant, it is in fact for the entire 
household that is being reached. What this means is that the assets, both social and capital, are provided 
for the entire household, who reaps the benefits provided from components such as social protection, 
health benefits for the mother and children and education. However, the comprehensive package was 
found to be highly cost-effective, having a benefit-cost ratio at 5.07 (Sinha et al. 2008).97
97 This information was collected during an interview with Ms Rabeya Yasmin, Associate Director, CFPR Programme, BRAC for the 
purposes of this paper.
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Annex 6.2: Baseline comparison between attrition and non-attrition households
  Attrition (during 
2002-08)
Available HH in 
2008
Difference
Has cash savings (% of respondent women) 13.20 14.50 -1.3
Roof made house (% of HHs) 34.91 37.26 -2.35
Use sanitary latrine (% of HHs) 3.99 3.32 0.67
Present value of the living room (BDT) (mean) 1184.07 1216.92 -32.85
Face always food deficit (%) 58.22 51.46 6.76***
Mean cultivable land (acre) 1.72 1.68 0.041
Own cow (% of HHs) 5.20 6.81 -1.62*
Own poultry (% of HHs) 35.10 39.48 -4.38***
Household size (mean) 3.21 3.78 -0.57
Age of the household head (mean) 44.00 43.03 0.97***
Female headed households (%) 44.85 32.42 12.42***
Years of education of the household head 0.49 0.53 -0.04
Observations 1,077 4,549
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Annex 6.3: Baseline (2002) value of the outcome variables of interest 
Outcome variables (mean) Participants Non-participants Difference
No. of Cow/bull 0.04 0.19 -0.14***
No. of goat/sheep 0.10 0.13 -0.03**
No. of duck/hen 0.85 1.44 -0.59***
Per capita income (Tk.) 2493 2785 -291.83***
Own cultivable land (decimals) 0.71 2.23 -1.52***
Homestead land (decimals) 2.27 2.98 -0.70***
Mortgaged-in/rented -in land (decimal) 2.00 3.61 -1.61***
No. of Radios 0.01 0.02 -0.01***
No. of Big trees 0.56 1.29 -0.74***
No. of beds 0.76 1.01 -0.25***
No. of Rickshaw/van 0.02 0.05 -0.03***
Market value of the house (Tk.) 864.2 1562.4 -698.2***
Formal outstanding loan (Tk.) 22.5 472.0 -449.5***
Informal outstanding loan (Tk.) 272.9 495.8 -222.9***
Per capita calorie intake (Kcal) 1730 1818 -87.70
Per capita food expenditure (Tk.) 8.58 9.07 -0.49
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Annex 6.4: Difference between participant and non-participant of the variables used for propensity 
score matching, 2002
 Control Treatment Difference
Female Headed household (%) 25.1 39.9 -14.8***
Household Size (mean) 3.905 3.655 0.249***
Owned tube-well (%) 3.74 1.64 2.09***
Own land (in decimals) (mean) 6.143 2.367 3.776***
Received govt. benefit (%) 17.36 18.7 -1.33
Has outstanding loan from NGO (%) 10.4 0.6 9.7***
Main occupation of the main female member of the 
household is housemaid or begging (%)
11.6 18.97 -7.35***
No. of active female member (mean) 2.001 1.972 0.0288
No. of active male member (mean) 0.9334 0.7307 0.2026***
Owned cow/bull (%) 0.1053 0.0306 0.0746***
Owned goat/sheep (%) 9.31 6.13 3.18***
Owned duck/hen (%) 46.17 32.65 3.51***
Owned rickshaw/van (%) 3.87 1.37 2.4***
Owned radio/TV (%) 2.00 0.80 1.2***
Owned ornaments (%) 0.91 0.71 0.20
Owned shop (%) 0.26 0.09 0.172
Main house’ roof made of straw (%) 32.89 41.71 -8.81***
Helped by non-relative neighbour (%) 14.9 16.4 1.5
Average schooling of the household members (years) 
(mean)
1.0146 0.6585 0.3560***
Maximum years of schooling in the households (mean) 2.5422 1.705 0.8371***
Whether faced any crisis/incidence (%) 73.02 81.83 -08.81***
Faced chronic food deficit in last one year (%) 69.66 51.62 18.04***
Can take help from state law (%) 46.86 45.8 01.06
Improved economic status in the last one year (%) 13.2 12.4 0.7***
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Annex 6.5: Determinants of participation, probit regression results (using full sample)
  Coefficient z-value
Female Headed household (Yes=1, No=0) 0.302 5.46***
Household Size 0.091 4.15***
Owned tube-well (Yes=1, No=0) -0.322 -2.42**
Own land (in decimals) -0.019 -6.45***
Received govt. benefit (Yes=1, No=0) 0.104 1.99**
Has outstanding loan from NGO (Yes=1, No=0) -1.429 -10.73***
Main occupation of the main female member of the household is 
housemaid or begging (Yes=1, No=0)
0.043 0.73
No. of active female member 0.006 0.23
No. of active male member -0.181 -3.87***
Owned cow/bull (Yes=1, No=0) -0.518 -5.77***
Owned goat/sheep (Yes=1, No=0) -0.053 -0.68
Owned duck/hen (Yes=1, No=0) -0.159 -3.75***
Owned rickshaw/van (Yes=1, No=0) -0.337 -2.44**
Owned radio/TV (Yes=1, No=0) -0.176 -0.96
Owned ornaments (Yes=1, No=0) 0.003 0.01
Owned shop (Yes=1, No=0) -0.657 -1.16
Main house’ roof made of straw (Yes=1, No=0) 0.178 4.32***
Helped by non-relative neighbour (Yes=1, No=0) 0.061 1.11
Average schooling of the household members (years) 0.008 0.2
Maximum years of schooling in the household (years) -0.057 -2.82***
Whether faced any crisis/incidence (Yes=1, No=0) 0.182 3.7***
Faced chronic food deficit in last one year (Yes=1, No=0) -0.338 -7.96***
Can take help from state law (Yes=1, No=0) 0.098 2.42**
Improved economic status in the last one year (Yes=1, No=0) 0.314 4.99
Constant -0.089 -1.03
Observations 4,549  
Pseudo R-square 0.12  
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Annex 6.6: Determinants of participation, probit regression results (used for food security analysis)
  Coefficient z-value
Female Headed household (Yes=1, No=0) 0.289 1.42
Household Size 0.106 1.18
Owned tube-well (Yes=1, No=0) -0.772 -1.11
Own land (in decimals) -0.081 -2.72***
Received govt. benefit (yes=1, No=0) 0.172 0.92
Has outstanding loan from NGO (Yes=1, No=0) -0.337 -0.44
Main occupation of the main female member of the household is 
housemaid or begging (Yes=1, No=0) 0.356 1.87*
No. of active female member -0.124 -1.1
No. of active male member -0.138 -0.86
Owned cow/bull (Yes=1, No=0) -0.550 -0.97
Owned duck/hen (Yes=1, No=0) -0.112 -0.47
Owned ornaments (Yes=1, No=0) -0.558 -0.82
Main house’ roof made of straw (Yes=1, No=0) -0.140 -0.85
Average schooling in the households (years) -0.228 -1.1
Maximum years of schooling in the households (years) 0.133 1.48
Faced chronic food deficit in last one year (Yes=1, No=0) -0.242 -1.48
Can take help from state law (Yes=1, No=0) -0.017 -0.1
Constant 0.133 0.43
Observations 298  
Pseudo R-square 0.07  
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Annex 7.1: Determinants of attrition
Variables Marginal effects Standard Error
beneficiary 0.035 0.018
cowbull_a -0.018*** 0.006
goatsheep_a -0.011* 0.006
duckhen_a -0.002 0.002
bigtree_a -0.005 0.004
csav 0.027 0.018
formaloan -0.013 0.015
badloan 0.012 0.013
percapinc 0.000 0.000
entrepreneur 0.006 0.033
emp_begging_maid 0.018 0.038
emp_daylabourer -0.04 0.032
owl_h -0.030** 0.013
owl_c -0.028 0.027
rickvan_a 0.026 0.023
rooftin 0.026 0.016
radiotv_a -0.012 0.036
twicemeal -0.015 0.017
egg -0.006 0.007
invited 0.001 0.013
Notes: Results show marginal effects of a probit model. The dependent variable equals one for households that are 
not in the balanced panel , 0 otherwise. Covariates reflect baseline characteristics. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Annex 7.2: Effects of the CFPR program across different time periods using non-parametric DiD with 
matching
Variables D1 
(2005-2002)
D2 
(2008-2002)
D3 
(2011-2002)
D4 
(2008-2005)
D5  
(2011-2008)
Directly affected outcomes
Livestock and nursery
cowbull_a 1.477*** 0.940*** 0.414*** -0.550*** -0.526***
goatsheep_a 0.405*** 0.278*** 0.01 -0.115*** -0.247***
duckhen_a 0.506*** 1.634*** 0.403*** 1.111*** -1.231***
bigtree_a 0.014 0.25 0.097 0.236 -0.216
Financial Participation
csav 0.625*** 0.563*** 0.398*** -0.065*** -0.161***
formalloan 0.303*** 0.221*** 0.125*** -0.093*** -0.089***
informalloan -0.124** -0.104* -0.071*** -0.020*** -0.024**
 Indirectly affected outcomes
Socioeconomic Status
percapinc 826.51*** 1493.63*** 1163.73*** 679.67*** -180.72
Occupation
emp_entrepreneur 0.083*** 0.177*** 0.040** 0.098*** -0.137***
emp_begging_maid -0.059*** -0.067*** -0.027** -0.009 0.051***
emp_daylabourer -0.035** -0.107*** -0.022 -0.073*** 0.074***
Asset holdings
owl_h 0.050*** 0.080*** 0.075*** 0.034* 0.0003
owl_c 0.007 0.036*** -0.008 0.033*** -0.039***
rickvan_a 0.028*** 0.035*** -0.003 0.007 -0.032*
rooftin 0.063*** 0.026** 0.019* -0.040*** -0.007
radiotv_a 0.011* 0.018*** 0.008 0.004 -0.008
Food Security
twicemeal 0.137*** 0.071*** 0.002 -0.070*** -0.059***
egg 0.365*** 0.326*** 0.1768** -0.038 -0.200***
Social Capital
invited 0.0527** 0.086*** -0.016 -0.033 -0.097***
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Annex 7.3: Summary statistics of baseline characteristics across male and female headed households 
Variable name Description 2002 Difference
Female 
Headed
Male 
Headed
Socioeconomic Status
percapinc Annual per capita households income (BDT) 2354 2633 -321***
csav Has cash savings (1/0) 0.103 0.164 0.061***
Occupation
emp_service salaried employment (1/0) 0.023 0.023 -0.001
emp_entrepreneur entrepreneur (ag/non-ag) (1/0) 0.129 0.229 0.100***
emp_begging_maid begging or working as maids (1/0) 0.325 0.036 -0.289***
emp_daylabourer employed as day laborer (1/0) 0.409 0.647 0.238***
emp_other employed in other categories (1/0) 0.048 0.01 -0.038***
Asset holdings
owl_h Owns any homestead land (1/0) 0.421 0.58 0.158***
owl_c Owns any cultivable land (1/0) 0.035 0.053 0.018***
cowbull_a Number of cow/bulls 0.045 0.143 0.098***
goatsheep_a Number of goats/sheep 0.085 0.129 0.044***
duckhen_a Number of poultry 0.833 1.287 0.454***
bigtree_a Number of big trees 0.534 0.841 0.307**
rickvan_a Owns any rickshaws or cycle vans (1/0) 0.006 0.028 -0.022***
radiotv_a Owns any radios/TVs (1/0) 0.005 0.017 0.012***
rooftin Roof of the house made of tin (1/0) 0.531 0.479 -0.052***
Financial Participation
formalloan Has formal loans from NGOs (1/0) 0.029 0.083 0.054***
informalloan Has informal loans from money lenders(1/0) 0.361 0.317 -0.044*
Food Security
twicemeal Usually can have at least two meals a day (1/0) 0.537 0.631 0.094***
egg Number of eggs consumed in the past week 0.44 0.643 0.202***
Social Capital
invited Invited to non-relatives’ homes 0.217 0.293 0.076***
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively from t-tests. 
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Annex 7.4: Effects of the CFPR program in the Rangpur District
Variables D1 
(2005-2002)
D2 
(2008-2002)
D3 
(2011-2002)
D4 
(2008-2005)
D5 
(2011-2008)
Directly affected outcomes
Livestock and nursery
cowbull_a 1.309*** 0.920*** 0.413*** -0.383*** -0.492***
goatsheep_a 0.434*** 0.427*** 0.177** -0.005 -0.243**
duckhen_a 0.502** 1.750*** 0.465* 1.260*** -1.100***
bigtree_a 0.379** 0.519** 0.077 0.145 -0.395
Financial Participation
csav 0.618*** 0.671*** 0.592*** 0.054** -0.060**
formalloan 0.378*** 0.224*** 0.107*** -0.155*** -0.105***
informalloan -0.057 -0.032 -0.034 -0.090 -0.116 
 Indirectly affected outcomes
Socioeconomic Status
percapinc 984.634*** 1,717.551*** 1,728.290*** 748.770*** 221.886
Occupation
emp_entrepreneur 0.058** 0.134*** 0.085** 0.075** -0.040
emp_begging_maid -0.054** -0.067*** -0.054* -0.013 0.013
emp_daylabourer -0.013 -0.076** -0.059 -0.063* 0.013
Asset holdings
owl_h 0.127*** 0.152*** 0.088** 0.024 -0.049
owl_c 0.020 0.061*** -0.005 0.061*** -0.052***
rickvan_a 0.036** 0.060*** 0.008 0.025 -0.035 
rooftin 0.062*** 0.019 0.012 -0.045** -0.001
radiotv_a 0.009 0.019 -0.013 0.01 -0.028*
Food Security
twicemeal 0.101*** 0.094*** 0.084*** -0.004 -0.071**
egg 0.403*** 0.360*** 0.142* -0.044 -0.251**
Social Capital
invited 0.107*** 0.142*** -0.01 0.029 -0.132***
Notes: Results obtained by linear regression with inverse propensity weighing. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Number of inclusion or exclusion criteria met 
Inclusion Criteria Treated Inclusion Criteria Control
Exclusion Criteria Treated Exclusion Criteria Control
Annex Figure 7.1: Comparison between the numbers of inclusion and exclusion criteria met by the 
treated and the control
Note: Inclusion criteria: Household owns less than 10 decimals of land; Main source of income is by female member 
begging or working as domestic help; no active male adult (female household head); School going children working 
for pay; No productive or income generating assets. 
Exclusion criteria: No Active female member in the household; Microfinance participants; Household members receive 
government benefits.
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Developing counties have established a number of social safety-net programmes to deal with various 
concerns. These programmes cover issues ranging from health, nutrition, education and job creation 
using public works and other approaches. Typically, such programmes focus on specific areas. For 
example, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes focus on providing cash transfers to reduce 
child labour and enhance human capital investments or for instance, the recognition that catastrophic 
healthcare expenditure is one of the most common factors in precipitating poverty has led to the 
implementation of a variety of health insurance schemes throughout the developing world. Indeed, the 
push towards universal healthcare coverage (UHC) is providing further impetus to the development of 
health insurance schemes.
 While not challenging the usefulness of programs that focus on a specific area, the last two decades 
have also seen the advent of integrated approaches to poverty alleviation in countries in South Asia and 
Africa. This is perhaps a useful approach, most notably for the ultra-poor who are typically precluded 
from traditional market based poverty alleviation approaches. In addition to income generation, these 
programmes integrate a number of additional components such as training and transfers related to 
health, education, nutrition and social mobilization. The fact that generally separates these approaches 
from traditional interventions is that as opposed to a one-off push, these programmes require 
participation over a certain duration over which the additional services are delivered. Though the scope, 
the targeted population and the components vary considerably, programmes such as these are gaining 
popularity and are being implemented across a number of developing countries.
 This thesis evaluates two social safety-net programs implemented in South Asia. One of these focuses 
on a single area, health insurance, while the other is an integrated program. The first half of the thesis 
(Chapter 2 to 4) focuses on the evaluation of two health insurance schemes that have been implemented 
in India. The first is a Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI) scheme that provides coverage for both 
in and outpatient care. The second scheme is a high-profile national insurance scheme called Rashtriya 
Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY), implemented by the Government of India. The latter half of the thesis 
(Chapters 5 to 7) focuses on an ultra-poverty alleviation programme undertaken in Bangladesh called 
Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction: Targeting the Ultra-poor (CFPR:TUP). The programme uses 
an integrated approach to ultra-poverty alleviation through the provision of income generating assets 
and multifaceted training over a duration of two years. 
1.0  Evidence from health insurance schemes in India
The analysis of the two health insurance schemes, namely the Community Based Health Insurance 
Schemes offered in three sites (Kanpur Dehat, Vaishali, and Pratapgarh) and the nationally implemented 
Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) focus on the effects of the scheme on healthcare utilization and 
financial protection. 
 In terms of design features, the CBHI schemes evaluated here are supported by NGOs but entirely 
financed and run by the local community in which they operate. The schemes provide outpatient 
coverage from Rural Medical Practitioners (RMPs) on a capitation basis. This mode of contract offers 
patients unlimited consultations and free medicines from the RMPs. The schemes also offer cover 
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inpatient costs of up to Rs. 4000 per person per year (PPPY) at a cost of about Rs. 195 PPPY (1.5% of 
annual per capita expenditure). Using a randomized control trial, we find no tangible effects of CBHI on 
healthcare utilization or financial protection in two of the three sites (Kanpur Dehat and Vaishali). In the 
third site (Pratapgarh), the CBHI scheme is associated with a drop in the likelihood of seeking outpatient 
care.
 The RSBY scheme targets households below the poverty line (BPL) and provides cashless protection 
against hospitalization costs. Families of up to five persons pay an annual premium of INR 30 per year for 
protection against hospitalization costs of up to INR 30,000 in any RSBY designated hospitals. The thesis 
focuses on Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, and for these two states assesses the determinants of enrolment and 
dropout, followed by an assessment of the link between scheme membership and healthcare utilization 
and financial protection among below-poverty-line (BPL) households. The analysis shows that the less 
wealthy, lower educated households or households belonging to scheduled castes/tribes are more likely 
to enrol and stay in the programme. There is evidence of adverse selection and households with a higher 
proportion of members with chronic conditions are more likely to enrol and have a lower likelihood 
of dropping out. Insurance related awareness plays a role in determining a household’s decision to 
enrol and continue with RSBY’s coverage. Results also indicate that insurance uptake is influenced 
by accessibility to the empanelled hospitals. Association between RSBY membership and healthcare 
utilization is limited. With regard to financial protection, only insured households in Bihar experienced a 
reduction in out-of-pocket spending and as a result, lower debt. 
2.0  Integrated approach to ultra-poverty reduction in Bangladesh 
The latter half of the thesis evaluates the impact of an integrated approach to ultra-poverty alleviation. 
Entitled, Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction: Targeting the Ultra-Poor (CFPR), the programme 
was launched in the poorest districts of Bangladesh in 2002. The programme provided income 
generating assets valued at approximately USD $140 and a comprehensive livelihood development 
training programme to encourage entrepreneurship. Once selected, the participants enrolled in the 
programme for two years. The evaluation examined the effect of the programme on various outcomes 
and across different time periods: short term (two years post- graduation), medium-term (four years 
post-graduation) and long-term (seven years post-graduation).
 Using a randomized control trial, the thesis first examines the short term effects of CFPR on the 
nutritional status of the participants and spill-over effects on households in communities where the 
programme took place. Considerable improvement was seen in the nutritional status of ultra-poor 
household members, most pronounced for children below 5. Results also indicate that the programme 
has positive externalities. Two factors are important to note: first, magnitudes of the spill over effects 
were generally half of the effects on the treated, and second, the spill-over effects were restricted to 
other poorer households in the community. The increase in children’s nutritional status was largely 
driven by increased duration of exclusive breastfeeding. For older individuals, improvements were 
created through increased food security and hygiene practices. Assessment of the heterogeneity of 
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impact showed greater benefits among female headed households while the effects were found to be 
gender neutral among individuals.
 Subsequently, the thesis assesses the impact of the project over the medium and long term using 
quasi-experimental methods. These outcomes include income, employment choices, productive and 
non-productive asset holdings, food security and social capital. We find that the effects of CFPR nearly 
double between the short and medium terms. The effects on income levels for instance, increase to BDT 
1493 (in the medium term) compared to BDT 826 during the short term. The participants increase their 
productive asset base (such as livestock, rickshaws and cultivable land) and expand their businesses 
through increased financial market participation. In the long-term, while the outcomes for the 
participants remains substantially higher than the control, there are no incremental effects between the 
medium and long term (income, for instance, was BDT 1300 higher among the treated and significant at 
conventional levels). 
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Ontwikkelingslanden werken met sociale vangnetprogramma’s om verschillende problemen aan te 
pakken. Deze programma’s hebben betrekking op vraagstukken die kunnen variëren van gezondheid 
en voeding tot onderwijs en werkgelegenheid en maken onder meer gebruik van openbare werken. 
Gewoonlijk richten dergelijke programma’s zich op specifieke gebieden. Zo richten programma’s voor 
voorwaardelijke subsidies (conditional cash transfer – (CCT) zich op terugdringing van kinderarbeid 
en verhoging van de investeringen in menselijk kapitaal. En de erkenning dat catastrofale uitgaven 
voor gezondheidszorg tot de belangrijkste oorzaken van toenemende armoede behoren, heeft in veel 
ontwikkelingslanden geresulteerd in de invoering van verschillende zorgverzekeringsregelingen. Het 
streven naar een universele zorgdekking vormt daarbij een extra stimulans voor de ontwikkeling van 
zorgverzekeringsregelingen.
 Behalve de programma’s die zich op een specifiek gebied richten en waarvan we het nut zeker niet 
in twijfel willen trekken, hebben we de afgelopen twee decennia in landen in Zuid-Azië en Afrika ook 
integrale methoden zien opkomen om de armoede te bestrijden. Die benaderingen zijn in potentie 
nuttig, met name voor personen die in extreme armoede leven, die gewoonlijk niet bereikt worden 
met de traditionele, op de markt gebaseerde armoedebestrijdingsinspanningen. Deze programma’s 
genereren niet alleen inkomsten, maar omvatten ook een aantal extra componenten, zoals scholing en 
overdrachten op het gebied van gezondheid, onderwijs, voeding en maatschappelijke mobilisering. Deze 
programma’s onderscheiden zich doorgaans van traditionele interventies doordat zij, in tegenstelling 
tot een eenmalige stimulans, uitgaan van participatie gedurende een bepaalde tijd, namelijk de periode 
waarin de aanvullende diensten worden verleend. De omvang, doelgroep en onderdelen kunnen 
aanzienlijk verschillen, maar over het algemeen winnen deze programma’s aan populariteit en worden 
zij in verschillende ontwikkelingslanden toegepast.
 In dit proefschrift worden twee sociale vangnetprogramma’s in Zuid-Azië geëvalueerd. Een van 
de programma’s richt zich op een enkel gebied, namelijk de zorgverzekeringen, terwijl het andere 
een integraal programma is. In eerste helft van het proefschrift (hoofdstuk 2 t/m 4) worden twee 
zorgverzekeringsregelingen in India geëvalueerd. De eerste is een zogeheten Community Based Health 
Insurance-regeling (CBHI – zorgverzekering op gemeenschapsbasis), die dekking biedt voor zowel 
klinische als poliklinische patiënten. De tweede regeling is een grootschalig nationaal verzekeringsstelsel, 
Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) genaamd, dat is ingevoerd door de regering van India. De tweede 
helft van het proefschrift (hoofdstuk 5 t/m 7) heeft betrekking op een programma voor de bestrijding 
van extreme armoede in Bangladesh, met de naam Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction: 
Targeting the Ultra-poor (CFPR:TUP). Met dit programma wordt de bestrijding van extreme armoede 
integraal aangepakt doordat er gedurende twee jaar inkomstengenererende activa en een veelzijdige 
scholing worden aangeboden.
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1.0  De praktijk van zorgverzekeringsregelingen in India
Bij de analyse van de twee zorgverzekeringsregelingen, namelijk de op drie locaties (Kanpur Dehat, 
Vaishali en Pratapgarh) aangeboden Community Based Health Insurance en de landelijk ingevoerde 
Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY), is met name gekeken naar de effecten van deze regelingen op 
het zorggebruik en de financiële bescherming.
 De geëvalueerde CBHI-regelingen worden qua ontwerpkenmerken weliswaar gesteund door ngo’s, 
maar ze worden volledig gefinancierd en beheerd door de lokale gemeenschap waarin ze functioneren. 
De regelingen voorzien in een poliklinische per capita-dekking van plattelandsartsen (Rural Medical 
Practitioners – RMP’s). Deze contractmethode biedt patiënten een onbeperkt aantal consulten en 
gratis medicijnen van de RMP’s. Daarnaast biedt de regeling dekking voor klinische kosten tot INR 4000 
per persoon per jaar (PPPJ) tegen een kostprijs van ongeveer INR 195 PPPJ (1,5% van de jaarlijkse uitgaven per 
hoofd van de bevolking). In twee van de drie locaties (Kanpur Dehat en Vaishali) hebben we met een 
gerandomiseerd gecontroleerd onderzoek geen tastbare effecten van CBHI op het zorggebruik of de 
financiële bescherming waargenomen. In de derde locatie (Pratapgarh) wordt de CBHI-regeling in 
verband gebracht met een afname van de kans dat er een beroep op poliklinische zorg wordt gedaan.
 De RSBY-regeling is gericht op huishoudens onder de armoedegrens en biedt bescherming tegen 
hospitalisatiekosten zonder contant geld. Gezinnen tot vijf personen betalen een jaarpremie van INR 
30 voor bescherming tegen hospitalisatiekosten tot INR 30.000, in alle aangewezen RSBY-ziekenhuizen. 
In dit proefschrift ligt de focus op Bihar en Uttar Pradesh, en voor deze twee staten zijn de bepalende 
factoren voor inschrijving en uitschrijving in kaart gebracht, gevolgd door een evaluatie van de relatie 
tussen deelname aan de regeling en het zorggebruik en de financiële bescherming onder huishoudens 
onder de armoedegrens. Uit de analyse blijkt dat huishoudens naarmate zij minder welgesteld en 
lager opgeleid zijn, zich sneller voor het programma inschrijven en ook ingeschreven blijven. Hetzelfde 
geldt voor huishoudens die tot geregistreerde kasten/stammen behoren. Er is aantoonbaar sprake van 
adverse selectie: huishoudens met meer leden met chronische aandoeningen schrijven zich sneller 
in en schrijven zich minder vaak uit. Bekendheid met verzekeringen speelt een rol bij het besluit van 
een huishouden om zich in te schrijven en ingeschreven te blijven voor de RSBY-dekking. Ook blijkt 
uit de resultaten dat het sluiten van een verzekering wordt beïnvloed door de toegankelijkheid van 
de deelnemende ziekenhuizen. Het verband tussen deelname aan de RSBY en het zorggebruik is 
beperkt. Wat de financiële bescherming betreft, ervaren alleen verzekerde huishoudens in Bihar een 
vermindering van contante uitgaven en daardoor minder schulden.
2.0  Geïntegreerde benadering van de bestrijding van extreme 
armoede in Bangladesh 
In de tweede helft van het proefschrift wordt de impact van een geïntegreerde benadering van de 
bestrijding van extreme armoede geëvalueerd. Onder de naam Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty 
Reduction: Targeting the Ultra-Poor (CFPR) werd in 2002 een programma gelanceerd in de armste 
districten van Bangladesh. Het programma voorzag in inkomstengenererende activa ter waarde van 
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ongeveer USD 140 en een uitgebreid scholingsprogramma op het gebied van levensonderhoud, om 
het ondernemerschap aan te moedigen. Na hun selectie schreven de deelnemers zich voor twee 
jaar voor het programma in. Voor de evaluatie werd het effect van het programma op verschillende 
resultaten en in verschillende periodes onderzocht: korte termijn (twee jaar na afstuderen), middellange 
termijn (vier jaar na afstuderen) en lange termijn (zeven jaar na afstuderen).
 Met behulp van een gerandomiseerd gecontroleerd onderzoek werden eerst de kortetermijneffecten 
van CFPR op de voedingssituatie van de deelnemers onderzocht, alsmede de uitstralingseffecten op 
huishoudens in gemeenschappen waarin het programma liep. Er werd een substantiële verbetering 
waargenomen in de voedingssituatie van de leden van extreem arme huishoudens. Deze was het 
meest uitgesproken voor kinderen van jonger dan 5 jaar. Ook bleek uit de resultaten dat het programma 
positieve externe effecten heeft. In dit kader zijn twee factoren van belang: ten eerste waren de 
neveneffecten over het algemeen half zo groot als de effecten op de behandelden, en ten tweede 
bleven de neveneffecten beperkt tot andere armere huishoudens in de gemeenschap. De verbetering 
in de voedingssituatie van kinderen was grotendeels te danken aan het feit dat er langere tijd uitsluitend 
borstvoeding werd gegeven. Voor oudere mensen werden verbeteringen gerealiseerd dankzij een 
verbeterde voedselveiligheid en hygiënische praktijken. Uit de evaluatie van de heterogeniteit van de 
impact bleek dat de voordelen groter waren in huishoudens met een vrouw aan het hoofd, terwijl de 
effecten genderneutraal waren onder afzonderlijke individuen.
 Vervolgens werd de impact van het project op de middellange en lange termijn beoordeeld 
aan de hand van quasi-experimentele methodes. Daarbij werd onder meer gekeken naar inkomens, 
werkgelegenheidskeuzes, het aanhouden van productieve en niet-productieve activa, voedselveiligheid 
en sociaal kapitaal. Wij hebben geconcludeerd dat de effecten van CFPR tussen de korte en middellange 
termijn bijna verdubbelen. Zo stijgen de effecten op inkomensniveaus tot BDT 1493 (op de middellange 
termijn), in vergelijking met BDT 826 op de korte termijn. De deelnemers vergroten hun productieve-
activabasis (zoals vee, riksja’s en bebouwbare grond) en breiden hun activiteiten uit door middel van 
een sterkere participatie in de financiële markt. Hoewel de resultaten voor de deelnemers op de lange 
termijn aanzienlijk hoger blijven dan voor de controlegroep, zijn er geen incrementele effecten tussen 
de middellange en de lange termijn (zo was het inkomen onder de behandelden BDT 1300 hoger, en 
significant op conventionele niveaus).
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Over the course of the PhD during the past four years, I have often fantasised about this moment and 
what it would feel like when I’m writing the acknowledgements. While the elation is certainly escalating 
at the prospect of having a new title, the thought of it being over and done with is taking something 
away from it. There are a large number of people to whom I owe gratitude for their support through this 
journey. It’s certainly not an easy thing to single out to thank everyone who matter, I genuinely hope I 
will not have missed anyone. 
 The two people at the forefront of it all and the most deserving, my mentors and guardians during 
the process, are Arjun Bedi and Ellen van de Poel. When I first started, the learning curve was much 
steeper than I had anticipated. All PhD candidates, more or less, go through various “crises” during these 
four years. For me, most the “crises” occurred early on and Ellen bore the brunt of it. I genuinely can’t 
thank you enough for the time and the effort you put in to get me through it (including prompt replies 
to my innumerable and sometimes inane emails at even 12 in the morning!). You were also a big source 
of support outside the PhD, especially after Iyana was born. As for Arjun, you have really taught me how 
to deal with the various nuances of not only academia, but the softer side of things such as dealing with 
sometimes difficult and convoluted situations. Lastly and somewhat off topic, I have never mentioned 
this as it’s quite obvious, but I’m in awe of your writing and I really aspire to be as skilful as you someday. 
Thank you both again for not only giving me the opportunity to pursue this degree but also steadfastly 
guiding me through it. 
 While the PhD is a lonely business on principle, I had the good fortune of being able to work 
with a number of people from different countries. Thanks to David Dror and Pradeep Panda from the 
Micro Insurance Academy for having me over in Delhi on multiple occasions and to all the colleagues 
there who presented me with exciting learning experiences. I want to single out two people, Arpita 
Chaktabarti and Sunil Saroj. If you guys weren’t there, I’m not sure how well I might have survived those 
gruelling months in the villages of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. We really did have a lot of fun, especially the 
post-survey biryanis!
 Thanks to the Research and Evaluation Division of BRAC for allowing me to use their data (especially 
to the data collection team and field staff ) and to my colleagues at both the Impact Assessment and 
Economics units, notably Andrew Jenkins and Narayan Das for all your support before and during this 
process. I also want to take this opportunity to mention Dr. Mahabub Hussain, who recently passed away. 
Not only was he a great resource and leader for BRAC, but also a great mentor who always encouraged 
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